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Introduction
NELSON L. DAWSON
Louis D. Brandeis is a figure of perennial significance. Brilliant
lawyer, innovative reformer, seminal thinker, and judicial
giant, Brandeis merits all the scholarly attention he received
during his lifetime and in the years since his death in 1941.
Historiography does not always follow a predictable pattern.
Subjects long neglected suddenly come into vogue while
popular topics are strangely ignored. But whatever the causes
of historiographical fluctuation-and they are undoubtedly
complex-it is clear that Brandeis has always attracted con-
siderable academic attention and that we are in a particularly
productive phase of Brandeis scholarship.
The first era in Brandeis studies culminated in the publi-
cation of Alpheus T. Mason's 1946 biography Brandeis: A Free
Man's Life. Mason's judicious work was based largely on the
sources available during Brandeis's lifetime; some were bal-
anced and some were uncritically laudatory. Mason's book,
valuable as it has been, suffers from some of the defects char-
acteristic of biographies written close to the life spans of their
subjects. It is not surprising that the book becomes weaker
during the description of the latter part of Brandeis's career.
Mason's coverage of the New Deal years is cursory, and there
is also an inevitable lack of historical perspective. However,
none of these defects detract from the work's valuable pio-
neering contribution.
The period from 1946 to 1971 is a transitional era in Brandeis
scholarship, characterized most notably perhaps by a number
of memoirs of Brandeis by former law clerks, other close as-
sociates, and various New Deal figures. Most of these works
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are positive, but some, particularly by New Deal rivals such
as Rexford Tugwell, are unfavorable.
The third stage of Brandeis scholarship began in 1971 with
the publication of his letters, which are being edited by David
W. Levy and Melvin I. Urofsky; two additional volumes are
forthcoming. The year 1971 was also the year Urofsky's semi-
nal survey of Brandeis's thought, A Mind of One Piece: Brandeis
and American Reform, was published. These works and the
availability of new manuscript sources have contributed to a
steady increase in the number of new books, including several
full-length biographies, as well as to a burgeoning periodical
literature.
This latest phase of Brandeis scholarship has not only re-
sulted in a steady expansion of knowledge about Brandeis
and his career but also generated productive debate over sev-
eral key issues relating to his significance.
There is the mystery of Brandeis's personality. While it
would clearly be an exaggeration to describe him as Winston
Churchill once described the Soviet Union-"a riddle
wrapped in a mystery"-it is true that there remains much
to be learned about his inner life. The more recent biographies
by Leonard Baker, Lewis J. Paper, and Philippa Strum have
helped to dispel some of the mystery, but they have not elim-
inated it altogether.
Brandeis's economic views-best characterized by his life-
long opposition to "bigness"-have been criticized by earlier
conservatives who denounced them as evidence of his hos-
tility to corporate America and by New Deal liberals who
dismissed them as evidence of a nostalgic Jeffersonianism
locked in Quixotic combat with the exigencies of twentieth-
century business evolution. More recent scholars, notably
Thomas K. McCraw, have moved beyond these earlier cate-
gories to subject Brandeis's economic philosophy to a search-
ing analysis by calling into question the adequacy of his grasp
of the varieties of corporate structure and their implications
for economic policy. The debate on Brandeis's economic phi-
losophy continues.
Perhaps the most significant of the current issues in Bran-
deis scholarship-and certainly the one that has received the
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greatest attention-is the question of judicial propriety. The
remarkable range of Brandeis's political activities before his
1916 Supreme Court appointment has long been understood.
The extent of his extrajudicial activities after 1916, however,
has received less attention. Brandeis's contemporaries, both
associates and rivals, knew of at least some of his activities,
and later scholars began supplying more details. The issue,
which had never been wholly neglected, came into promi-
nence in 1982 with the publication of Bruce A. Murphy's The
Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection: The Secret Political Activities of
Two Supreme Court Justices. The critical tone of the book, rein-
forced by the publisher's sensationalistic marketing efforts,
ensured that it would stimulate a reevaluation of Brandeis's
extrajudicial activities, particularly during the New Deal, as
well as an intense debate over the validity of Murphy's view
of Brandeis and Frankfurter.
There are other aspects of Brandeis's career that are re-
ceiving renewed attention as well. His relationship to the Pro-
gressive movement is subject to continual study as historians
seek to grapple with the bewildering variety of Brandeis's
reform activities in the context of an ongoing debate over the
nature of progressivism. Brandeis's relationship to Zionism
is another intriguing subject that bears on the mystery of his
personality, particularly the nature of his ethnic identity. In
the light of all these issues clamoring for renewed attention,
one is almost tempted to take his judicial accomplishments
for granted, and yet this subject has by no means been ex-
hausted.
This is clearly a dynamic period in Brandeis studies. The
present collection of essays is particularly timely because it
offers a fresh examination of the current issues. It is offered
not only as a useful assessment of current scholarship but also
in the hope that it will help stimulate further study. Even a
superficial glance at the titles of the essays in this book reveals
the range of Brandeis's interests-from general involvement
in social and economic reform to intense concern with con-
stitutional issues, Zionism, progressivism, and the New Deal.
It is difficult to think of any major area of American life, with
the exception of diplomacy, in which Brandeis was not deeply
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engaged. A profound consistency of social philosophy under-
girded his varied activities; and yet if he had-in the memo-
rable phrase used to describe this intellectual unity-a mind
of one piece, he was also, as the diversity of these essays
demonstrates, a man of many parts.
The essays in this book were originally presented as papers
at the Brandeis Conference held in Louisville, Kentucky, on
April 23-24, 1987. The conference, sponsored by the National
Endowment for the Humanities, came from the efforts of the
staff of the University of Louisville Archives. Dwayne Cox
headed the grant application process and was assisted by
Janet B. Hodgson and Cynthia Stevenson under the super-
vision of university archivist William J. Morison. The Filson
Club, headed by presidents Ronald R. Van Stockum and C.
Hayden Edwards and director James R. Bentley, offered the
collected papers to The University Press of Kentucky as a
member of the Press consortium. Valuable support and coun-
sel were also provided by the publications advisory committee
of The Filson Club's board of directors, consisting of Philip
P. Ardery, Kenneth Cherry, John S. Moremen, and John Ed
Pearce.
Chronology
JANET B. HODGSON
1856 Nov. 13 Born, Louisville, Kentucky
1872 May Brandeis family leaves for three-year stay in Eu-
rope
1873 Sept. Enrolls in Annen-Realschule, Dresden, Ger-
many
1875 May Returns to United States
Sept. Enrolls in Harvard Law School
1877 June Graduates Harvard Law School, first in class
Sept. Begins one year of graduate study at Harvard
1878 Sept. Begins law practice in St. Louis, Missouri, with
James Taussig
1879 July Begins Boston law partnership with Samuel D.
Warren
1882 Sept. Teaches course on evidence at Harvard Law
School
1886 Sept. Organizes and becomes secretary of Harvard
Law School Association
1889 Nov. Argues first case before United States Supreme
Court
1890 Dec. Writes "Right to Privacy" article with Warren,
published in Harvard Law Review
1891 March 23 Marries Alice Goldmark
1892 Fall Teaches courses on business law at Massachusetts
Institute of Technology
1893 Feb. 27 First daughter, Susan, born
1896 April 25 Second daughter, Elizabeth, born
1897 Jan. 1 Law firm changes name to Brandeis, Dunbar,
and Nutter
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1900 March Leads fight for preservation of municipal sub-
way systems when Boston builds Washington Street
subway
Summer Joins Edward A. Filene and others in for-
mation of Public Franchise League
1903 March Helps organize the Good Government Associa-
tion
1904 April 21 Addresses Boston Typothetae on industrial
relations
1905 April 18 Retained as counsel to New England Policy-
Holders' Committee
May 4 Addresses Harvard Ethical Society, "The Op-
portunity in the Law"
Oct. 26 Addresses Boston Commercial Club, "Life In-
surance: The Abuses and the Remedies"
Nov. 28 Addresses New Century Club, "What Loyalty
Demands"
1906 Nov.26 Massachusetts Savings Bank Insurance League
organized
1907 June 26 Massachusetts Savings Bank Life Insurance bill
signed into law
Oct. 19 Refuses chance to run for mayor of Boston
Nov. Publishes "How Boston Solved the Gas Prob-
lem," in American Review of Reviews
1908 Jan. 15 Argues Muller v. Oregon before the United
States Supreme Court
Feb. 11 Addresses New England Dry Goods Associa-
tion, Boston, "The New England Transportation Mo-
nopoly"
May 8 Presents an antimerger bill to the Massachusetts
legislature
1909 June 19 Publishes "Boston and Maine Pensions," in
The Survey
1910 Jan. 7 Retained by Colliers as counsel in Ballinger
case
May 27-28 Summation in Ballinger case
July 21 Enters New York Garment Workers' strike as
negotiator
Aug. Agrees to become counsel for the Committee of
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Commercial Organizations to oppose advanced freight
rates
Sept. 2 Garment Workers' Protocol agreement signed
Dec. Formation of National Progressive Republican
League
1911 Jan. 17 Presents argument before Inter'state Commerce
Commission in the Advanced Freight Rate case
March 27 Addresses Economic Club of New York,
"New Conception of Industrial Efficiency"
April 2 Addresses Boston Central Labor Union, "Or-
ganized Labor and Efficiency"
June 10 Publishes "The Road to Social Efficiency," in
The Outlook
Sept. Endorses Robert LaFollette, Sr., as presidential
candidate
Nov. 28 Publishes "Using Other People's Money," in
New York American
1912 June 19 Speaks at Brown University, "Business-A
Profession"
July 10 Endorses Woodrow Wilson for president
Aug.28 Conference with Woodrow Wilson at Sea Girt,
New Jersey
Sept. Begins campaign speaking tour for Wilson
Sept. 14 Publishes "Trusts, Efficiency, and the New
Party," in Colliers
Sept. 21 Publishes "Trusts, the Export Trade, and the
New Party," in Colliers
1913 April 7 Offered chairmanship of United States Com-
mission on Industrial Relations by President Wilson
May 19 Declines chairmanship of Commission on In-
dustrial Relations
July 18 Joins executive committee of Federation of
American Zionists
Nov. 22 Publishes first article on "Breaking the Money
Trust," in Harper's
1914 Aug. 30 Accepts chairmanship of Provisional Execu-
tive Committee on General Zionist Affairs
Dec.16-17 Argues Oregon minimum wage case before
Supreme Court
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Books published, Other People's Money and Business-A
Profession
1915 April 6 Gives talk on literacy test at New Century Club
April25 Addresses Eastern Council of Reform Rabbis,
"The Jewish Problem and How to Solve It"
July 5 Gives talk at Faneuil Hall, Boston, "True Ameri-
canism"
1916 Jan.3 Addresses Chicago Bar Association, "The Living
Law"
Jan. 24 Speaks at Carnegie Hall, New York, "Jewish
Rights and the Congress"
Jan.28 Nominated by Woodrow Wilson to the United
States Supreme Court
June 1 United States Senate confirms nomination of
Brandeis to Supreme Court
Aug. 10 Asked by Wilson to serve on Mexican arbi-
tration commission; Brandeis declines
1917 April 23 Meets Arthur Balfour to discuss possible Brit-
ish mandate over Palestine
1918 May 25 Proposes reorganization of American Zionist
movement
1919 June 14 Sails for England
July 8 Arrives in Palestine
Aug. Attends Zionist meetings in London
1920 June 13 Sails for London and World Zionist conference
July 7 Addresses World Zionist conference, "The Up-
building of Palestine"
Aug. 29 Addresses Executive Committee of Zionist Or-
ganization of America, "Review of the London Confer-
ence"
1921 April 26 Meets Albert Einstein
June 5-7 Attends Zionist convention in Cleveland,
Ohio
June 19 Resigns honorary presidency of World Zionist
Organization
Dec. 19 Dissents in Truax and American Lumber cases
before the Court
1922 April Daughter Susan opens law office in New York
City
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1924 Sept. 24 Begins donations of books and pamphlets to
the University of Louisville Library
1925 July 2 Daughter Elizabeth marries Paul Raushenbush
Oct. 25 Daughter Susan becomes first woman to argue
case before the Supreme Court
Dec. 30 Daughter Susan marries Jacob Gilbert
1926 Nov.2 First grandchild, Louis Brandeis Gilbert, is born
Nov. 13 Celebrates his 70th birthday
1927 May 16 Dissents in Whitney case
Aug. 22 Turns down last-minute appeal in Sacco and
Vanzetti case
1928 May 28 Dissents in Quaker City Cab case
June 4 Dissents in Olmstead case
Aug. 8 Brother Alfred dies
1929 Nov. 29 Makes first public Zionist appearance since
1921
1930 July 1 BrandeislMack slate elected by Zionist Organi-
zation of America
1932 March 21 Dissents in New State Ice Company case
1934 June 7 Meets with President Roosevelt on unemploy-
ment compensation bill
1936 Nov. 13 Celebrates his 80th birthday
1939 Feb. 13 Resigns from the Supreme Court
1941 Oct. 1 Suffers heart attack
Oct. 5 Brandeis dies
1945 Oct. 12 Alice Goldmark Brandeis dies
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The Propriety of Brandeis's
Extrajudicial Conduct
DAVID J. DANELSKI
The first scholarly work to consider extensively Louis D. Bran-
deis's extrajudicial activity was Alpheus T. Mason's Brandeis:
A Free Man's Life. l Published in 1946, it portrayed Brandeis
as a modern hero-a "crusader," a "cloistered warrior," a
"prophet," and a "stickler for proprieties."2 It also portrayed
him as an off-the-bench activist who drafted provisions for
party platforms, advised President Wilson and members of
his administration, provided leadership to the Zionist move-
ment, suggested topics to journal editors for articles on policy
matters, and influenced the policy views of those in power. 3
Mason never questioned the propriety of any of those activi-
ties, but he did provide explicit and tacit justifications for
Brandeis's conduct.
Mason's discussion of Brandeis's advice in the appoint-
ment of William G. McAdoo as director general of railroads
in 1917 illustrates explicit justification. In December of that
year, Joseph P. Tumulty, the president's secretary, asked
Interstate Commerce Commissioner Robert W. Wooley to
seek Brandeis's support of McAdoo. According to Mason,
Brandeis was sympathetic but "flatly refused to go to the
White House in McAdoo's behalf."4 Mason then reported:
"What if the President were to ask you to come?" Tu-
multy inquired. "That would be a command, and I
should obey," the Justice replied.
It was then agreed that Tumulty would take up the
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matter with the President and that Brandeis might ex-
pect an invitation from the President to call at the White
House the following Sunday afternoon. At 4:45 P.M.,
Sunday, December 9, no word having come from the
President, the Justice telephoned Wooley that he was at
a loss as to what to do. Wooley promptly notified Tu-
multy, who said that he had discussed the matter with
Wilson the day before, that his reaction to the suggested
invitation had been favorable, and a memorandum had
been placed on his desk.
"You see, Bob," Tumulty explained, "Woodrow Wil-
son is Scotch-Irish. When the Irish in him is on the job,
he is wonderful. The Scotch seems to have the upper
hand today."
At exactly 5 P.M. the President himself, accompanied
by two Secret Service men, appeared unannounced at
the Justice's apartment. "I could not request you to come
to me," Wilson explained, "and I have therefore come
to you to ask your advice."s
Mason concluded his report with this statement. "The Presi-
dent, like Brandeis, deemed it improper to ask a justice of the
Supreme Court to the White House on a matter necessarily
political. After a conference of about three-quarters of an
hour, the President thanked Brandeis, told him he would
appoint McAdoo, and left. Both men had exhibited a high
conception of the proprieties of judicial office.,,6
Mason's discussion of Brandeis's participation in drafting
a partisan political statement (called "The Document") illus-
trates tacit justification. In the early twenties, Brandeis kept
in close touch with ex-President Wilson, who, broken politi-
cally and physically, had withdrawn to his home in Wash-
ington. At Wilson's request, Brandeis met with a group of
loyal Wilson supporters for the purpose of formulating prin-
ciples upon which the Democratic party might make a come-
back in 1924. "By April 9, 1922," wrote Mason, "Wilson had
assembled the group's several pieces into a single document
nearly seven pages long. It was a ringing manifesto for an
American conception of social justice. To Wilson it was 'sat-
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isfactory'-'a very clear and self-consistent document.' Re-
publican leadership was bitterly denounced as the 'most
partisan, prejudiced, and unpatriotic coterie that ever misled
the Senate of the United States; . . . the country will never
be restored to its merited prestige until their work is undone.'
A clarion call went out to the Democratic party to return the
country to prestige."7 Mason suggested that Brandeis partici-
pated in the drafting of the partisan statement because of
affection for Wilson. Moreover, Brandeis's responses to Wil-
son, wrote Mason, were "confidential" and "usually stated
in general terms," and Brandeis counseled against using the
statement in the election campaign of 1922.8 "Ammunition
so potent should not be dissipated," Brandeis told Wilson.
"You have taught us the lesson of watchful waiting.,,9
Mason's portrayal of Brandeis as observing not only the
normal strictures of judicial propriety but gratuitously en-
larging them remained the conventional image of the justice
for a quarter of a century. In 1971, however, Melvin I. Urofsky
criticized Brandeis's participation in drafting "The Docu-
ment" as improper. "The country would have been rightly
upset," wrote Urofsky, "if it had discovered a Supreme Court
Justice working to draft a party platform in order to get Demo-
crats in power."IO
Urofsky's charge of impropriety was mild compared to
Bruce Allen Murphy's charges in 1982. The most serious of
Murphy's charges were that Brandeis had threatened to hold
legislation unconstitutional if his policy views were not fol-
lowed by the Roosevelt administration and that Brandeis,
while on the Supreme Court, had paid Felix Frankfurter a
substantial annual stipend for political activities to further
Brandeis's policy goals. II The New York Times regarded the
latter charge important enough for front-page coverage and
a critical editorial. "[T]he Brandeis-Frankfurter arrangement,"
stated the Times, "was wrong. It serves neither history nor
ethics to judge it more kindly.... [T]he prolonged, meddle-
some Brandeis-Frankfurter arrangement violates ethical stan-
dards.,'12
Since 1982, Lewis J. Paper, Philippa Strum, Leonard Baker,
and David C. Gross published book-length biographies of
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Brandeis. 13 Each dealt with one or more of the charges made
by Urofsky and Murphy. As to Brandeis's participation in
drafting "The Document," Paper wrote that "Brandeis cer-
tainly knew that most people would have frowned on his
collaboration with Wilson on a political matter." But Paper
thought that Brandeis's actions had been "discreet." There
had been "no speeches, no press releases, just some corre-
spondence and some private meetings, most of them at Wil-
son's house on S Street in northwest Washington."14 Paper
discussed the Brandeis-Frankfurter financial arrangement in
more detail. He acknowledged that in the post-Watergate era,
there was merit to the view that the arrangement would give
the appearance of impropriety. "But," he added, "Brandeis
and Frankfurter lived in a different time. For them, the fi-
nancial support did not reflect an employer-employee rela-
tionship. More than anything, it symbolized the close
emotional and intellectual bond between the two men. ,,15 Af-
ter further discussion of Murphy's charge, Paper concluded
that the Brandeis-Frankfurter financial arrangement was not
improper.
Strum was more critical of Brandeis's participation in the
drafting of "The Document." She thought the correspondence
between Brandeis and Wilson on the matter was important
because of the light "it sheds on the difficulty Brandeis had
containing himself within the traditional boundaries of judi-
cial ethics.,,16 Overall, Strum was more troubled by Brandeis's
extrajudicial activities than any of Brandeis's recent biogra-
phers. Near the end of her book, she concluded ambivalently:
"Brandeis seems to have been both unethical and honest: he
immersed himself in the formulation of policy in a most un-
judicial manner, but he judged the cases that came before him
according to the legal principles he enunciated publicly."17
Baker thought that Brandeis's participation in the drafting
of "The Document" was "one of his few judicial 'indiscre-
tions.' ,,18 Like Mason, Baker said that Brandeis had acted in
the matter out of affection for Wilson. Baker defended Bran-
deis's financial arrangement with Frankfurter as well as his
other extrajudicial activities. "[T]here were no rules to define
whether Brandeis's extrajudicial activities were improper,"
-Brandeis's Extrajudicial Conduct 15
wrote Baker, "only traditions which he did not push beyond
accepted bounds."19
Gross discussed only the propriety of Brandeis's financial
arrangement with Frankfurter. The arrangement, wrote
Gross, "was something that would have been frowned upon
if it had been known to the public. A judge, especially a Su-
preme Court Justice, was expected to sit high on the bench
and interpret the law. The fact that other judges engaged in
the same kind of activity does not alter the fact that Brandeis's
actions, from a strictly legal and ethical view, were question-
able."zo
In summary, the biographies after Mason's contain the fol-
lowing charges of impropriety against Brandeis:
1. Participating in the drafting of a politically partisan
document.
2. Threatening to hold legislation unconstitutional if the
executive branch did not follow his policy views.
3. Providing Frankfurter with a regular stipend for political
activities to accomplish Brandeis's policy goals.
4. Immersing himself in the formulation of executive and
legislative policy.
Before considering the propriety of Brandeis's extrajudicial
activity, it is necessary to discuss the standards used for mak-
ing such determinations. Several standards have been used
in determining the propriety of extrajudicial activity-canons
of judicial ethics, collective judicial prescriptions, individual
judicial prescriptions, public expectations, precedent, and
conscience.
In 1924, eight years after Brandeis's appointment to the
Supreme Court, the American Bar Association adopted its first
code of judicial ethics. The most specific provision in the code
dealing with extrajudicial activity was a canon that acknowl-
edged that a judge is entitled to entertain political views and
have the same rights as other citizens. But, the code added,
"it is inevitable that suspicion of being warped by political
bias will attach to a judge who becomes the active promoter
of the interests of one political party as against another. He
should avoid making political speeches, making or soliciting
payment of assessments or contributions to party funds, the
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public endorsement of candidates for political office and par-
ticipation in party conventions.,,21 Other canons plausibly re-
lated to extrajudicial activity were more general. The official
conduct of judges should be "free from impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety," and their conduct in everyday
life" should be beyond reproach" ;22 judges should do nothing
that would "justify the impression" that others might influ-
ence their impartiality;23 and judges should be careful to avoid
actions that would "awaken suspicion" that their business
relations or friendships influenced their judicial conduct.24
Although the canons lack precision, taken together, they sug-
gest that it is improper for judges to do anything that affects
their impartiality or gives the appearance of doing so.
During Brandeis's tenure on the Supreme Court, its mem-
bers collectively agreed on standards of propriety that were
more specific than the 1924 canons. The major collective pre-
scriptions were as follows:
1. No justice should be involved in any activity that even
hints of corruption. 25
2. No justice should participate in an electoral campaign. 26
3. No justice should give advice to another branch of gov-
ernment in an¥ matter that is likely to come before the Su-
preme Court. 2
4. No justice should speak publicly on any matter that is
likely to come before the Supreme Court. 28
5. No justice should give advice on executive appoint-
ments unless requested to do so.29
These prescriptions reflect a concern for avoiding extra-
judicial activity that might affect impartiality or give the ap-
pearance of affecting impartiality. To a lesser extent, they also
reflect a concern for separation of powers.
Individual justices often hold prescriptions concerning
extrajudicial activity that are more or less restrictive than the
collective prescriptions of their colleagues. Brandeis's per-
sonal code of propriety was especially stringent: no honorary
degrees, no writing of articles, no speeches, no investments
that could even remotely cause a conflict of interest, no un-
invited contacts with other branches of government, no ex-
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tensive involvement in social causes. Mason quoted Justice
Harlan F. Stone as saying that Brandeis "was strongly of the
belief that a Justice of the Court should devote himself single-
mindedly to his duties as a Justice, without undertaking to
engage in any outside activities."30 Although Brandeis oc-
casionally violated his own prescriptions, some of those de-
partures-for example, a speech on a matter not likely to come
before the Court-do not raise any question of impropriety. 31
Public expectation of propriety is a difficult standard to
apply because it is usually vague and changes over time. Yet
the standard is important because there is general agreement
that if the justices violate it, they undermine the Supreme
Court's legitimacy.32 But one must be wary of retroactive ap-
plication of the standard. As Paper pointed out, questionable
extrajudicial activity must be judged in the context of the time
in which it occurred.
The standard of precedent-what has been done may be
done-has serious problems because justices have often acted
contrary to their collective and individual prescriptions. Thus,
practically all extrajudicial activity, including questionable ac-
tivity, can be justified by precedent. At best, precedent is a
suspect standard for determining the propriety of extrajudicial
activity.
Conscience is the ultimate standard for justices who plan
to engage in extrajudicial activity. Justices may consider can-
ons of judicial ethics, collective and individual judicial pre-
scriptions, public expectations, and precedent, but only their
individual consciences can dictate their conduct in specific
instances. At times, conscience may even require extrajudicial
conduct that appears ethically questionable. 33 Conscience-
based extrajudicial activity is, I believe, entitled to the benefit
of doubt, for justices are appointed to the Supreme Court for
their ethical sensitivity as well as their legal expertise. Yet
conscience as a standard of propriety is not without problems.
I believe the standard is acceptable for determining propriety
"only when conscience is informed by a sensitive understand-
ing of the judicial function and the separation of powers. Such
a sensitive conscience would forswear not only conduct that
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would affect a justice's impartiality in the decision of cases,
but even conduct that gives the appearance that impartiality
might be affected."34 This standard captures the essence of
the relevant 1924 canons and the justices' collective prescrip-
tions during Brandeis's tenure on the Supreme Court. In ad-
dition, it is useful in determining whether individual justices'
prescriptions are too scrupulous or not scrupulous enough,
whether public expectations of propriety are too high or too
low, and whether precedents may be used in measuring extra-
judicial activity. If extrajudicial activity affects impartiality, it
is improper. If it gives the appearance of affecting impartiality,
then it is at least ethically questionable. 35
Although the requirements of proof are not the same in
history as they are in law, I believe that judicial impropriety
must be proven by primary evidence that is clear and con-
vincing. So the first question in this inquiry is whether such
evidence shows that the conduct asserted as improper oc-
curred. If it does, the next question is whether that conduct
violates an acceptable standard of propriety. These are the
questions I shall attempt to answer in discussing the four
charges of impropriety that others have made against Bran-
deis.
Participation in Drafting a Partisan Document
There is no doubt that Brandeis helped to draft a partisan
document at Wilson's request in the early twenties. Although
such action was not without precedent, it violated Brandeis's
personal code of propriety, the prescriptions of his colleagues,
and perhaps also the 1924 canons. Although Mason had dis-
cerned no impropriety in the matter, Urofsky and others have
concluded that Brandeis acted contrary to public expectations
of propriety. They may be right, but that is difficult to prove.
Brandeis appears not to have acted in violation of his con-
science. On the one hand, there were the claims of friendship
and honor to grant the request of an ailing and broken ex-
president who had appointed him to the Supreme Court; on
the other hand, there was the claim of duty not to act in a
way that would injure the Court's reputation. He resolved
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the conflicting claims by participating discreetly and confi-
dentially in drafting the partisan platform. There is no evi-
dence that his activity affected his impartiality in the decision
of any case, but his activity was so clearly political that, if
disclosed, it would have given the appearance of affecting his
impartiality. For that reason, I believe that activity must be
viewed as ethically questionable.
Threatening to Hold Legislation Unconstitutional
Murphy's assertion in 1982 that Brandeis had threatened to
declare New Deal legislation unconstitutional if the Roosevelt
administration did not follow his policy views is the most
serious charge of impropriety against Brandeis, for if sup-
ported by the evidence, it constitutes "malfeasance, perhaps
worthy of impeachment."36 Here is Murphy's assertion and
supporting evidence.
Finally exasperated, in late April 1934/ Brandeis decided
that the time for patient teaching combined with occa-
sional urgent warnings had passed. Now was the time
for nothing short of overt threats. Through Gardner
Jackson, the justice sent a message to Rexford Tugwell
and Jerome Frank that "he was declaring war" on the
New Deal. Though Tugwell was not moved by Bran-
deis's vision of the AAA, such a threat from a member
of the Supreme Court caused great consternation. So he
passed the message along directly to President Roose-
velt/ who promised to see Brandeis as soon as possible
to "butter him up some." According to Tugwell's ac-
count, the administration took this warning so seriously
that Jerome Frank "succeeded in postponing the prose-
cution of an oil code case . . . on the theory that with
Brandeis feeling as he does we ought not to take the
case up."
A previously unpublished exchange of letters discov-
ered in FOR's personal files at Hyde Park show [sic] how
far the desperate, aging justice was willing to go in play-
ing political hardball with the president. Knowing that
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all his indications of displeasure would find their way
back to the Oval Office, Brandeis also lectured Jerome
Frank and Adolf A. Berle on the issue of "bigness." This
time, though, the justice's critical assessment of the
AAA and the NRA was followed by an unmistakable
warning-which Berle immediately forwarded to Roo-
sevelt-that Brandeis "had gone along with the legislation
up to now, but that unless he could see some reversal of the
big business trend, he was disposed to hold the government
control legislation unconstitutional from then on.,,37
The italicized portion of the statement is from a letter writ-
ten by Berle to Roosevelt on April 23, 1934, which Murphy
cited. Murphy gave the impression in this passage that
Berle and Frank had heard Brandeis make the threat and that
Berle then reported to FOR what he had heard Brandeis say.
The evidence that Murphy cited does not, however, support
that interpretation. Here is the full text of Berle's letter to
FOR.
April 23, 1934
Dear Caesar:
Mr. Justice Brandeis has been revolving matters in his
head and I think requires some attention. At all events,
he stated his view to Jerome Frank the other evening,
asking to see me and Rexford Tugwell. His idea was that
we were steadily creating organisms of big business
which were growing in power, wiping out the middle
class, eliminating small business and putting themselves
in a place in which they rather than the government were
controlling the nation's destinies. He added that he had
gone along with the legislation to now; but that unless
he could see some reversal of the big business trend, he
was disposed to hold the government control legislation
unconstitutional from now on. I think also he regretted
not having had a chance to talk to you about it. He, of
course, wants drastic taxation of big business units, ac-
companied by leaving small business, via the N.R.A.,
strictly alone.
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His view, if ever stated, would command wide popu-
lar support. But as long as people want Ford cars they
are likely to have Ford factories and finance to match.
I am, as always,
Faithfully yours,
sl ADOLF A. BERLE38
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The letter reports not what Brandeis told Berle but what Berle
thought Brandeis said to Frank. Thus, Berle's statement is
hearsay. It may even be double or triple hearsay, for on April
26, 1934, Tugwell wrote in his diary: "The other day, Brandeis
sent word, in effect, that he was declaring war. It came
through Gardner Jackson to Jerry Frank and myself."39 If Tug-
well and Berle were referring to the same remarks attributed
to Brandeis-and given the dates and content of the two docu-
ments that seems to be the case-Brandeis gave his views to
Jackson, who reported them to Tugwell and Frank, who
passed them on to Berle, who then relayed them to FDR. Such
evidence, in my view, cannot be relied upon to support a
serious charge of judicial impropriety. Thus, Murphy's con-
clusion that Brandeis threatened to hold legislation uncon-
stitutional cannot be accepted as fact. 4o
Unless new direct evidence surfaces on the matter, the
verdict of history is likely to be that Brandeis was perhaps
imprudent in expressing his criticisms of the New Deal to
members of the executive branch but not that he abused the
powers of his judicial office by threatening to declare legis-
lation unconstitutional if the administration did not follow his
views. 41
The Brandeis-Frankfurter Financial Arrangement
There is solid evidence showing that Brandeis supported
Frankfurter's political activities with an annual stipend for
many years, but that evidence does not convincingly prove
Murphy's interpretation of the character, purpose, and extent
of the arrangement. That interpretation, upon which the New
York Times relied in concluding that the arrangement "was
wrong,,,42 rests essentially on three assertions.
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Murphy's first assertion was that the arrangement was con-
ceived from the beginning-that is, 1916-as "a long-term
lobbying effort" in which Frankfurter would be Brandeis's
"paid political lobbyist and lieutenant. ,,43 But the only evi-
dence Murphy cited bearing on Brandeis's intentions at the
time were two letters written to Frankfurter in 1916. In the
first, Brandeis wrote:
My Dear Felix: You have had considerable expense for
travelling, telephoning and similar expenses in public
matters undertaken at my request or following up my
suggestions & will have more in the future no doubt.
These expenses should, of course, be borne by me.
I am sending check for $250 on this account. Let me
know when it is exhausted or if it has already been.44
When Frankfurter answered that he appreciated the gesture
but could not accept the check, Brandeis wrote to him again.
My Dear Felix: Alice and I talked over the matter before
I sent the check and considered it again carefully on
receipt of your letter. We are clearly of opinion that you
ought to take the check.
In essence this is nothing different than your taking
travelling and incidental expenses from the Consumers
League or the New Republic-which I trust you do. You
are giving your very valuable time and that is quite
enough. It can make no difference that the subject matter
in connection with which expense is incurred is more
definite in one case than in the other.
I ought to feel free to make suggestions to you, al-
though they involved some incidental expense. And you
should feel free to incur expense in the public interest.
So I am returning the check. 45
The letters do not support the interpretation that Brandeis
and Frankfurter envisioned "a long-term lobbying effort."
Brandeis did not specify the nature of the activi,ties for which
Frankfurter's expenses would be paid; he said only that those
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activities were to be "in the public interest." Further, prac-
tically all of Brandeis's requests to Frankfurter from 1916 to
1920 that Murphy reports concerned Zionist activities. Thus,
the most plausible interpretation of the Brandeis-Frankfurter
arrangement's purpose, at least until the twenties, is the one
that Urofsky and Levy gave in 1975: "LDB set up an expense
fund for Frankfurter's use, so that the law school professor
would not have to bear the costs of his Zionist work.,,46
Murphy's second assertion was that Brandeis made annual
payments to Frankfurter from 1916 to 1938 and that the
amounts increased as the expenses of their political activities
rose. Murphy stated, "In mid-1917 [Brandeis] placed $1,000
in the special account, and then replenished that amount in
each of the next seven years.,,47 In 1925, according to Murphy,
Frankfurter received $1,500, and thereafter, until 1938, he re-
ceived $3,500 per year. 48
The letters Murphy cited, however, show a different pic-
ture. In 1917 Brandeis had sent Frankfurter a check for $1,000
as a contribution to a memorial fund for a friend who had
died. When arrangements for the fund were delayed, Bran-
deis asked Frankfurter to deposit the check "in a special ac-
count & draw against it for your disbursements, past & future,
in public matters.,,49 None of the documents Murphy cited
shows payment by Brandeis to Frankfurter between 1917 and
1922. In 1922 Brandeis told Judge Julian W. Mack that he
would send Frankfurter a check for $1,000.50 This discussion
was in the context of paying for Frankfurter's expenses in
Zionist affairs. In 1923 Brandeis wrote Frankfurter and said
that he planned to send a check for $1,000 to defray Frank-
furter's disbursements in public affairs, 51 "unless you and
Marion [Frankfurter's wife] object."52
In 1925 Frankfurter wrote Brandeis about a personal finan-
cial problem. 53 Two years earlier his wife had suffered a ner-
vous breakdown, and therapy required an additional annual
expenditure of $1,500. He told Brandeis he could make that
amount easily doing odd jobs for New York lawyer friends,
but he begrudged the time it would take from intrinsically
more important work. The following was Brandeis's response:
"I am glad you wrote me about the personal needs and I'll
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send the $1,500 now or in installments as you may prefer.
Your public service must not be abridged. Marion knows that
Alice and I look upon you as half brother, half son.,,54
This evidence tends to negate the existence of any regular
financial connection before October 1925; payments from
Brandeis to Frankfurter up to that time were ad hoc and rep-
resented reimbursement for expenditures already made. It
was only beginning in late 1925 that Brandeis consistently
made payments to Frankfurter of $3,500 per year-usually
$2,000 in January and $1,500 in October; there were also oc-
casional additional payments for special projects. 55
The wills of Louis and Alice Brandeis, which Murphy ap-
parently failed to examine, reinforce an interpretation, sug-
gested by the above letter, that the stipend had the dual
purpose of advancing the public good and helping a close
friend in need. The principal legatees in Mrs. Brandeis's will
were her daughters, Susan and Elizabeth, and Frankfurter;
each was to receive $50,000. Mrs. Brandeis also provided gen-
erously for other relatives and friends, but none was to receive
more than $25,000. Justice Brandeis's own will at the time also
ranked Frankfurter among relatives, and Frankfurter was the
only person in the will whom Brandeis designated "my
friend." Brandeis gave Frankfurter the same percentage of his
estate as he gave his brother, Alfred, his nephew, Louis B.
Wehle, and his wife's sisters, Pauline and Josephine Gold-
mark, and made all of the gifts for the same purpose: "to
enable them the more freely to devote time to the public ser-
vice.,,56 In addition, both Louis and Alice Brandeis charac-
terized payments of Frankfurter's stipend as gifts.
Murphy's third assertion was that the arrangement was
secret, that is, deliberately hidden from public view. 57 He
provided no evidence for this assertion. Instead, he argued
that the stipend was secret because he could find nothing to
indicate either that Brandeis's colleagues on the Supreme
Court knew of the arrangement or that any other person ex-
cept Judge Mack knew of it. 58 But even if Brandeis did not
tell his colleagues on the Court of the stipend, that fact does
not necessarily imply that he was hiding it. Certainly, his
failure to disclose his simultaneous contributions to various
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educational institutions, causes, friends, and relatives did not
suggest that he was hiding those contributions. 59 None of the
documents mentioning the payments to Frankfurter indicates
that the arrangement was secret. Further, there is evidence
that persons other than Mack knew that Brandeis had been
helping Frankfurter financially. 60
Thus, the arrangement was not, as Murphy suggests, sin-
ister. But it is true that Brandeis told Frankfurter in 1927 that
the stipend was being paid to him "for our joint endeavors
through you."61 And some of those endeavors involved mat-
ters likely to come before the Supreme Court. 62 Thus, even
though the evidence does not convincingly prove Murphy's
assertions in their entirety, it does raise a serious question
about the propriety of the Brandeis-Frankfurter arrangement.
The arrangement was unprecedented. Chief Justice Wil-
liam H. Taft sometimes used intermediaries for political pur-
poses, but that was done ad hoc and involved no payment. 63
So precedent as a standard provides no clear answer to the
question of propriety. Nor do judicial collective prescriptions,
for there was no prescription concerning the matter. It ap-
pears that the arrangement did not violate Brandeis's indi-
vidual prescriptions. His personal code of propriety
concerning his assistance to Frankfurter was apparently the
same as for his activity concerning Zionism-that he do no
more than "(1) to think on the main problems of the cause;
(2) to give moral support; and (3) to give financial support.,,64
It also appears that the arrangement was not a violation of
conscience, for apparently Brandeis's motives were to help a
friend in need and at the same time advance the public good.
Brandeis may have violated the public-expectation stan-
dard in his financial arrangement with Frankfurter. The New
York Times's strong negative reaction to the arrangement in
1982 provides some support for that view, but it must be
remembered that the Times's reaction was based on Murphy's
exaggerated account of the matter and that public expectations
of judicial propriety were stricter in the eighties than they
were in the twenties and thirties. Although Brandeis's im-
partiality never seems to have been compromised and his
payments to Frankfurter apparently never affected the deci-
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sion of any case,65 such conduct creating the appearance of
a possible compromise of impartiality raises questions of im-
propriety. I do not conclude, as the Times did, that the Bran-
deis-Frankfurter financial relationship was "wrong," but I do
believe it was ethically questionable.
Immersion in the Formulation of Policy
Finally, Strum's conclusion that Brandeis had immersed him-
self in the formulation of legislative policy "in a most un-
judicial manner" is supported by clear and convincing
primary evidence.66 Strum focused particularly on Brandeis's
activity during the New Deal. Her best example was Bran-
deis's involvement in formulating and enacting the unem-
ployment insurance provisions of the Social Security Act of
1935. That involvement began in the summer of 1933. Bran-
deis, his daughter Elizabeth, and her husband Paul Raush-
enbush discussed how federal legislation might be used to
encourage the states to provide unemployment compensa-
tion. "Have you considered," asked Brandeis, "the case of
Florida v. Mellon?" Slowly they grasped the point of his ques-
tion: The case provided constitutional justification for legis-
lation they wanted. Florida v. Mellon had upheld a federal law
that permitted the use of state inheritance taxes as a credit
against federal inheritance taxes. 67 On September 16, 1933,
Brandeis wrote his daughter Elizabeth setting forth his views
for a national unemployment insurance plan. "F.D. [Roose-
velt]," Brandeis wrote, "indicated to F.F. [Frankfurter] a de-
sire to talk with me generally on matters, before Court
convenes. If he carries out his purpose, I want to discuss
irregularity of employment with him. Let me have as soon as
possible your & Paul's views as to the above; &, if you can,
a rough suggestion for a bill.,,68 Brandeis then formulated a
plan based on Florida v. Mellon; he suggested "a federal payroll
tax on employers, from which they could deduct whatever
amount they were paying into state unemployment plans."69
Later in the fall the Raushenbushes met with Charles Wy-
zanski, Tom Corcoran, and other young New Dealers and
liberal business leaders to discuss Brandeis's plan. 7o During
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the Christmas holidays, they met with A. Lincoln Filene,
Frances Perkins, and Sen. Robert A. Wagner to organize a
campaign "in support of the Brandeis idea.,,71 When Roo-
sevelt decided to delay consideration of the bill, Brandeis saw
the president about the matter. In a letter marked "Strictly
Confidential," Brandeis wrote to his daughter Elizabeth:
"Don't be discouraged by the President's message. He sum-
moned me yesterday & when I reached him at 4:45 P.M. he
had in his hands his message & started to read it to me. When
he came to the part on social insurance, I stopped him, told
him it was all wrong, & for about 3/4 hour discussed that
question & I think I convinced him of the error. He said the
message had already gone to the Capitol & it was too late to
change that; but it would not commit him to means, etc. I
have left some efficient friends in Washington, who are to
work for the true faith during the summer.,,72 Congress en-
acted the bill, and the president signed it on August 15, 1935.
Brandeis's advice to FOR violated neither the standards of
precedent nor conscience. Other justices had given similar
advice to presidents and cabinet members, and there is little
doubt that Brandeis believed he had acted properly.73 But it
did violate the justices' collective prescription, as well as Bran-
deis's own prescription, against giving advice in a matter
likely to come before the Court, and Strum apparently
thought it had violated the public-expectation standard. 74 Wil-
liam o. Douglas, however, believed that Brandeis's advising
of presidents on policy was not improper, for if it "caused
any collision with future judicial decisions . . . , [Brandeis]
would have been the first to suggest that [he] not sit.,,75 But
Brandeis did not disqualify himself when the constitutionality
of the unemployment compensation insurance program was
challenged in Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis,76 and the Court
upheld the program by a five-to-four vote.
Was Brandeis's participation in Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis
improper? Under the 1924 canons, it would have been if his
conduct gave the appearance of impropriety. 77 His partici-
pation appears to have violated the collective prescriptions of
at least some of his colleagues in the thirties. 78 But precedent
can be cited for Brandeis's participation in the case. 79 Pre-
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sumably, Brandeis's failure to disqualify himself did not vio-
late his conscience, and there is no evidence that his
impartiality had been compromised. However, his partici-
pation in the case showed an insensitivity to the separation
of powers and gave the appearance that his impartiality might
be affected, for Brandeis had formulated the legislation, in-
dicated that he thought it was constitutional, encouraged oth-
ers to support it, and advised the president to enact it.
Further, at Brandeis's request, Frankfurter had supported the
legislation in both the White House and Congress while re-
ceiving a regular stipend from Brandeis for such activities. 80
Thus, Brandeis's participation in Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis
appears to have been at least ethically questionable. 81
This inquiry suggests the following observations:
First, I doubt that Brandeis ever thought his extrajudicial
activity was improper. His sense of rectitude was extraordi-
nary. I do not agree with the suggestion of the New York Times
that Brandeis was morally arrogant. 82 Morally autonomous is
a better description. Frankfurter once wrote that Brandeis
"had the utmost attainable intellectual and moral au-
tonomy."83 Brandeis's primary standard for action was his
own conscience. If he believed he was right, that settled the
matter for him, no matter what others might think. Lewis
Paper agrees. In a letter written after the publication of his
biography of Brandeis, Paper wrote that "Brandeis had an
incredible self-confidence that blinded him to ethical consid-
erations that might have deterred another attorney. . . . He
was so sure of himself, so convinced of the purity of his dedi-
cation to the public interest, that he could not see conflicts
that seem so obvious to the outside."84
Second, Brandeis deeply respected the Court as an insti-
tution; thus, he tried to avoid activity that would negatively
affect its reputation. That was the reason for his quiet, con-
fidential, discreet, behind-the-scenes approach when he acted
extrajudicially. The event that underlay his approach was a
public address he made at a Zionist meeting in New York in
1916, less than two months after his appointment to the Su-
preme Court. His opponents openly attacked him at the meet-
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ing. One of them shook his finger at Brandeis saying that the
Jewish people would repudiate him. Another cried out/
"There are higher things than the Supreme Court of the
United States!,,85 Two days later, the New York Times censured
Brandeis for participating publicly in the controversial meet-
ing. As a justice, said the Times, Brandeis had an obligation
"to withdraw from any activities of a political or social na-
ture . . . and avoid all controversies or commitments which
might seem in any degree to affect their judicial impartiality
of mind."86 Stung by the double attack, Brandeis resigned his
formal positions in the Zionist movement. "If I were a private
citizen, and concerned only personally/" he told a fellow Zi-
onist/ "I should, for the sake of our cause, ignore the attack,
as I did so many times in the past in the course of other public
work. But I feel that respect for the high Court, of which I
am a member, and therefore also the future of our cause,
demands that so far as humanly possible I should guard
against the repetition of such events.,,87 And he did. Bran-
deis's reaction to the attacks for the New York address in 1916
appears to be the origin of his personal prescription against
public speeches and his sub rosa approach to extrajudicial ac-
tivities/ including his financial arrangement with Frankfurter.
Third, Brandeis's questionable extrajudicial activity will not
significantly diminish his place in history. He will remain the
modern hero originally portrayed in Mason's biography. To
some, he will be a hero with chinks in his armor. To others,
he will be a misunderstood prophet. To his successors on the
Supreme Court, the ethical problems raised by his off-the-
bench political conduct will quite likely be a lesson in the perils
of such conduct.
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Brandeis and the New Deal
NELSON L. DAWSON
In late 1932 Louis D. Brandeis was a seventy-six-year-old Su-
preme Court justice and political activist who was eagerly
anticipating a new age of reform. The exhilarating days of
Woodrow Wilson's first term, when Brandeis had played a
significant role in shaping policy, had been followed by World
War I and a decade of Republican control. The Progressive
remnant that survived into the twenties was forced to operate
under severe constraints. 1 Franklin D. Roosevelt's election,
however, brought new hope to all reformers and gave Bran-
deis a last opportunity to influence national political policy.
Brandeis's deeply held social philosophy provided the general
guidelines that governed his efforts to shape New Deal policy
while an awareness of his own finitude undoubtedly spurred
his efforts. 2
Brandeis's social philosophy can be understood only in the
context of his intense moral convictions. While he had little
apparent interest in formal theology, he had a deep commit-
ment to an austere Biblical morality; there was good reason
for Roosevelt to call him "lsaiah."3 At times this stance led
to unlikely alliances. Concerned over the decadence of the
twenties, he once urged William Jennings Bryan, whom he
called "the preacher of righteousness," to "wage a crusade
for decency and righteousness."4
Brandeis had advocated many reforms since his early days
as the "People's Attorney," but his varied activities are gen-
erally explicable by his denunciation of "the curse of bigness."
He believed that enduring reform could only occur if both
business and government were reduced to manageable size
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as had been attempted during Wilson's first term. Brandeis's
opposition to bigness drew fire from contemporary critics who
accused him of trying to "turn the clock back."s Nevertheless,
over the years Brandeis's economic views have been accorded
a generally sympathetic hearing. His opposition to the trusts,
his emphasis on competition, and his concern for small busi-
nessmen have placed him firmly in the Progressive tradition.
More recently, however, his views have been criticized.
Thomas K. McCraw has subjected them to a particularly
trenchant analysis.
McCraw asserts that Brandeis never really understood the
nature of big business, that he did not distinguish between
various kinds of trusts, and that his opposition to bigness was
an idee fixe that "contributed to the institutionalization of a
confused and contradictory regulatory program, one that
stood almost no chance of working.,,6 McCraw accuses Bran-
deis of an elitist position that did not favor consumers but
rather the small shopkeepers "in their war against large, price-
cutting retailers." He opposed large, integrated firms in favor
of the inefficient smaller companies as much for political and
ideological reasons as for economic reasons. Furthermore,
McCraw concludes, his program for decentralization would
"likely have required nothing short of authoritarian action by
the state."7
This is a formidable indictment and one that deserves a
more extended analysis than it can receive here. Certainly,
Brandeis remained unalterably opposed to bigness as a first
principle. Yet he seemed surprisingly flexible on the central
question of the relationship between size and efficiency. Bran-
deis's analysis of business enterprise seems far more prag-
matic and sophisticated than McCraw's description would
indicate. 8 Economic analysis of this kind is difficult. While
McCraw's critique merits careful consideration, the provi-
sional conclusion seems best summed up in the old Scottish
verdict "not proven." But whatever the outcome of the cur-
rent debate over the validity of Brandeis's economic perspec-
tive might be, the fact is that this perspective is what provided
the framework in which he evaluated specific New Deal poli-
cies.
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Brandeis was also convinced, however, that enduring re-
form depends not only on the right policies but also on their
implementation by the right people. Personnel is as important
as legislation. This belief provided the rationale for Brandeis's
intense activity as a New Deal recruiting officer. This persis-
tent, behind-the-scenes effort was not a mere quest for per-
sonal power but rather an attempt to implement the policies
he believed essential to economic recovery and political re-
form. 9
Brandeis confronted the opportunity offered by the New
Deal not only with his general and widely known social phi-
losophy but also with a specific recovery program that has
received less attention. IO Brandeis's recovery program was
Keynesian in the broad sense and was based on the conviction
that massive government spending would stimulate the
economy sufficiently to produce recovery. He advocated an
ambitious public works program consisting of projects of per-
manent value, such as soil conservation, afforestation, flood
control, and navigational improvements. Since such a pro-
gram would require enormous government spending at a time
when money was scarce, Brandeis advocated rigorous taxa-
tion of wealthy individuals and large corporations to raise the
necessary revenue. 11 This program was more conservative
than John M. Keynes's approach because it sought to avoid
deficit spending. 12 While the various elements of this program
were not original with Brandeis, he combined them in such
a way as to produce a distinctive approach to recovery that
he urged persistently throughout the New Deal years.
From Brandeis's perspective this approach had several ad-
vantages. Obviously, he believed it would produce recovery.
It would, furthermore, do so in a simple and direct manner
that was consistent with his general social philosophy. The
public works projects would become permanent national as-
sets. Many of them were intended to improve the plight of
the nation's farmers, a source of deep concern to Brandeis.
By providing jobs for the unemployed, the public works pro-
jects would maintain their self-respect as productive citizens
as well as contribute to the national welfare. Brandeis's tax
reforms reflected his belief in the curse of bigness and the
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evils of concentrated wealth. It is not surprising, therefore,
that Brandeis evaluated New Deal policy in all its bewildering
complexity by the simple standard of how it would affect the
implementation of his recovery program. This is the key to
understanding the promise and the frustration of the New
Deal from Brandeis's perspective.
There was a basic conflict within Brandeis's social philoso-
phy that he was never able to resolve. The conflict is in-
escapable for political activists who oppose a powerful central
government. Brandeis had a profound distrust of strong gov-
ernment, and he opposed the early New Deal emphasis on
central planning as it was expressed in the National Recovery
Administration (NRA) and the Agricultural Adjustment Ad-
ministration (AAA). Yet his recovery program required a pow-
erful federal government capable of launching a massive
public works program financed by heavy taxation of the rich
and powerful. Such an approach not only required a strong
government but could be expected to increase its power. Bran-
deis never resolved this conflict, but it is doubtful if he was
much troubled by it because, like all pragmatists, he was more
interested in results than in consistency. He opposed gov-
ernmental power in general, but he advocated it, if only in-
directly, when it was essential to secure the ends he thought
necessary to recovery.
Brandeis confronted the opportunity offered by Roosevelt's
election from his position on the Supreme Court, a position
he deeply valued and yet one that imposed certain constraints
on his political activism. 13 His reluctance to act directly led
him to depend on a complex network of personal contacts
within administrative circles to provide informationC!nd to
influence policy decisions. The essential link was the rela-
tionship between Brandeis, Felix Frankfurter, and Roosevelt.
Frankfurter first encountered Brandeis while a student at the
Harvard Law School in May 1905 when he heard Brandeis
speak on liThe Opportunity of the Law," a speech that dis-
cussed the contributions activist lawyers could make to the
creation of a better society.14
Brandeis and Frankfurter became friends in Washington,
D.C., in 1911 during Brandeis's business trips from Boston.
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Their friendship deepened despite Frankfurter's support of
Theodore Roosevelt during the presidential campaign of 1912
when Brandeis emerged as one of Wilson's most influential
advisers. In 1913 Brandeis helped obtain Frankfurter's ap-
pointment to the faculty of the Harvard Law School, and by
1916 the letter salutation "Dear Mr. Frankfurter" had become
"Dear Felix"; the first-name greeting was a singular honor in
Brandeis's circle of acquaintances. In 1919 Brandeis wrote
Marion Denman, Frankfurter's fiancee, that he had become
"half brother-half son."IS
Brandeis's growing friendship with Frankfurter occurred
at a crucial time in his career because his Supreme Court ap-
pointment in 1916 imposed restraints on his political involve-
ments. Frankfurter, therefore, began to act as Brandeis's agent
in a variety of social causes, and Brandeis began supple-
menting Frankfurter's income to subsidize these efforts. From
1926 to 1938, Frankfurter received $3,500 a year, an amount
equivalent to over $30,000 in 1988 dollars. 16 With Brandeis's
support, Frankfurter became a liberal gadfly. He wrote articles
for progressive publications, particularly the New Republic,
supported reform legislation, defended Sacco and Vanzetti,
and labored for Zionism. At the same time, Frankfurter also
worked at cultivating a large number of potentially useful
people with those skillful techniques of influence-including
outright flattery-that he called "personalia."17 Brandeis had
found the ideal representative.
The relationship of Frankfurter and Roosevelt, however,
did not develop in such a progressive fashion. Frankfurter
and Roosevelt first met at the Harvard Club in New York City
in 1906, but there was little contact until World War I when
they both served on the War Labor Policies Board. 18 Another
gap in their relationship followed and lasted until 1928. Frank-
furter later reported, rather unconvincingly, that he had sim-
ply "lost sight" of Roosevelt during this ten-year period. 19 It
is not surprising that the opportunistic Frankfurter reviewed
the relationship in 1928 after Roosevelt had been elected gov-
ernor of New York. Then he began to offer unsolicited sug-
gestions on both policy and personnel. A closer relationship
slowly developed so that Frankfurter later recalled that by
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1932 they had formed "rather easy, I might say, intellectually
intimate ties.,,2o This developing relationship did not remove
all of Brandeis's and Frankfurter's reservations regarding Roo-
sevelt as a presidential candidate. They realized, however,
that he was the only viable progressive choice, and after his
election the Frankfurter connection became a potentially pow-
erful means of projecting Brandeis's influence into the new
administration. 21
Brandeis did not have to rely solely on his link with Roo-
sevelt, however, because the burgeoning of New Deal agen-
cies provided him with an unprecedented opportunity to
place suitable people in government service. The recruits were
usually Frankfurter's bright, young proteges. 22 Brandeis con-
stantly sought to increase his influence, casting his nets
widely by means of his famous Sunday afternoon teas at his
modest apartment. The rooms were stifling in summer. Food
was a secondary consideration. But the teas gave Brandeis an
opportunity to make contacts, hunt for talent, give advice,
and gather information. 23
Although Brandeis was not involved in Roosevelt's presi-
dential campaign, he nevertheless became an unwelcome fig-
ure among some of his advisers. His chief opponent was
Rexford Tugwell. Tugwell, A.A. Berle, Jr., and Raymond Mo-
ley composed a group of academic advisers called the Brain
Trust that was committed to central planning. They were con-
vinced that the government planning agencies of World War
I were the relevant models for dealing with the depression.
The Brains Trusters, particularly Tugwell, opposed what they
regarded as Brandeis's outmoded perspective. They ignored
his recovery program and argued that his opposition to big-
ness was Jeffersonian nostalgia for a simpler America. 24
The difference of opinion was aggravated by suspicion. As
early as the fall of 1932, Tugwell was complaining about Bran-
deis's "mysterious channels" of influence that he described
in conspiratorial terms. He did not, however, criticize Bran-
deis's activities as violations of judicial propriety. 25 Berle's
opposition to Brandeis's philosophy was increased by his dis-
like of Frankfurter, who had been one of his professors and
with whom he had clashed while a student at the Harvard
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Law School.26 Brandeis had a better relationship with Moley
than with any of the other Brains Trusters. He thought that
Moley was more receptive to his opinions and sought to trans-
mit the details of his recovery program to Roosevelt through
him by way of Frankfurter. Moley may have been more re-
ceptive than his colleagues, but he never really accepted Bran-
deis's program despite receiving the full Frankfurter
treatment-over 150 letters from January to September 1933.
In any case, his usefulness to Brandeis diminished in 1934 as
he drifted away from Roosevelt. 27
Roosevelt created a minor crisis for Brandeis at the begin-
ning of his administration by offering to appoint Frankfurter
solicitor-general. Frankfurter declined as tactfully as possible
by telling Roosevelt that it would be impossible to accept the
position and still "have anything to do on any matters on
which you might want my help." This response had Bran-
deis's hearty approval. Roosevelt may have been mildly ir-
ritated at the refusal, but there was no significant strain in
the relationship. At Brandeis's urging, Frankfurter continued
to bombard Roosevelt and his advisers with suggestions on
policy and personnel. 28
The concept of two New Deals involves an oversimplifi-
cation of the complex legislative record of Roosevelt's first
term that has produced historiographical debate. 29 Yet for all
of its limitations, it remains a useful way to schematize the
first term. 3D The conventional view is that the first New Deal
of 1933 featured the central planning of NRA and AAA while
the second New Deal of 1935 focused on "Brandeisian" re-
forms. Another conventional interpretation is that Brandeis
opposed the first New Deal and supported the second New
Deal, but this position represents another oversimplifica-
tion. 31 In fact, he was not totally opposed to the first or com-
pletely satisfied with the second.
Brandeis did oppose the most important initiatives of the
first New Deal, the National Recovery Administration (NRA)
and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA). He
had almost no contact with NRA head Hugh Johnson, and
he made little effort to place any recruits in the agency. As
early as August 1933, Brandeis commented that NRA was
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having "troubles galore," implying that it was retarding re-
covery. The NRA's only possible contribution, Brandeis ar-
gued, would be to protect labor organizations and encourage
regularity of employment. By 1934 it was clear that the NRA
was floundering. Eventually, Brandeis voted with a unani-
mous Court to overturn it in the case of Schechter v. United
States on May 27, 1935.32
Brandeis had a long-standing interest in agriculture. His
correspondence with his brother Alfred reveals his concern
over the agricultural depression of the twenties. 33 He was
convinced, however, that the AAA was taking the wrong
approach by aiding the wealthier farmers at the expense of
the agricultural underclass of small farmers, sharecroppers,
and tenants. Even before the agency had begun to function,
Brandeis confided to Frankfurter that he was concerned about
the sweeping production controls that he feared would ac-
centuate the curse of bigness in agriculture. He did not think
that the AAA was unconstitutional, and so he dissented from
the decision in United States v. Butler (1936) that eventually
overturned it.34
Despite their opposition to AAA policy, Brandeis and
Frankfurter were able to place a coterie of reformers in its
legal department. The group was headed by Jerome Frank
and included such bright, young activist lawyers as Nathan
Witt, Lee Pressman, and Alger Hiss. These men and their
allies disrupted AAA policy by the zeal with which they
sought direct assistance for sharecroppers and tenants. Bran-
deis had supported the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union
(STFU) and had given money to Commonwealth College,
which espoused its positions. In early 1935 AAA head Chester
Davis, angered by the reformers' adoption of positions taken
by the STFU, decided on a purge. Secretary of Agriculture
Henry Wallace reluctantly agreed; Brandeis's tenuous influ-
ence in the AAA disappeared. With characteristic under-
statement he observed that "AAA developments are very
regrettable."35 The purge was a setback but hardly a catas-
trophe since there had been little chance that the activists
could have significantly influenced AAA policy.
Despite disappointment concerning the main thrust of the
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first New Deal, Brandeis could take modest satisfaction in
some legislation such as the Securities Act of 1933. Secretary
of Commerce Daniel Roper asked banker Huston Thompson
to work on securities legislation. After an early draft of
Thompson's bill ran into trouble in Congress, Moley asked
Frankfurter to work on another draft. Thompson had asked
Brandeis for advice, but Brandeis's interest was focused on
Frankfurter's effort. So he consulted with Frankfurter as well
as with James Landis and Benjamin V. Cohen whom Frank-
furter had enlisted in the project. In the ensuing competition
of drafts, Frankfurter's version won out, much to Brandeis's
satisfaction. The measure passed Congress on May 27, 1933.36
The establishment of the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA) was another reason for satisfaction because it was to
implement conservation measures that Brandeis had long ad-
vocated. The long-standing interest of Sen. George Norris and
Roosevelt himself made lobbying by Brandeis unnecessary.
Willard Hurst, one of Brandeis's law clerks, recalled that he
hailed the TVA as "a great achievement in human inventive-
ness and regional decentralization." He worked for the place-
ment of David Lilienthal, a Frankfurter protege, on the TVA's
board of directors. Lilienthal battled for Brandeis's "grass-
roots" conservation policies against the pro-industry stance
of the other directors. 37
Such achievements as TVA and securities legislation, how-
ever, were not sufficient to redeem the first New Deal for
Brandeis. He remained unreconciled to its planning empha-
sis. His own recovery program, which he urged incessantly,
either directly or through Frankfurter and others, was no-
where close to adoption. This was bad enough, but the situa-
tion deteriorated even more as Roosevelt vacillated from late
1933 to the spring of 1935. Apparently puzzled by the failure
of the economy to rebound, Roosevelt tried Brandeis's pa-
tience with his flounderings. In some desperation, Roosevelt
clutched at the monetary theory of George Warren who be-
lieved that a reduction in the gold value of the dollar would
raise prices and promote recovery. In August he began a gold-
buying policy that alarmed Brandeis. Although Roosevelt
soon abandoned the futile policy, Brandeis remained disil-
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lusioned. By unhappy coincidence, Frankfurter was in Eng-
land during this crucial period from September 1933 to August
1934. So Brandeis was without Frankfurter's help during the
worst phase of Roosevelt's indecisiveness. Their correspon-
dence during this period is pervaded with deep pessimism.38
In Frankfurter's absence, Brandeis turned to several of his
proteges for help, particularly to Benjamin Cohen, Thomas
Corcoran, and James Landis who worked on the Securities
Exchange Act, one of the few significant measures passed in
1934 and one that established the Securities Exchange Com-
mission. Although Brandeis approved of the regulatory
power granted to the new commission, such measures were
peripheral. His recovery program was nowhere close to adop-
tion. From England Frankfurter continued to shower Roo-
sevelt with advice without apparent effect. 39
Brandeis was anxious for Frankfurter to return quickly and
plunge immediately into action. Brandeis was troubled by the
possibility that Roosevelt's first term would end in failure.
Upon his return, Frankfurter, always the point man for Bran-
deis's initiatives, was intensively reoriented by conferences
with Brandeis himself along with Cohen, Corcoran, and oth-
ers. With Brandeis urging him on, Frankfurter saw Roosevelt
several times in the summer and fall of 1934 to exhort him to
regain the initiative by adopting Brandeis's recovery pro-
gram.40
Roosevelt eventually responded to the encouragement of
Frankfurter and other discontented liberals. The result was
the second New Deal. He announced a new program in his
January 1935 message to Congress, but he did not present it
in detail until the following spring. Brandeis responded to
this opportunity with redoubled efforts to influence policy
and to place proteges in key positions. After considerable
effort, Frankfurter succeeded in having Corcoran, one of his
most trusted lieutenants, named a special assistant to the
president. This appointment in March 1935 raised Brandeis's
hopes for the eventual adoption of his recovery program. 41
One of Brandeis's long-standing concerns was regularity
of employment; he had been grappling with the issue for
years, and eventually it emerged from behind-the-scenes con-
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sideration in time to be included in the legislative program of
the second New Deal. In accordance with his general social
philosophy, Brandeis advocated a decentralized program on
the state level in which employees placed part of their wages
in a trust fund in amounts proportionate to the average annual
employment rate for their particular industry. This reserve
fund would then be kept by the employers in times of full
employment.42
Brandeis's daughter Elizabeth Raushenbush and her hus-
band Paul, both professors at the University of Wisconsin,
lobbied successfully for the Wisconsin legislature to pass a
law that embodied Brandeis's approach in early 1932. This
so-called Wisconsin Plan was, however, challenged by a cen-
tralized alternative advocated by Abraham Epstein, called the
Ohio Plan. The Ohio Plan stipulated a centrally pooled fund.
Its basic goals were unemployment and old age insurance
rather than regularity of employment. An intense debate de-
veloped over the merits of the rival plans. 43
Brandeis urged others to support the Wisconsin Plan, and
he also lobbied vigorously for it behind the scenes. 44 Yet the
final result was disappointing. The original draft of the social
security law, called the Wagner-Lewis Bill, was strongly Bran-
deisian, but subsequent compromises, which Roosevelt ac-
cepted, greatly weakened it. By March 1935 Brandeis was
deeply pessimistic, commenting to Frankfurter that any mea-
sure passed during the rest of the year would be "unutterably
bad." When the Social Security Act passed Congress in Au-
gust 1935, Brandeis and Frankfurter maintained a disap-
pointed silence.45
Brandeis was deeply interested in tax policy because his
recovery program was dependent on increased revenue. De-
spite the politically sensitive nature of the issue, there were
some hopeful signs by late 1934 when Roosevelt instructed
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau to consult with
Frankfurter on the matter. The two men were rivals, so Mor-
genthau must have been chagrined while Frankfurter ex-
pressed amusement at his discomfiture. 46 In December 1934
the Treasury Department unveiled a major tax reform pro-
gram that included such Brandeisian features as increases in
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gift and inheritance taxes along with corporate taxes. At this
crucial point, however, Roosevelt hesitated, creating wide-
spread disillusionment among liberals. Brandeis and Frank-
furter were alarmed at Roosevelt's vacillation, and Frankfurter
helped arrange a conference between Roosevelt and key
congressional liberals in May 1935.47
This liberal pressure along with Roosevelt's growing con-
cern over the popularity of such potential rivals as Huey Long
helped restimulate his progressive zeal. Frankfurter helped
maintain this momentum by spending much time in the White
House during the summer of 1935 where he enjoyed regular
access to Roosevelt. Roosevelt sent Congress a strong tax bill
that contained the Treasury Department recommendations.
Congress, however, reacted to powerful opposition by sig-
nificantly weakening the bill before passing it in late August.
Brandeis tried to stay optimistic by claiming that Roosevelt
had "come out on top," but he knew better.48
In July 1934 the National Power Policy Committee had been
created to deal with the complex problems posed by the public
utility holding companies. The issue was one of great im-
portance to Brandeis who had long been concerned about the
curse of bigness as it existed in the power industry. He was
particularly hopeful when Benjamin Cohen was named gen-
eral counsel for the committee and began drafting legisla-
tion. 49
A strange impasse occurred. Cohen advocated strict regu-
lation of the holding companies rather than outright abolition.
Brandeis also favored this approach because he believed that
a rigid law mandating abolition would prove unenforceable
as had happened with the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.
Roosevelt, however, favored abolition. In August Frank-
furter, who was still in the White House much of the time,
hammered out a compromise that eliminated the "death sen-
tence" provision and enabled the measure to pass. The Public
Utility Holding Company Act represented a kind of victory
even though the final form had been weakened and enforce-
ment in the future proved ineffective.5o
The question of public works was of concern to Brandeis
because of its implications for his recovery program. In fact,
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Frankfurter had consistently urged Roosevelt to support a
massive public works commitment of up to $5 billion a year
ever since his return from England. Despite these efforts,
however, the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act that passed
Congress in April 1935 fell considerably below what Brandeis
had hoped for. Frankfurter congratulated Roosevelt on the
passage of the act, but his remarks were perfunctory.51
The second New Deal was not a great triumph for the
Brandeisian social philosophy. The public works and tax mea-
sures were too weak to be of any significance in implementing
his recovery program. The social security and holding com-
pany legislation was desirable but flawed; neither focused on
recovery. Brandeis, in fact, showed little interest in some of
what are regarded as the most significant accomplishments
of the second New Deal. He had little to say about relief
despite his approval of its humanitarianism because he did
not think it promoted recovery. He also showed little interest
in Robert Wagner's National Labor Relations Act or, indeed,
in labor issues generally. 52
From Brandeis's perspective, in fact, the second New Deal
was at best only a mild success. He could feel optimism only
because he hoped that such modest achievements would
prove to be the foundation of a new offensive that would
continue until his long-term goals could be attained. For a
time this seemed likely, particularly after Roosevelt's land-
slide victory in 1936. In retrospect, however, it is clear that
by this time the New Deal was losing momentum. So without
Brandeis realizing it, his last chance for substantive progress
was slipping away. Roosevelt's disastrous effort to change
the composition of the Supreme Court in 1937 was both a
cause and a symptom of this situation.
Roosevelt had been concerned about the reaction of the
Supreme Court to reform legislation since the beginning of
the New Deal. The so-called Black Monday decisions in May
1935 gave dramatic expression to the tension between the
Court and the New Deal. It is true that the three decisions
did not significantly alter the course of the administration.
Only the case of Schechter v. United States, which overturned
the NRA, involved basic policy. Nevertheless, Roosevelt took
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the decisions badly and struck back by denouncing the Court
for embracing a "horse and buggy" view of the Constitution.
The Court went on to overturn the AAA in 1936.53 It is true
that the NRA and AAA had proved to be ineffective, but
Roosevelt reacted vigorously because he could only assume
that the Court would continue its pattern of rejecting New
Deal legislation. In the euphoria of his tremendous victory in
1936, he decided to strike back. Unfortunately, the method
he chose ultimately damaged his prestige and strained his
relationship with Brandeis. 54
In January 1937 Roosevelt warned Frankfurter of an im-
pending "awful shock" and asked him to suspend judgment
until they could confer. The "awful shock" was a court reform
bill that would enable the president to appoint new federal
judges for all those who did not retire at the age of seventy.
Although all federal courts were included, the obvious target
was the recalcitrant Supreme Court. Roosevelt consulted with
very few advisers regarding this bill, relying heavily on the
advice of Homer Cummings. Cummings, ironically, got the
idea from the arch-conservative Justice James McReynolds
who had made a similar proposal when he was Wilson's at-
torney general in 1913.55
Brandeis strongly opposed the bill; he told Corcoran, who
first told him of it, that he was "unalterably opposed." Roo-
sevelt, he observed, "was making a great mistake." He was
undoubtedly stung by the implication that he and his older
colleagues were not carrying their share of the Court's work
load, but his objections went far deeper. He could not approve
of what he regarded as a clumsy maneuver to augment presi-
dential power in an arbitrary way. And there was another
factor to be considered. Although Brandeis had always been
one of the Court's liberal mavericks, he was nonetheless a
member of the Court and therefore saw it as only eight other
men were able to. Brandeis had a deeply conservative instinct,
particularly where the Court was concerned, and the Court
bill stimulated it powerfully. 56
While there was never any doubt about Brandeis's reaction,
Frankfurter's position was ambiguous. His published work
on judicial matters indicated a philosophical opposition to
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such schemes as the Court bill. However, his relationship
with Roosevelt, which by 1937 had become the basis of a
possible Supreme Court appointment, ensured that a break
with Roosevelt on this issue would be a wrenching experi-
ence. So Frankfurter apparently tried to convince himself that
the bill was justified. His attempts to defend it, however, seem
halfhearted and querulous; they were not up to his usual
standard of spirited rhetoric. 57 Already hard-pressed on the
issue, Frankfurter's position was made even more difficult by
Brandeis's flagrant opposition. Brandeis was instrumental in
bringing together two of the bill's key opponents-Chief Jus-
tice Charles Evans Hughes and Burton K. Wheeler, chairman
of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Their meeting led to
Hughes's letter to the committee that effectively refuted Roo-
sevelt's rationale for the proposal.58
Frankfurter reacted to Brandeis's activities with deep dis-
approval. In late March he wrote him an anguished letter,
never sent, in which he expressed resentment at "the C. J.
[Hughes] putting you on the front line even with your ap-
provaL" Several days later he wrote Brandeis to denounce
Hughes's letter as an unwarranted intervention in a political
matter; he concluded, "I am sorry to write thus, but I am
very, very sad." Brandeis replied laconically, "I reserve com-
ment on what you say until there is chance for talk, saying
only that you are laboring under some misapprehensions."
They met in April and agreed not to discuss the matter in
order to avoid any further strain on their relationship. 59
What is the significance of the struggle over Roosevelt's
Court bill? It certainly resulted in a bitter personal defeat for
the president even though it undoubtedly contributed to the
Court's liberal shift beginning in 1937. In retrospect, however,
it seems doubtful if it altered the course of the New Deal in
any major way. The defeat revealed the strength of an emerg-
ing conservative coalition. The Court struggle probably ac-
celerated the combination of opposition forces, but clearly the
loss of the momentum for reform would have occurred in any
case. The struggle, furthermore, did not permanently affect
the Brandeis-Frankfurter-Roosevelt connection. All relation-
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ships were eventually restored though they were perhaps
never quite the same, particularly the relationship between
Brandeis and Roosevelt. 6o The Brandeis-Frankfurter relation-
ship was certainly changing, but the Court struggle was not
the underlying cause. In 1937 Brandeis was eighty-one years
old, only two years from retirement while Frankfurter was
fifty-six years old, only two years from a Supreme Court ap-
pointment. Their relationship had slowly begun to reflect
Frankfurter's increased responsibilities over the years. By the
mid-thirties, their relationship had become collegial.
But in any case whatever residual strains might have been
left over from the Court struggle, they could not have affected
Brandeis's impact on the New Deal simply because by the
late thirties the New Deal had lost its momentum and there
were few legislative initiatives even in the face of the ongoing
economic crisis. The correspondence of Brandeis and Frank-
furter reflects this situation. Their letters reveal a shift from
participation to observation. There was a growing sense of
puzzlement and detachment. Brandeis and Frankfurter had
strongly criticized Roosevelt during his vacillations of 1934,
but they were silent during the floundering of 1938. Even
reformers as sanguine as Brandeis and Frankfurter confessed
to an uncharacteristic bewilderment. "It's all strangely ob-
scure-why things go down so disastrously & why they
gradually seem to be climbing up." Brandeis, for his part,
welcomed the economic upswing but confessed that he could
see "nothing which suggests a solution of our problems."61
In 1938 Brandeis was compelled to face both the limitations
of the New Deal and the constraints of declining health. He
confronted the latter with his characteristic realism and dig-
nity as he resigned from the Court in March 1939. Frankfurter,
who had clearly attained his full professional maturity, was
appointed to the Court later in the year. 62 So the New Deal
partnership ended at last with Brandeis in retirement and
Frankfurter on the Court during a vastly different era of global
conflict in which domestic concerns declined in urgency. One
of the New Deal's most significant partnerships ended along
with the New Deal itself as Dr. Win the War replaced Dr.
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New Deal. Brandeis continued his intense interest in public
affairs and came to appreciate Roosevelt's rising stature as a
leader of the beleaguered democracies. Yet he also continued
to chafe at the unwelcome inactivity. In May 1940 he confided
sadly to his niece, "All I can do now is let people talk to me
and imagine I help them, but I don't.,,63
Brandeis's lifelong commitment to political activism en-
sured that he was a perennially controversial figure from his
early days as the "People's Attorney" through the turbulent
battle for confirmation to the Supreme Court to his later career
as a progressive justice on a conservative Court. It would
probably be a source of wry amusement for him to know that
he remains a controversial figure over forty years after his
death. Various aspects of Brandeis's career have generated
scholarly debate over the years, but it is the issue of judicial
propriety that has most recently put him once again before
the public eye.64 It is clear that Brandeis never manifested
that Olympian detachment from political matters expected of
Supreme Court justices. His activities, furthermore, intensi-
fied during the opportunity afforded by the New Deal. He
certainly violated the recognized canons of judicial propriety.
Indeed, it is arguable that the intensity and duration of his
political activity while on the Court is unparalleled. 65 Further-
more, Brandeis was aware of the impropriety because he was
careful to conceal his activities and maintain the appearance
of detachment. 66
Yet it seems clear that Brandeis did not act unethically; one
can argue that he did so only by uncritically identifying un-
ethical behavior with impropriety. Brandeis acted selflessly,
and he held his proteges to the same high standards that
governed his own behavior. He was not interested in power,
prestige, or money. To regard him as a Machiavellian con-
spirator is to do him a great injustice. This debate over Bran-
deis's political activities might well have sounded somewhat
strange to him. It is certainly possible that, however much
deference he felt was necessary to disarm contemporary opin-
ion, he did not think of his activities as political in character.
While it is impossible to reconstruct his own thoughts on this
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issue, it is clear that he was not interested in partisan issues
as such. He was undoubtedly convinced that he was doing
the right things for the right reasons for the public good dur-
ing a time of great national emergency.
We are not, to be sure, excused merely by the sincerity of
our rationalizations, and this is a potentially dangerous one.
There are many people eager to justify misbehavior by ap-
pealing to the public good while acting in an ostensibly dis-
interested manner. Some of the great tyrants of history have
done this. But, as Frankfurter once observed, "everything
turns on men.,,67 There is Cicero and there is Cataline; there
is Huey Long and there is Louis D. Brandeis. His behavior
can ultimately be judged not only by his methods but also by
his intentions and by his results.
In the last analysis, there is an ironic sense in which this
debate seems curiously inconsequential because of the limi-
tations Brandeis encountered in seeking to influence the New
Deal. At first there was reason for optimism. His early efforts
during Wilson's first term had been largely successful. Then
after the barren years of the twenties, Brandeis, near the end
of his career, was buoyed by the promise of the New Deal.
It is not surprising, given the circumstances, that he was not
inclined to be inhibited by canons of judicial propriety. Yet
the promise of the New Deal turned to frustration; for all his
efforts Brandeis could not shape the New Deal as he wished.
It might have been some consolation for him to reflect that
no one else could either. In a very real sense, Brandeis was
defeated by his perennial nemesis-the curse of bigness. The
New Deal was a pivotal event in administrative size and com-
plexity. So while there are many secondary explanations for
Brandeis's frustration, the primary reaso,n may well be simply
that no one, including Roosevelt himself, could control that
booming, buzzing confusion called the New Deal. Brandeis's
frustration was prophetic. Must a government big enough to
grapple with the increasingly complex problems of modern
society also become too big to function effectively? Is the curse
of bigness ineluctable? We have inherited this perplexing
question from the era of Brandeis and the New Deal. It raises
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an issue of perennial relevance for the America of the twen-
tieth and twenty-first centuries.
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Brandeis, Judaism,
and Zionism
ALLON GAL
Louis D. Brandeis represents a classic case of American Zion-
ism. (The term American Zionism rather than Zionism in America
is intentional.) A declared Zionist since 1912 and the leader
of the Zionist movement in this country from August 1914,
Brandeis's conversion to Zionism is intriguing. In 1912 Bran-
deis was fifty-six years old, a successful lawyer, a nationally
recognized Progressive, and a person with a gratifying per-
sonal and family life. "What brought Louis Brandeis to Zion-
ism?" is the traditional formulation of the problem by scholars
as well as many others. This posing of the question, however,
is largely self-defeating. Predating the "Zionization" of Bran-
deis was the process of his "Judaization." From semiassimi-
lationism Brandeis first moved gradually to acquire Jewish
identity and Jewish pride. In a way, his later and famous
Zionist "appearance" was a continuation of his growing af-
firmation of his Jewishness. This positive connection between
Judaism and Zionism-a conspicuously American Jewish
phenomenon-requires some elaboration.
European Zionism developed a paradoxical, tensional re-
lationship with Judaism. Zionism in Europe came to liberate
the Jews from a long, tortured Jewish past; it also came to
redeem them from an allegedly docile, submissive, and exilic
tradition. On the other hand, European Zionism spoke in the
name of an all-embracing Jewish renewal, of a Jewish renais-
sance.
The dialectical solution of that contradiction was in the
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European Zionist concentration on ancient Jewish history, on
the epochs of independence. The culture of those sovereign
times was often referred to as "Hebrew" rather than as "Jew-
ish." Zionism in Europe, generally speaking, came then to
disrupt Jewish continuity, to build a bright, new future while
glorifying ancient times.!
Zionism in the United States cannot chiefly be accounted
for by local rejective or oppressive factors. It did not come to
disrupt the inertia of a shameful or distressful history. Ameri-
can Zionism did not have any reason to skip over the im-
mediate American past. Actually, American Jews-Zionists
included-tended to take pride in American Jewish history
and in the accomplishments of American Jews. (This pride
was often expanded to include a nostalgic romanticization of
European Jewish history as well.) After all, Jews in America
were emancipated without having to raise any real fight for
emancipation; and America was for all intents and purposes
their home. Zionism in this country thus had the inherent
tendency to develop as an extension of the Jewish past. That
is, Zionism and Judaism in America had the intrinsic dispo-
sition to be mutually interwoven. 2
Brandeis's concept of Jewish nationalism lacked a clear dis-
tinction between Judaism and Zionism. Actually, he tended
to blur the two. This happened neither by accident nor as a
result of lack of analytical capacity. Rather, this interweaving
of Judaism and Zionism expresses, I suggest, the genuine
American nature of Brandeis's path to Zionism. Indeed, as
we will see later in this chapter, Brandeis's road from semi-
assimilation to Zionism decisively testifies to the American
qualities of his brand of Jewish nationalism.
Another American aspect of Brandeis's path to Zionism
was its nonspeculative nature. Brandeis's changes did not
occur as a result of theoretical discussions or ideological reve-
lations. The causes of his transformation were largely rooted
in the realities of his life and work as a lawyer, a Progressive,
and a Jew.
Louis D. Brandeis spoke on Judaism in public for the first
time in November 1905. As a lawyer, his career owed much
to Boston Jewry; Brandeis had early and solid business ties
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with members of his ethnic group. Still, as a Jew, he lived on
the margins of that community. As a result of his work as a
lawyer and an urban reformer, however, he gradually learrled
about the potential of the Jewish community on behalf of the
causes for which he fought. In the winter of 1905-6, he des-
perately needed the support of the local community in his
crusade to clean up the government of his beloved Boston.
He managed to inspire his listeners (Jewish professionals) and
to mobilize them while referring to the Torah's ethics and to
Jewish ethos in general. As the audience was responsive,
Brandeis the Progressive's interest in and appreciation for his
ethnic community rose sharply. Earlier teachings of his
mother about the moral quality embedded in Judaism and a
family tradition about its relatedness to a historic Jewish mes-
sianic trend probably served to foster this awakening. When
in subsequent years (roughly 1906-9) Brandeis fought for sav-
ings bank life insurance and against railroad mergers, he
boldly sought-and got-the backing of the Jewish com-
munity. His attraction to the Jewish people further deepened
in 1910 when he negotiated a compromise in a bitter garment
strike that involved Jews on both sides; he sharply sensed
then that the same noble ethos was the frame of reference for
both employers and workers. The latters' denouncement of
injustice in the name of prophetic tradition elated him; thanks
to the whole experience he felt belongingness to an eminent
Jewish ethical civilization. He was also impressed by the in-
tellectual level of the debates and by the workers' literary
versatility. Brandeis's association with Jews also broadened
over issues involving the rights of labor, consumers' griev-
ances, and social work. As a consequence of these experiences
and contacts, by the end of 1910 Brandeis began to identify
publicly and proudly as a Jew. 3
The next phase in Brandeis's ethnic development-his
adoption of Zionism-was a direct continuation of his Ju-
daization. He gradually became a Zionist when he learned
that independent Jewish life in Palestine would advance best
what he considered sublime in Jewish civilization. What he
had found in his American Jewish community, he now dis-
covered, more vigorously expressed, in Jewish Palestine. This
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process of Brandeis's Zionization was indeed interwoven with
his Judaization (and this is one of the reasons why historians
find it difficult to ascertain precisely "the date" of Brandeis's
Zionist turn). Again, his Zionization was a process, intimately
connected with the development of his Jewishness. His
gradual adoption of Zionism extended roughly through the
years 1909-14. During this phase he was, for example, thrilled
to learn about the discovery of the "wild wheat" in Palestine
and the possibility that this kind of wheat, sought by botanists
for many years, might bring about an agricultural revolution
that could eliminate hunger from the world. He found the
whole Jewish community in Palestine especially creative and
hardworking; and he found there a balance between the en-
hancement of individual potential and the imperatives of so-
cial responsibility. The accomplishments of small, democratic
Jewish Palestine were for him a cherished model and an anti-
dote to the stifling monopolization and the oppressive bigness
he bitterly fought against in America. 4
Jewish Palestine was a new hope not merely for Brandeis
the Progressive but also for Brandeis the frustated philo-
Yankee. He had been a loyal son of New England, steeped
in its tradition. The great prominence of Puritan sentiments
in Brandeis's personality and philosophy may be traced to his
days at Harvard Law School (from 1875). He founded in 1879,
together with his best friend, Samuel Warren (an ardent Yan-
kee), a Boston law firm with apparent establishment connec-
tions. Actually, the firm never penetrated the big industries
of New England nor the financial bastions of Brahmin Boston.
Ethnic barriers, however, prevented his acceptance by the
group he so identified with. Over a period of many years,
Brandeis, as an outsider, came to idealize the Puritan ethos
and to internalize it deeply. All this notwithstanding, from
about 1905 Brandeis harbored increasing disappointment with
the Yankees of his day. He gradually reached the conclusion
that they had not properly stood the test of the lofty Puritan
heritage. Consequently, he began to see the Zionist endeavor
across the ocean as an embodiment of Puritan values. As he
changed the focus of his personal identity, Jewish Palestine
became for him the early, exemplary New England. In his
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eyes the Yishuv (pre-Israel Jewish Palestine) was the resto-
ration of the discredited Puritan world, the true New Zion. 5
This peculiar Puritan Zionism of Brandeis did reflect, how-
ever, the general American circunlstances in which his ide-
ology was shaped. Were Brandeis suffering from an
aggressive anti-Semitism, he would not hope for a Jewish
state akin to the "oppressors"; it was because he did not en-
counter anti-Semitism of the European style that Brandeis saw
the Zionist enterprise as a correction of Yankee society. To be
sure, he was maneuvered to "his ethnic place" in social Bos-
ton; but this was done quite "gentlemanly." And the subtly
developed pattern did not cause Brandeis and his family any
traumatic experience. True, some Yankee magnates and their
lackeys used anti-Semitism to silence "the radical Jew"; but
this tactic was quite rarely and incidentally employed. Un-
pleasant situations notwithstanding, Brandeis's admiration of
the Yankee's civilization did not dissolve. Moreover, he never
lost hope for bringing America back to its ideals. He trusted
in the American potential for good both domestically and in-
ternationally.
The United States continued to be the home-both physical
and spiritual-for Louis D. Brandeis the Zionist. Beginning
in 1916, he served as a justice of the United States Supreme
Court for twenty-three years. When he died in 1941, he was
buried (to be precise, cremated and buried) in the city in which
he had been born, Louisville, Kentucky. Obviously, his Zion-
ism did not come to supplant his Americanism but rather to
complement it.
Though Brandeis's official leadership of the American
Zionist movement lasted only about two years (August 1914-
July 1916), his influence on American Zionism was tremen-
dous and its impact felt up to his last days. This impact cannot
be accounted for simply as the result of authority derived from
his accomplishments in the society at large; nor can it be fully
explained by his lavish support of Zionist activists and causes.
Undoubtedly, while these factors did help enhance Brandeis's
position, the main source of his influence was a combination
of his powerful personality with a coherent ideology that sen-
sitively reflected the American circumstances.6
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What were the basic characteristics of Brandeis's Zionism?
As is self-evident from his life and career, he did not consider
America as "exile." Basically a pluralistic Jeffersonian, he
gradually came to conceive the United States as a union of
ethnic cultures; in this union the Jewish community could
both thrive and work for a better society. Brandeis came to
this philosophy, later known as cultural pluralism, through
his own experiences and spiritual growth and the influence
of the articulate Zionist philosopher, Horace Kallen. In his
comprehensive address of April 1915, "The Jewish Problem-
How to Solve It," Brandeis dwelled extensively on the theme
of America as a nation composed of different nationalities.
The free and creative development of these nationalities
would spiritually enrich the United States and would make
it a democracy par excellence, he claimed. This address of Bran-
deis became a hallmark of mainstream American Zionism,
secular and religious alike. 7
Another feature of Brandeis's Zionism, expressing his
genuine American path to Jewish nationalism, was his con-
ceiving of Zionism as a means for attaining higher goals. His
short speech accepting the chairmanship of the Provisional
Executive Committee for General Zionist Affairs (August 3D,
1914) classically reflected this mission orientation.
Experiences, public and professional, have taught me
this: I find Jews possessed of those very qualities which
we of the twentieth century seek to develop in our strug-
gle for justice and democracy; a deep moral feeling
which makes them capable of noble acts; a deep sense
of the brotherhood of man; and a high intelligence, the
fruit of three thousand years of civilization. These ex-
periences have made me feel that the Jewish people have
something which should be saved for the world; that
the Jewish people should be preserved; and that this is
our duty to pursue that method of saving which most
promises success. 8
The mission-orientation of Brandeis's Zionism did not sin-
gle him out from other Americanized Zionists. Actually, a
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thread of a mission rationale ran through American Zionism
since its foundation. The first president of the Federation of
American Zionists, Richard Gottheil (1898-1904), expounded
the idea; and subsequent Zionist leaders, secular and religious
alike, similarly expressed a mission rationale for their Zion-
ism. Zionist personalities of different backgrounds, such as
Henry P. Mendes, Judah Magnes, Horace Kallen, and Hen-
rietta Szold, largely rationalized Zionism by the potential con-
tribution to mankind of the movement and the future state.
Indeed, suggesting the creation of a new state against many
heavy odds required, in the American context, a justification
meaningful also for society at large. It was the mission ra-
tionale that fulfilled this requirement.9
The mission-orientation of Brandeis's Zionism was, how-
ever, especially pronounced. Both the American and the Pro-
gressive in him did not let him adopt Zionism without a
conspicuous general rationale. A third factor that worked to
intensify his mission-orientation was his Puritan urge. This
Puritan element previously referred to was a main character-
istic of Brandeis's Zionism during the phase discussed in this
chapter. His Zionist addresses during this phase were bound
to Puritan ideals and were immersed in Puritan images. He
often spoke in those years, for example, about "our Pilgrim
ancestors" when pointing to the first pioneers who had come
to Palestine. It was the bold spirit of the early Puritans that
he found among the Jewish settlers, and it was the formers'
success that he time and again brought as a promise. More-
over, the Puritan bent and the mission-orientation of Brandeis
were interwoven in the vein of the Puritan tradition to estab-
lish a model society, "a City upon a Hill." In his bitter conflict
with the European Zionists (in the early twenties) about the
way to build Palestine, Brandeis said: "Our aim is the King-
dom of Heaven, paraphrasing Cromwell. We take Palestine
by the way. But we must take it with clean hands; we must
take it in a way as to ennoble the Jewish people. Otherwise,
it will not be worth having."lo
A good part of Brandeis's attitudes in that historic conflict
should be traced to the Puritan-like source of his Zionism.
His zealous passion for self-reliance of the Yishuv, his detes-
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tation for and fear of any resemblance to the Chalukkah sys-
tem were Puritan in nature. In the same pattern were also his
obsession for very high standards of work ethic, strict ac-
countability, and rigorous scrupulousness in general. In sum,
Brandeis of the twenties expected the Yishuv to develop much
along the lines of the cherished Puritan saga. 11
European Zionism was a movement for an all-embracing-
culture, language, historical traditions-nationalist renais-
sance. Brandeis's brand, however, focused, in keeping with
his own ethnic development, on the building up of Palestine
along certain social-ethical values. Immigration to Palestine
was suitable for the unfortunate European brethren and for
the few American pioneers; and cultural renewal, again, was
limited (from the nationalist point of view) in Brandeis's ver-
sion of Zionism to upholding sublime values. In this kind of
Palestinian endeavor, Brandeis believed, sympathetic non-
Zionists and Zionists could most closely cooperate. He thus
suggested that an organization, about equally shared by in-
terested non-Zionists and Zionists, would lead the building
of Palestine. This concept, alongside his Puritan vision, was
a major cause for his bitter conflict with the European Zionists,
headed by Chaim Weizmann, in the years 1919-29.12
Great Britain controlled Palestine from the end of 1917 (to
the establishment of Israel), and Zionists of all countries had,
of course, to take a stand in the face of this reality. Actually,
the attitude toward the British Mandate (1920-48) became a
touchstone for the various Zionist ideologies.
Brandeis's attitude toward Britain during that period de-
rived largely from his Puritan element. He admired Britain as
the great bearer of the Anglo-Saxon ethic; that country em-
bodied for him the values he most cherished, such as eco-
nomic creativity, democracy, and education. He loved
London and wrote amiably about the English people. When
it came to virtues of character, thought Brandeis, both
"America and Great Britain excel"; and he admired "their
superiority in moral, mental, and physical cleanliness."
"Cleanliness" meant for him exactitude, industry, high regard
for science, as well as purity and fairness. 13
As the Mandatory power of Palestine, Britain was com-
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mitted by its own declaration and by international law to es-
tablish a Jewish national home in Palestine. Brandeis was
predisposed to trust British policies. Moreover, of Puritan
mentality, he highly regarded promises especially when le-
galized. Brandeis adhered to this attitude throughout his first
Zionist phase, roughly the years 1914-29.
Brandeis's attitude becomes clearer when compared with
that of Vladimir Ze'ev Jabotinsky, the European Zionist
thinker and future leader of the nationalistic Revisionist move-
ment. (The Revionist party was founded in 1925 and demanded
that the entire mandated territory of Palestine on both sides
of the Jordan River be turned into a Jewish state. Hostile to
progressive and labor Zionism, in 1935 the Revisionists
seceded from the World Zionist Organization and established
the New Zionist Organization.) The two personalities met for
the first time in Palestine in 1919. This was, however, also
their last meeting as it opened a rift that kept them apart until
the end of their lives. The historic encounter is related by
Jabotinsky's biographer.
When Jabotinsky met Justice Brandeis, he told him
plainly that the [British] administration's policy was
bound to result in anti-Jewish outbreaks and did not
shrink from using the word "pogrom." ... When Ja-
botinsky told him: "We of Russian origin are like hunting
dogs who can smell blood from afar," Brandeis an-
swered: "Why do you quote examples from Russia? This
is not Tsarist Russia. This is a territory occupied by an
Anglo-Saxon Power. It belongs to a completely different
world. I do believe in British justice." When Jabotinksy
continued ... Brandeis replied coldly: "Sir, I can only
see that we do not speak a common language."14
The early and decisive breach between Brandeis and Ja-
botinsky clearly reflected the American peculiarities of the
former's Zionism. The American Zionist leader trusted the
Anglo-Saxon power as he considered it playing according to
a special set of rules; this "completely different world," Bran-
deis believed, would enable some sort of a clean way to fulfill
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the dream. He judged Zionist policies not as a mundane effort
amid power-hungry countries but rather as a means to cleanly
pursue lofty goals. Thus, he felt threatened by Jabotinsky's
course that might profane his "Kingdom of Heaven" vision
and the ennobling way toward it-hence the zealousness for
his own attitude and the early and total rejection of Jabotin-
sky's.
Neither the decisive breach with Jabotinsky nor the conflict
with Weizmann meant that Brandeis was closed to the influ-
ence of other Zionist thinkers. He integrated other influences,
however, into his own mind-set. There was a relationship
between the two major Zionist schools at the time-political
ZionIsm and cultural Zionism-and the Zionist thought of
Brandeis.
Through his early loyal assistant in Zionist affairs, Jacob
de Haas, Brandeis came to know the work of the founder of
political Zionism, Theodor Herzl. Brandeis tended to accept
the Herzlian line of relying on international legal arrange-
ments to assure the development of Jewish Palestine; this line
was in harmony with his own attitude that inclined to em-
phasize the significance of international legal commitments.
However, Brandeis totally disregarded other aspects of Her-
zlian Zionism, for example, Herzl's vision of ingathering
all the exiles in Palestine as the ultimate goal of the move-
ment. IS
Similarly, Brandeis was attracted to Ahad Ha'am, prime
expounder of cultural Zionism, according to which the de-
velopment of Jewish culture and spiritual values should be at
the core of Jewish nationalism. He did not share, though, the
European Zionist's passion for cultural self-realization nor his
love for nationalist historical traditions. What Brandeis did
appreciate in Ahad Ha'amism became clear in his letter to the
Zionist philosopher in September 1917 (with the approaching
of the Balfour Declaration). "I ... acknowledge my great in-
debtedness [to you]. Unfortunately I cannot read your writ-
ings in the original. Of the history and other things Jewish I
was almost as ignorant as of this language. Your essays gave
me some understanding and revealed to me that much which
I ignorantly worshiped was my own." Obviously, the refer-
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ence was to social justice that Ahad Ha'am considered as
central to the Jewish ethos.16
About a year later Brandeis wrote to Ahad Ha'am, "With
the approaching realization of our dreams, I am prompted to
thank again our great teachers, to whom lowe so much." He
continued to praise Ahad Ha'am's legacy, implying that its
essence was commitment to democracy and justice. The Eu-
ropean Zionist philosopher, on the other hand, emphasized
justice as an organic part of a Hebrew-speaking Jewish society
well versed in the prophetic tradition. 17
Brandeis's interest in Judaism was indeed confined by his
conspicuously American kind of Zionism. First, his attention
focused on social-ethical values he considered applicable to
the modern world. Second, he tended to concentrate on tenets
and accomplishments of diaspora Jewish history. From time
to time, he added to the list of qualities to adopt in his above-
quoted August 1914 speech. In his "Duty of Educated Jews"
(November 1914, Intercollegiate Menorah Association, Co-
lumbia University), he listed the following: intellectual ca-
pacity; an appreciation of the value of education; indomitable
will; capacity for hard work; and again, above all, the quest
for democracy and justice. As to the practice of democracy
among Jews, he stressed "an all pervading sense of duty in
the citizen"; "submission to leadership as distinguished from
authority"; and "a developed community sense.,,18
Recalling Brandeis's path to Judaism and Zionism, it's not
surprising that he always found deep kinship, even identity,
between American and Jewish ideals. In the above-mentioned
Menorah address, for example, he claimed "that the twentieth
century ideals of America have been the ideals of the Jew for
more than twenty centuries." He succinctly summarized his
concept in "The Rebirth of the Jewish Nation" speech of Sep-
tember 1914. "Jews were by reason of their traditions and
their character peculiarly fitted in the attainment of American
ideals.... to be good Americans, we must be better Jews,
and to be better Jews, we must become Zionists.,,19
America in the twenties and traumatic events beyond its bor-
ders in 1929-30 and in subsequent years reshaped Brandeis's
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Zionist ideology. Classic Brandeisian Zionism, a distinctive
result of the American circumstances in the Progressive era,
was confronted by new phenomena and was tested by world
processes, some of which touched the American shores as
well. Brandeis, ever too realistic and too humanistic to be
dogmatic, responded creatively to the new realities.
Post-World War I America was pervaded by chauvinsim
and intolerance. Calvin Coolidge's dictum-"America must
be kept American"-set the tone of the decade and beyond.
The United States was inhospitable then to even the vaguest
version of cultural pluralism. These circumstances caused
Brandeis's Zionism to be almost exclusively concentrated on
Palestine. Inherent tendencies in his own original Zionist pos-
ture also worked to this effect; the reduction of Judaism and
Zionism to values shared with American democracy did not
leave much room for a distinctive Jewish life in the diaspora.
The noble Jewish ideals, virtually identified in his eyes with
the ideals of American Progressives, could be a part of a spe-
cial Jewish civilization chiefly beyond the diaspora. These
built-in ideological tendencies of Brandeis's Zionism were
now strengthened by the rejectionist factors of America in the
twenties. The result was that the Jewish endeavor in Pales-
tine, the building up there of a model society, clearly came
to be the dominant characteristics of Brandeisian American
Zionism. 20
During the twenties nativism in this country ran high; one
of its expressions was the Sacco and Vanzetti affair in which
the Brandeis family was closely involved. The United States
drastically changed its immigration laws, obviously discrimi-
nating against Catholics and Jews. Anti-Semitism became a
persistent and a considerable force in the United States (until
the end of World War II).
Post-World War I Europe became less hospitable than ever
for Jews; and in different types of countries, ranging from
agrarian Poland to industrialized and "highly cultured" Ger-
many, the danger of a most brutal anti-Semitism became
imminent. Brandeis was highly sensitive regarding de-
velopments in Germany. He bitingly condemned the eva-
sive attitudes of assimilated German Jews (in Germany as well
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as in the United States). And during the first week of Hitler's
regime, he stated: "They [Germany's Jews] must all leave. All
of them. There is no other way." When Rabbi Stephen Wise
asked him how 600,000 people could be taken out of Ger-
many, Brandeis repeated: "They must all leave. I would have
the Jews out of Germany. They have been treated with the
deepest disrespect. I urge that Germany shall be free of Jews.
Let Germany share the fate of Spain [from which all Jews had
been expelled in 1492]. No Jew must live in Germany."21
Brandeis supported many of the activities of Stephen Wise
who had early faced the peril of growing Nazism and who
courageously worked to mobilize American public opinion,
Jewish and non-Jewish, to thwart the danger. 22
Though Brandeis had made a few comments on anti-
Semitism during the twenties, it was in 1930 that he summed
up the menacing processes in a clear-cut, conclusive way. In
a programmatic letter to Robert Szold, his loyal assistant in
Zionist matters, he then incisively concluded:
The condition of the Jews in the Diaspora in 1930-as
compared with 1920 and 1914-has worsened to such a
degree, that the belief of thinking Jews that the Jewish
problem would be solved by growing enlightenment in
the Diaspora must have been seriously shaken-if not
shattered....
The anti-Semitic outbreaks in Europe, the closing of
the doors to immigrants by practically all the new coun-
tries, the rise of anti-Semitism even in the new countries
remove the old alternatives from consideration. The
question now presented largely is Palestine-or De-
spair?23
In Brandeis's eyes Palestine now stood first of all as a haven
for the despaired; this role gradually came to overshadow the
old one assigned by him to Palestine-that of being a social
laboratory in the service of democracy and progressivism. In
1930 the very fact that the gates of Palestine were open for
the Jews gave that country the crucially needed humanistic
function. In an alienated and cruel world, only the Jewish
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homeland presented itself as a refuge for the persecuted peo-
ple.
The situation of the Yishuv itself also worked to reshape
Brandeis's classic Zionist concept. Arab leadership from the
twenties on resorted to terrorist tactics in its attempts to
hamper Zionist activity in Palestine. Hajj Amin al-Husayni,
mufti of Jerusalem, instigated Muslim fanaticism and Arab-
Palestinian brutal chauvinism aimed against the whole Jewish
population in Palestine. A future collaborator of Hitler, al-
Husayni directed in the summer of 1929 a murderous attack
aimed to terrorize the whole Yishuv (over one hundred Jews
were killed and four hundred were injured). This attack
brought from Brandeis a new kind of reaction (compared, for
example, with his careful criticism of Arab violence in
1921). H~ detested and was deeply alarmed by the chauvinist-
terrorist attack. Concerned for Jewish Palestine's security, he
determined to listen most attentively to the leaders of the
Yishuv's defense reports, to respect their judgments, and to
lavishly furnish assistance for security purposes. 24
Palestine as a refuge for Jews from persecuting countries
was always an element in Brandeis's Zionism, but now the
perspective was different. The danger for European Jewry was
imminent; and the "place of refuge" itself, Jewish Palestine,
was savagely threatened. Brandeis now felt a new kind of
responsibility, grave and clearly nationalist, of safeguarding
the physical survival of his people. The mission rationale of
his Zionism now retreated, and a survivalist motif came to
the fore.
A new image of the Yishuv now began to force itself upon
his mind. A courageous, self-defending settlement strategi-
cally located on the top of the hill gradually replaced the
previous vision of a model city of justice upon a hill. His fight-
ing-back brethren in Palestine instifled in him a mix of new
pride and concern. In a letter (September 1929) to Felix Frank-
furter, Brandeis emphasized the need to enable the Yishuv
to defend itself. "As against the Bedouins, our pioneers are
in a position not unlike the American settlers against the In-
dians. I saw myself the need of their self-defense in 1919 in
Poreah, with our Shomer [watchman], on guard mounted on
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the hill top, and the blacktented Bedouins below who had
peaceably but with ever robber purpose, crossed the Jordan."
And to this he immediately added, "As to other Arabs, the
position is not different in essence, of course.,,25
Brandeis of the thirties was thrilled when he learned that
Palestinian Jews were "good fighters," and he loved retelling
stories about settlers who managed to defend their villages
heroically against Arab attackers. Again, survivalism, though
still somewhat tinted with the old Puritan colors, became a
major theme. 26
British policies in Palestine also worked to realign Bran-
deis's original Zionist ideas. In March 1930 the Report of the
Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August 1929
was published, ushering in a new era in relations between
the Zionist movement and the Mandate government. The re-
port cast doubt on the ability of the Zionist movement to settle
more Jews in Palestine without dispossessing Arabs. Whereas
direct blame for the riots was attributed to the Arabs, the
committee found "mitigating circumstances" in the conduct
of the Jews. In the months after the publication of the report,
the British government policy became increasingly hostile to-
ward the emergent National Home, and immigration quotas
were curtailed to the point of actual suspension. In October
1930 the Passfield White Paper was published, sanctioning
anti-Zionist policies. Brandeis was very active in the partly
successful effort to repeal this policy. The whole experience,
however, was somewhat traumatic for him. The British could
no longer be counted on as the bearers of the Anglo-Saxon
ethos. For him this was not merely a case of a change of
policies but "a betrayal"; England ignored both legal com-
mitments and the rules of fair play. The civilized Anglo-Saxon
country demolished rules of the game he had sacredly be-
lieved in. Consequently, he turned "inward," to an appre-
ciation of Jewish political self-reliance and activism. 27
It was in this vein of Brandeis's growing Zionist militancy
that "his people" contributed to the revolt that deposed philo-
British Chaim Weizmann from the presidency of the World
Zionist Organization at the 1931 Zionist Congress. Maybe this
was in part a personal vendetta (in retaliation for the depo-
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sition of the Brandeisian leadership of the ZOA [Zionist Or-
ganization of America] by the pro-Weizmannites in the
Cleveland convention of 1921); but mainly it was a demon-
stration of a new line, of an evolution of Brandeis's original
Zionism. He now painfully learned that self-interest was a
basic rule of "the game of nations," England included. His
Zionism, in response, became both more worldly and more
militant. 28
In conclusion, several factors worked to revise Brandeis's
mission-oriented Zionism: nativism and anti-Semitism in the
United States; chauvinism, Nazism, and brutal anti-Semitism
in Europe; Arab Palestinian terrorism; the beginning of Brit-
ain's retreat from the Mandate. All these factors combined to
dilute the mission rationale of Brandeis's Zionism. His Zion-
ism was now seriously attuned to assuring the very existence
of the Jewish people. With the attenuation of the mission
justification, Brandeis's Zionism became somewhat somber
and more nationalistic.
Brandeis's new Zionist approach was also expressed in a
change in his policy of giving. Actually, his financial contri-
butions always reflected, and often very accurately so, the
significance he attributed to certain causes. As has been noted
elsewhere, his contributions to the Boston Jewish philan-
thropic organizations sensitively registered his growing in-
terest in Judaism and Zionism. During the twenties (when
the conflict with the Weizmannites on the method of building
Palestine was at its height), Brandeis's contributions to Pal-
estine were carefully selective and relatively modest. During
the period 1925-29, his contributions to the Zionist movement
totaled about $30,000. In a dramatic increase, he gave in 1930
alone almost $40,000. During the ensuing years, he main-
tained this extremely high level of assistance. 29 Brandeis him-
self rationalized his new approach by claiming (in the summer
of 1930) that during the last decade the Yishuv had overcome
the economic blurs of the past; he claimed that the Yishuv
was now bound toward self-reliance and was appealing to
productive people from abroad to join.3o
In other words, Brandeis rationalized that the Yishuv
passed the high Puritan test and that it therefore deserved
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lavish economic support. More than an assumed change in
the economic ways of the Yishuv, I would suggest it was the
aforementioned events and processes and the change of Bran-
deis's own attitude that brought about his dramatically greater
help. Together with his huge contributions, Brandeis very
much intensified his interest in the details of Palestine's de-
velopment. His in-depth knowledge regarding Palestine be-
came legendary and amazed even the most "inside" Pales-
tinian Jews. Revealingly, he then began to talk about the "hap-
piness" of the Zionists working in Palestine, and he found
them "achieving a degree of happiness not experienced else-
where." Undoubtedly, the psychological term employed and
the affirmative conclusions reflected Brandeis's own eager-
ness and clear inclination to uninhibitedly identify with the
enterprise in the Jewish homeland. 31
Along with the new nationalist disposition, there naturally
developed a discernment and an appreciation of the dynamic
forces in the Yishuv. And the leading element, throughout
the twenties (and virtually until the establishment of Israel),
proved to be the labor movement with its accomplishments
in the economy, settlement, and self-defense (Hagannah, the
precursor of the Israel Defense Forces, was founded and led
by the Labor movement). Already in the late twenties, Bran-
deis began to support the Histadruth, the General Federation
of Hebrew Workers in Palestine; but this was then sporadic
and largely philanthropic support. Conspicuous expressions
of Brandeis's new course came during 1930 when he entrusted
the Palestine Economic Council and the Palestine Economic
Corporation with extremely large building projects and others
connected with the cooperative movement in Palestine. He
then made arrangements to be directly and systematically up-
dated. In the summer of that year, Brandeis began to cultivate
a network of people who would be experts on the labor
economy in Palestine and who would professionally help the
advancement of the cooperative movement. He considered
the success of the Histadruth sector-in his eyes, the back-
bone of striving Jewish Palestine-crucial for the whole Zi-
onist endeavor. 32
Beginning in the mid-thirties, a political alliance emerged
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between Brandeis and the leadership of the Labor camp in
Palestine, especially David Ben-Gurion, the previously mili-
tant Histadruth leader. In a comprehensive letter (January
1934), Ben-Gurion reported to Brandeis on his recent visit to
London and his analysis of the world scene. He predicted that
both Germany and Japan were preparing for a world war.
The only feasible solution for the Jews, he wrote, was Pal-
estine; and the experience of fifty years of agricultural pio-
neering proved that the land could absorb tremendously more
Jews than the British were willing to admit. The only plan
open to the Zionists, he concluded, was to continue their work
in Palestine, creating a national home designed to absorb
masses of Jews. Brandeis responded to this document in a
decisively positive manner. "I agree entirely with the opinion
which you express, with the reasons therefor, and that we
should strive unceasingly to obtain the objective stated. I be-
lieve this is possible. So far as may be possible, I shall lend
aid." In a letter (June 1936), aimed against the anti-Ben-
Gurion criticism of some "dovish" circles, Brandeis made his
opinion known. "We have in Ben-Gurion and [Moshe] Sher-
tock [Sharett, head of the political department of the Jewish
Agency] practical leaders of great ability, men of understand-
ing, vision and wisdom rare in government. We should give
them unqualified, ardent support.,,33
A member of the Jewish Agency for Palestine's Executive
since 1933 and its chairman since 1935, Ben-Gurion increas-
ingly questioned Weizmann's traditional philo-British line.
From 1938 he came to cultivate an Anglo-American orientation
instead, relying heavily on arousing American public opinion.
Gradually, Ben-Gurion came to be Brandeis's political ally in
a Zionist alignment, loose though it was, often arrayed against
Weizmann and his followers. High points of the Brandeis-
Ben-Gurion relation came when the latter assured, in May-
June 1935, massive support of Brandeis for the development
of the strategic port of Akaba (now Elath, on the northeastern
arm of the Red Sea, at the southern end of the Negev) and
when Brandeis firmly backed Ben-Gurion's militant policy
against the forthcoming anti-Zionist British White Paper
policy in January 1939. Though during 1940-41 Brandeis did
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not always adhere to Ben-Gurion's militant course, he did
pursue a line that was much akin to that of the dynamic Pal-
estinian leader. 34
To reiterate, Brandeis's Zionist ideology of the years 1914-
29 was mission oriented, advocated cultural pluralism, and
was immersed in Puritanic ideals and images. But from about
1930, his nationalist outlook became primarily survivalist ori-
ented; it focused almost exclusively on the Palestinian scene,
and it emerged from its Puritanic vicarious nature. Symboli-
cally, beginning in the early thirties, Brandeis began for the
first time to use the Hebrew word halutz (pioneer; plural-
halutzim). This terminology, along with his avoidance of the
old philo-Yankee phraseology, reflected Brandeis's new Zi-
onist affirmation. He now wholeheartedly identified with the
embattled pilgrims of his own people.
Who were those halutzim with whom Brandeis now fully
identified? They were not chiefly good fighters. Actually, most
of them saw the war in general as a terrible evil and their
embattled situation in Palestine as tragic and imposed upon
them by external circumstances. They took pride not in mili-
tary feats, necessary as they were for their self-defense, but
rather in building. And they worked not merely to build up
a modern national economy in a desolated country but also
to create at the same time a new society. 35 Indeed, it is, there-
fore, imperative to examine Brandeis's new Zionist version
in the context of social Palestine. But before doing this, we
should return for a moment to Brandeis the Progressive. And
we should emphasize that he firmly retained his social-ethical
beliefs and idealism to the end of his life.
Brandeis was disgusted by the developments in American
society and its economy during the twenties. A central figure
in this development was the true New Englander Calvin Cool-
idge, vice-president from 1921 to 1923 and president from 1923
to 1929. In a candid letter to Frankfurter, Brandeis revealed
how "painful, distressful and depressing" it was for him to
listen to Coolidge and that he regarded this thoroughly busi-
ness-oriented president as systematically working to deprive
America of all its idealism. When he tried to recall the next
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most depressing and distressful experience of his lifetime,
wrote Brandeis, he had to go back over thirty years, when in
preparing for the Public Institutions Hearings, he had gone
to a Boston's Poor-House hospital and had passed through
the syphilitic ward. "I had a like sense of uncleanness," he
gloomily wrote to his friend. 36
With these deep feelings of aversion, it was not surprising
Brandeis looked abroad for new horizons and cleaner air. Dur-
ing the earlier period of his disenchantment with the Yankees,
he had begun a serious acquaintance with British Labor. This
time, as a result of the materialistic twenties and the depres-
sion of 1929-33, he began to be intensely interested in Den-
mark's democratic socialism. Since the early thirties, he was
eagerly learning about the Danish cooperative system and
energetically publicizing it. 37
In Brandeis's mind Palestine also held great social promise
similar to that of Denmark. Already in the Zionist Organi-
zation of America's Pittsburgh Program of 1918, of which he
was a mentor, there was a call to apply the cooperative prin-
ciple "so far as feasible in the organization of agricultural,
industrial, commercial, and financial undertakings." Ac-
tually, Jewish Palestine advanced along lines similar to the
progressive course recommended by the Pittsburgh Program;
and it developed a dynamic and socially most interesting and
diverse cooperative sector. Already in 1923 the Histadruth set
up the Cooperative Society (Hevrat Ha-Ovdim), which em-
braced all the cooperative enterprises in Palestine with the
purpose of shaping the Jewish homeland as a democratic-
cooperative society.38 It was, however, only at the end of the
twenties that this unique social endeavor was definitely ap-
preciated by Brandeis. In his aforementioned pro-Histadruth
letter of the summer of 1930 to Robert Szold, he wrote: "The
social life and strivings of the [Palestinian] Jews ... affords
abundant material for appeal to Jewish liberals-with or
without religious faith and to idealists of any race or
creed.... The aspirations and striving of the Jewish Labor
Organization, [i.e., the Histadruth] and the achievements
should appeal mightily to our progressives." Brandeis came
to support financially some cooperative enterprises. Politically
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more significant was the fact that he sustained dailies and
periodicals of mainstream labor Zionism in Hebrew, English,
and Arabic. 39
The previous section showed that Brandeis's orientation
toward the Histadruth derived in large measure from his
understanding that this was the national pioneering and most
reliable camp. To this must now be added that his interest in
the labor sector in Palestine should be interpreted in the light
of his progressivism as well.
Within labor Palestine, the kibbutz federation Ha-Shomer
Ha-Tzair pointedly enchanted Louis Brandeis. The social and
the national ideology of this youth movement was marked
by radicalism: negation of the diaspora, rejection of the es-
tablished social order, and formation of a kibbutz network in
Palestine. Alongside deep dedication to the Hebrew culture,
efforts were made to synthesize Zionism and revolutionary
socialism. The radicalism of Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair had addi-
tional distinctive features relevant to this discussion: The
movement fostered among its adherents a search for the root
of things and a demand for consistency of thought, analysis,
and action; this led to the principal obligation of the indi-
vidual-that of personal fulfillment of ideals and conclusions.
A sophisticated educational system created a pioneering at-
mosphere in Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair groups, and pedagogic
measures culminated in the obligation to make aliyah (im-
migration to Palestine) and to live in a kibbutz. The movement
was detached from the traditions of the European shtetl
(small town) perhaps more than the other kibbutz trends,
emphasized efficiency, and was noted for its "delivering-the-
goods" frame of mind. Finally, paramount emphasis was
placed in Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair upon educating the whole per-
son-moral development, building capacity for collective ac-
tion, strengthening of character, work ethic, resourcefulness,
self-discipline, and austerity. 40
The historic figure in the Brandeis-Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair
connection was Irma Lindheim, president of Hadassah from
1926 to 1928, an intimate ally of Brandeis in the American
Zionist battles, and an admirer of the radical Zionist move-
ment. In her autobiography she relates the beginning of the
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Brandeis-Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair relationship. It was about 1930
when she was in Detroit and first met a Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair
youth group. The Hadassah leader "was struck by the extra-
ordinary level of their intellect, culture and purposefulness."
And she was even more deeply impressed by their being an
antidote to the corrupted twenties and by their Puritan-like,
yet modern, qualities. "Here were young people, virile, mod-
ern, spirited, utterly immune to the allure of law-breaking
which seemed in the very air of the times, adhering with utter
naturalness to abstinence from liquor, and even from smok-
ing, which was also against their code."
It was after this visit, and similar experiences in Boston,
Montreal, and elsewhere [relates Irma Lindheim], that
I took occasion to visit Mr. Brandeis in Washington. I
wanted to discuss with him my discovery of this group
of young people who were fitting themselves for lives
according to principles which were his own.
Ever a man who admired people who lived by their
beliefs, he listened closely, a brooding yet gratified
expression in his eyes, to what I had to tell him of the
youth movement. He put searching questions....
Judge Brandeis asked if I thought it would be possible
for him to meet some of the young people themselves,
to hear from their own lips of their dreams, hopes, plans.
It struck me that he was reaching out to live vicariously
what might, had the opportunity come earlier in his life,
have become a fulfillment he could have wished for him-
self. 41
Lindheim then introduced Mordecai Bentov to Brandeis.
A member of kibbutz Mishmar Ha-Emek, a thinker and a
leader of the movement, Bentov was a Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair
delegate to the United States between 1931 and 1933. (Upon
the establishment of the State of Israel, he became its minister
of labor and reconstruction.) A spiritual rapport and warm
personal relations developed between the young, intellectual
kibbutz member and Justice Brandeis. 42
On the verge of his departure to Palestine, Mordecai Bentov
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wrote a thoughtful letter to Brandeis, summarizing their in-
teraction. In an idealistic vein, he dwelled on the values of
hard work and self-reliance that were central to the movement
he represented. This movement, he also stressed, was a ful-
filling one-ideals and professed values had to be realized
either through personal behavior or through communal effort.
Bentov's letter vividly depicted a movement that was devoted
to physical work but also pursued education and cultural life.
Finally, in a simple and dignified way, the writer expressed
his high regard for Brandeis-as a Progressive, a Zionist, and
an inspiring idealist. 43
Upon returning to his kibbutz, Bentov wrote a six-page
ideological letter to Brandeis that demonstrated again the kin-
ship that had developed between the two men. Individualism,
reflected the kibbutz theoretician, was a most cherished value
in his movement; the cooperative system, he suggested, was
both the best basis for pursuing individualism as well as the
guarantee for the development of a refined personal character.
He wrote explicitly about the "pioneer ideals and puritan mor-
als of the New Palestine," and described how the humanistic
nature of the kibbutz society enabled it to overcome the natu-
ral hardships that surrounded it. 44
There was also an interesting political-economic facet to
this letter of the Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair ideologue. While his
kibbutz movement was committed to a high work ethic and
to the principles of efficiency, the movement's development
was hampered by high interest on loans. The banks, wrote
Bentov to the author of Other People's Money, should be tamed
to serve the productive, hardworking elements of society.45
There was not much concrete political content in Bentov's
letters to Brandeis. The subject that did emerge clearly-and
undoubtedly was shared by both of them-was a firm op-
position to fascism abroad and to Revisionism at home. 46
The letter ended with a detailed account of the first Ameri-
can group that was then in Palestine preparing itself to es-
tablish a kibbutz. Bentov mentioned his "old idea of having
them [the American halutzim] settled on land adjoining Mish-
mar Ha-Emek."47 As will be shown, that idea did materialize,
and an "American" Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair kibbutz was estab-
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lished not far from Bentov's and was named after Justice Louis
D. Brandeis.
The emissary of Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair in the United States
in the late thirties was Joshua Leibner. He carried on Bentov's
educational endeavor and was, thanks to his halutzic and
puristic character, very warmly appreciated by Brandeis. It is
instructive to note that it was during the time of Leibner, who
was an educational (rather than a political) personality, that
the connection between Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair and Brandeis
was conclusively cemented. 48
Joshua Leibner was one of the founders of the IIAmerican"
kibbutz named after Brandeis. Established in 1937 on the
Menasheh Hills, it was called Ein Ha-Shofet (in Hebrew, The
Spring of the Judge). Shmuel Ben-Zvi, another founder of the
new kibbutz, served as a representative of Ha-Shomer Ha-
Tzair in America from 1940 to 1946. He met Brandeis both in
Washington and in his Chatham summer house and kept alive
Brandeis's connection with Ein Ha-Shofet and Ha-Shomer Ha-
Tzair. Brandeis himself-with love, concern, and admira-
tion-followed up and supported the development of the
pioneering communal settlement.49
When Britain published the anti-Zionist White Paper of
May 1939, Brandeis swiftly responded. He volunteered to
support the founding of another Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair kibbutz
(near Ein Ha-Shofet). "Such action might help to make them
understand where our faith lies," he wrote. Eventually, the
other kibbutz was established in 1941 and was named Ramat
Ha-Shofet (The Height of the Judge) in honor of Julian W.
Mack (earlier Brandeis's closest ally in Zionist matters). so
Significantly, Brandeis supported not just "his" kibbutz but
all the activity of the Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair movement in the
United States.S1 This and his initiative to establish another
Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair kibbutz testify to the depth and the con-
stancy of his attraction to Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair.
What qualities of Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair appealed to Bran-
deis? How far did ideology and politics play a role in this
connection?
It is not in the strictly political dimension that one should
look for an explanation of the connection between Brandeis
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and the radical kibbutz movement. The Marxist-socialist lean-
ings of Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair and the growing sympathy for
Soviet Russia and-in regard to Zionist policies-the incli-
nation to a binational solution of the Arab-Jewish conflict all
certainly ran against Brandeis's beliefs.
That world of differences, however, should not obscure
the significance of the Brandeis-Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair con-
nection. Even in the political sphere, it seems that there was
a formidable link between the Progressive-American and the
Socialist-Zionist movement, namely, a detestation for and
firm stand against Revisionism. 52 But, again, the kernel of the
connection lay beyond politics.
Irma Lindheim, who eventually joined kibbutz Mishmar
Ha-Emek, sensed that the Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair kind of pio-
neer life such as that of Joshua Leibner was for Brandeis the
ultimate realization of his ideals. Philip S. Bernstein, the noted
social-minded religious leader who was the Brandeises' neigh-
bor and frequent visitor in Cape Cod, corroborates Lindheim's
firsthand impressions. In his memoirs on Louis Brandeis, he
states, "I try to recall the individuals of whom he [Brandeis]
spoke highly"; and here he lists a few leaders in American
Jewish life and Zionism and concludes, "However, his great-
est enthusiasm was reserved for unknown young men, like
Joshua Leibner of Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair, in whom he found
the healthiest combination of American pioneer spirit, Jewish
idealism, and social vision."53 The firsthand impressions and
direct observations of Lindheim and Bernstein seem to have
much validity.
Indeed, it was the educational-ideologi~al traits of Ha-
Shomer Ha-Tzair that attracted Brandeis. It has been shown
that in the process of the intensification of his Zionism the
mission rationale attenuated significantly and that he gradu-
ally ceased to identify with the Pilgrims as his revered ances-
tors. He now needed a new group with which to identify.
This group had to be socially compassionate; had to integrate
boldly the nationalist drive into a broader social-ethical en-
deavor; had to be conspicuously idealistic, pioneering, and
of Puritan qualities; had to be far enough from the shtetl's
slovenly style to represent modernity and efficiency; and had
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to emphasize Jewish values rather than tradition. The Ha-
Shomer Ha-Tzair movement-which in great measure
exemplified these traits-came to serve as the object of
Brandeis's search for identity. It was the halutzim of kibbut-
zim such as Mishmar Ha-Emek, Ein Ha-Shofet, and Ramat
Ha-Shofet that obviously appealed to his social-ethical and
idealistic impulses and to his search for a meaningful Jewish
identity.
An interesting expression of Brandeis's progressive-
Zionism and his attraction to the Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair type
of people was his support of the American Zionist students'
organization, Avukah (Torch). Officially affiliated with the Zi-
onist Organization of America (ZOA), which subsidized its
activities, Avukah retained from its inception an ideological
orientation of labor Zionism. During the thirties, under the
leadership of people such as Zellig Harris (of the University
of Pennsylvania, president of Avukah from 1934 to the end
of the thirties) and the younger Seymour Melman (of the City
College of New York and Columbia University), the organi-
zation became increasingly radical. Accusations were made
that the movement was preoccupied with general American
issues rather than with Jewish ones; that it concentrated on
the American scene instead of on Palestine; and that it ad-
hered to Marxist philosophy and had procommunist leanings.
Beginning in the late thirties, the relationship between Avu-
kah and the ZOA was extremely strained. (As a result of this
conflict and America's participation in World War II-army
service claimed more and more of the Avukah membership-
Avukah's New York headquarters was permanently closed in
1943.)54
At its 1938 convention, Avukah adopted a "three-fronts"
program to which it adhered during the subsequent years.
According to Avukah's analysis, American Jewry suffered
chronically from a minority situation, was ever threatened by
fascism and anti-Semitism, and in any case did not have much
to offer to its enlightened youth. Avukah's solution was two-
fold: outward-a bold struggle for civil liberties conducted
together with antifascist and progressive forces; and inward-
a radical democratization of American jewry's communal
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structure. On the "third front"-Palestine-Avukah's Pro-
gram for American Jews hailed the Yishuv as "a progressive
society, free ... from some of the general social ills that beset
the western world." Avukah explicitly called for the Labor
Zionists to retain their leadership in the building up of Pal-
estine. Moreover, the student organization clearly implied in
its program that it was the Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair movement
that was best qualified to fulfill the vision of a new society in
the Jewish homeland. 55
Indeed, the students' organization, under Harris's lead-
ership, adopted all the major political tenets of Ha-Shomer
Ha-Tzair. Also, Avukah of the late thirties and early forties
cultivated very close practical connections as well as fast per-
sonal relations with the radical kibbutz movement. The close
relations of Avukah with Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair expanded in
both the United States and in Palestine. Kibbutz Ein Ha-Shofet
(the one named after Brandeis) served Avukah as a base for
the organization's Palestinian programs. 56
Brandeis was consistently interested in the work of Avu-
kah, supported it financially, and met regularly with the
organization's leaders and activists. Zellig Harris, a compas-
sionate Progressive-Zionist whom the justice very much ap-
preciated, visited Brandeis quite often. When Harris quit his
official positions in Avukah in 1939-40, Brandeis asked him
to be informally involved in the organization's affairs. Harris
responded affirmatively and retained his influence. Despite
repeated accusations of Avukah's ultraleftist leanings, Bran-
deis maintained his support of the organization to his last
days.57
What attracted Brandeis to the radical students' organiza-
tion and made him its constant supporter? The answer may,
to an important degree, lie in the political arena. While Ha-
Shomer Ha-Tzair was chiefly a pioneering and educational
movement, Avukah was mainly a political-ideological orga-
nization. A major feature that distinguished Avukah under
Zellig Harris's leadership was its militant anti-Revisionist
stance. Actually, the very emergence of Harris to leadership
and his whole Avukah career were characterized by his firm
attitude against Revisionism. In the summer of 1934, he de-
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voted himself to holding off the Revisionists' attempt to get
control, in ways he considered nondemocratic, of the Ameri-
can Zionist student organization. He then began systemati-
cally to learn about fascism in general and about possible
imitations in Jewish life. It was during this educational and
political process that he came in close touch with Ha-Shomer
Ha-Tzair people in the United States. The ideological and
practical alliance he then forged with the radical kibbutz
movement was thus ever imbued with a deep aversion toward
Revisionism as a Jewish sort of fascism. 58
Earlier in this essay, the strong animosity-ideological as
well as personal-that Brandeis felt in 1919 toward Vladimir
Jabotinsky, the world leader of the Revisionist movement,
was referred to. Brandeis's antagonism and contempt even
increased during the thirties. Beginning in 1933, Stephen
Wise, expressing sentiments also shared by Brandeis, became
an outspoken critic of Revisionism. He claimed the movement
was essentially fascist and alien to the democratic spirit of
Judaism and Zionism. Brandeis forcefully backed this anti-
Revisionist course. 59
Following the outbreak of World War II, Brandeis-Wise-
inspired American Zionism acutely faced the challenge of the
New Zionist Organization. Jabotinsky himself arrived in
America in March 1940. He died suddenly later in that year;
Revisionists in the United States, however, embarked on their
own militant course from 1939-40. A leading sponsor of this
trend was Be~ Hecht, the famous novelist and playwright. It
is most instructive to perceive how this advocate of Revision-
ism in America synthesized his Judaism with Americanism.
Hecht's synthesis was dramatically the opposite of Brandeis's
and helps, by comparison, to better understand not just the
latter's sympathy for a group such as Avukah but also at the
same time the essentials of Brandeisian Zionism. It is worth-
while to quote in some length from Ben Hecht's most inter-
esting autobiography.
The German mass murder of the Jews, recently begun,
had brought [in 1939] my Jewishness to the surface. I
felt no grief or vicarious pain. I felt only a violence to-
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ward the German killers, I saw the Germans as mur-
derers with red hands. Their fat necks and round,
boneless faces became the visages of beasts. Their de-
scent from humanity was as vivid in my eyes as if they
had grown four legs and a snout. . . .
The anger led me to join an organization for the first
time in my life. It was called "Fight for Freedom" and
was dedicated to bringing the U.S.A. into the war
against the Germans....
I was aware that I was doing all these things as a Jew.
My eloquence in behalf of democracy was inspired
chiefly by my Jewish anger. I had been no partisan of
democracy in my earlier years. Its sins had seemed to
me more prominent than its virtues. But now that it was
the potential enemy of the new German Police State I
was its uncarping disciple. Thus, oddly, in addition to
becoming a Jew in 1939 I became also an American-
and remained one. 60
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For Hecht, then, American values were accidental to his
Zionism; and he adopted democracy once it became useful
for his Jewish interest. Brandeis's Zionism was precisely the
opposite. He conceptualized Zionism as deeply akin to the
American ethos; and he originally adopted Zionism once he
realized it could sustain and refine his Americanism. Brandeis
the Zionist of the thirties was far different from the one of
the teens; he would not talk now about taking Palestine "by
the way" to the Kingdom of Heaven. Still, he did retain his
belief that Jewish nationalism had to attest to the best of values
shared by Judaism and Americanism. The Revisionist move-
ment, therefore, seemed to him anathema to all he cherished,
and he was fully disposed to support all kinds of democratic
groups firmly opposing that movement.
Of course, Brandeis sided with Avukah not just because
of its militant anti-Revisionist policies. He undoubtedly shared
the movement's compassionate commitment to the building
up of the Jewish homeland as a thoroughly progressive so-
ciety. On the whole, though, there is no doubt that a good
part of Brandeis's support derived from nonpolitical sources.
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He was attracted to idealistic and intelligent youth. And Avu-
kah's connections with Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair-as an educa-
tional and pioneering movement-also worked to nourish
Brandeis's attraction to the radical student organization.
All his Zionist life Brandeis was aligned with "general Zi-
onism," namely, the mainstream Zionist Organization of
America. Remembering his path to Judaism and Zionism via
American progressivism, it's not surprising that he often
leaned toward labor Zionism. In addition, Brandeis's mili-
tancy linked him to Zionist radical circles as well. Avukah and
Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair thus appealed to Brandeis the militant
Progressive.
The Ha-Shomer Ha-Tzair kibbutz movement, however, ap-
pealed also to Brandeis the American Jew. Ein Ha-Shofet and
Ramat Ha-Shofet, pioneering settlements located on Pales-
tine's Menasheh Hills, fully satisfied Brandeis's deep yearn-
ings for an ethnic identity. For him these kibbutzim not only
represented a social model of a City upon a Hill but also
offered him the happiness of sharing his brethren's good
fight.
In its last stage, Brandeis's Zionism became less conditional
upon the mission element. During this development Brandeis
synthesized his twin driving forces-contribution to the bet-
terment of society and belonging to a primordial group. He
also now identified with Zionism as a movement for assuring
the inalienable right of his people to live peacefully among
the nations. He perceived Zionism as a vital, creative move-
ment carving out its own social patterns.
Still, Brandeis never embraced Zionism the way most Eu-
ropean Zionists did. For them, Zionism was an organic move-
ment, striving to bring about a total nationalist renaissance,
religious and historical traditions included. These latter ele-
ments remained absent from Brandeis's Zionism. Instead, he
emphasized the social and ethical values he believed were the
essence of Judaism. This belief served as the nexus binding
his Zionism with Americanism. Always a proud, idealistic
American, he conceptualized a deep kinship between Jewish
and American ideals. Zionism for him was ever bound to
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achieve noble values-including freedom, justice, and the
right of man to a dignified and creative life-that he consid-
ered common to the American promise and to the Jewish
ethos.
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Brandeis and the
Progressive Movement
DAVID W. LEVY
The purpose of this essay, as is obvious from its title, is to
bring into relationship a man and a movement. How complete
a Progressive was Louis Dembitz Brandeis? Where precisely
did he "fit" into that movement? To what extent did the move-
ment echo his ideas and predispositions? To what extent did
its achievements satisfy his hopes and its failures dash them?
The assumption, of course, is that in the process of ruminating
about the relationship, both the individual and the movement
may be more clearly understood.
The central problem in such an undertaking will at once
be obvious to any historian and to any intelligent nonhistorian
who reflects upon the matter for even a moment. Brandeis
was a single individual, after all; and although, like other men,
he was capable of complexity and open to change, he is prob-
ably more notable for his steadiness, his consistency, his hav-
ing, as Professors Paul Freund and Melvin Urofsky have both
argued, an essentially unified and unfragmented mind. l We
know, by now, a great deal about him: what positions he
espoused, what he believed in, what he loved and hated. It
seems fairly safe to predict that additional information about
Brandeis will probably not lead to upsetting and entirely un-
predictable revelations. The picture of him in our scholarship
is clear, growing clearer, and not likely to be overturned. 2
It can never be the same in the case of movements. There
may have been a time in our historiography when it was
sufficiently revealing to point out that William Lloyd Garrison
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was "an abolitionist" or that Samuel Adams was "a revolu-
tionary." But with our growing understanding of social move-
ments, our growing appreciation of how complicated and
shifting all such social alliances really are, this extrapolation
from some movement to a substantial delineation of an in-
dividual who was a part of it is no longer possible. We now
find it necessary to ask what kind of an abolitionist was Gar-
rison, what sort of a revolutionary was Adams, what manner
of a progressive was Louis D. Brandeis? And if this trick of
fitting individuals into some larger movement is difficult for
any such collection of diverse persons, it is especially hard in
the case of the Progressive movement.
That social alliance was composed of men and women who
had arrived at their progressivism by traveling along a be-
wildering variety of routes. Some of them came through the
agrarian protest of the late nineteenth century. Others made
their journeys through social work, through the labor move-
ment, through politics, socialism, or the Single Tax movement
of Henry George. Many were drawn by certain shocking ex-
periences in various urban settings; some by their commit-
ments to American Protestantism. There were numerous
journalists, academics, attorneys, and businessmen. And
given this tremendous diversity of career and experience
among progressive reformers, it will not be surprising that
they came with different agendas, different political alle-
giances, different priorities and programs, different diagnoses
of the evils that troubled America, different prescriptions for
restoring the nation to good health. Nor should it be sur-
prising that the prescriptions of some of them conflicted with
the prescriptions of others.
There is no need to rehearse here the details of their de-
bates-over what to do about the trusts, over prohibition,
over women's suffrage and immigration restriction, over labor
unions and conservation and a half-dozen other matters.
Some who thought of themselves as progressives looked for-
ward boldly to a new America of fresh opportunities and
opening possibilities; others looked backward nostalgically to
a simpler, more decent and neighborly society. Some put their
faith in the people and worked for more democracy; others
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were betting on organized labor or a new political party or a
company of social scientists, technicians, and other experts.
Some thought that present evils could be cured and a better
society ushered in by ending the corrupt practices in business
and politics; others advocated far-reaching structural changes
in government. Because it was subject to such internal ten-
sions and strains, to such heated debates over fundamental
policies among individuals who undoubtedly thought of
themselves as members of the same embattled company, pro-
gressivism has eluded, far more thall most movements in our
history, precise definition. 3
"The more that historians learn," Peter Filene concluded
in a famous article of 1970, "the farther they move from con-
sensus." Filene, in fact, was so impressed by the swirling
diversity and disagreement within progressivism that he re-
jected the whole notion of there having been "a movement"
at all. 4 Historical scholarship since Filene's 1970 verdict has
not taken so extreme a position. Through the seventies and
eighties, historians of the period have tried to recognize the
diversity within progressivism while continuing to insist that
there really was, at the heart of the activity, some common
core that was sufficient to define a movement after all. Many
of these historians have tried to make sense of the movement
by dividing progressives into subgroups or factions within
the larger ferment. 5 Others-arguing that even these broad
factions cannot properly encompass the diversity within pro-
gressivism or pointing out that too many progressives partook
of beliefs and advocated courses of action that wandered
easily across the factional boundaries-have tried to suggest
other grounds for the existence of a Progressive movement.
Some have resorted to listing certain underlying principles
that united the movement, principles that were general
enough to sanction the diversity or vague enough in their
terminology (appeals to "the people" or to "efficiency" or to
"honest government") to cloak disagreements over concrete
courses of action. 6 Other historians have contended that, for
now, the most promising approach to understanding pro-
gressivism is to abandon the search for some "essence" and
to concentrate instead upon the particular elements of its ap-
102 DAVID W. LEVY
peal, the lineage of its various aspects, the individual careers
of its practitioners, the ways in which its fluctuating coalitions
came together and broke apart.
After the last two decades of spirited debate, therefore, it
seems clear that historians will continue to emphasize the
diversity of progressivism, continue to insist that, despite this
diversity, a genuine social movement of considerable impor-
tance did in fact exist, and continue to search for whatever
unifying principles they can discover. In that pursuit they will
inevitably turn frequently to the reforming career of one of
the central figures of the era, Louis D. Brandeis. Where, in
this confusion of experience, analysis, presupposition, and
program, did the Boston attorney belong?
It is clear that he had very little to do with a great many
facets of the Progressive movement. We do not see him en-
gaged in the attempt to bring about world peace, for example.
Nor does he seem to care much about the settlement-house
movement or about social work in general. He is not involved
in wiping out prostitution or in attempts to improve the public
health. He is not a worker for progressive education or for
improving the family or for bettering conditions for prisoners.
We do not find him trying to abolish child labor or to improve
urban housing or to ameliorate the condition of black Ameri-
cans. And yet some of these causes worked improvements in
the lives of millions of American citizens, and all of them can
be considered as parts of the Progressive movement.
Brandeis's interests were confined almost entirely to po-
litical and economic reform. He came to progressivism, more-
over, out of a profound unease and anxiety about the modern
world and out of a resulting wish to restore to this country
some of the characteristics and habits of an earlier and happier
time. He belonged to the party of nostalgia, and he carried
in his makeup a picture, perhaps mythical, of a past America
that was more upright, simple, and congenial. His progres-
sivism was born out of an attempt to restore that America by
combating the most troubling and intrusive of modern evils.
That Brandeis was temperamentally ill at ease with many of the
innovations of the modern world is perfectly clear. He
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avoided telephones whenever he possibly could. He hated
the automobile and much preferred to walk. (In 1927 he con-
gratulated his daughter for the "thrilling news" that his
grandson was learning to walk. "It's fortunate he is learning
now. By the time he reaches maturity the art may be among
the lost-through disuse.,,7) For those occasions when the
grandfather himself could not walk, he kept his horse and
buggy until he was forced off the streets of Washington, D.C.,
in the mid-twenties. Modern advertising was, to him, a per-
nicious vice, and he complained about it for all of his mature
life. The modern obsession with fashion repulsed him. "We
are living in an artificial age, and artificiality is ruining many
of those just starting out in life. . . . The little struggling clerk
must bedeck his wife with bizarre clothes so he can take her
out and impress upon those who behold her in all her mag-
nificence that he is making big money."s
Above all, it was this ostentation, this obsession with lux-
ury, the high and soft living of the rich (and, even worse, of
those who tried to appear rich) that appalled and depressed
him. H.L. Mencken remembered that, as a lad who hated
exercise himself, he was always profoundly surprised when
he encountered an athletic boy who "showed a capacity for
articulate speech."g In the same way, Brandeis often seemed
slightly surprised when he encountered someone raised un-
der the habits of modern luxury who turned out to be public-
spirited, honest, and high-minded. One of his best friends
was a businessman and playboy named Herbert White, whose
main talent seemed to be befriending the rich and powerful.
"Herbert is quite his old good self," Brandeis reported to his
brother Alfred. "Not visibly affected by his rich associations
(& no riches himself).... Herbert was South with [James J.]
Storrow this winter-a part of the time at a small rich-man's
club in No. Carolina (60,000 acres) and then visiting a friend
in South Carolina (30,000). Lucullus was ein Hund dagegen
[a dog by comparison]. Father would have said: 'Nichts er-
freuhliches [not very pleasant].' It is evident, you & I are relics
of a past world-which I prefer."IO
His own vacations were almost always flights from urban
civilization and modern conveniences-off to Dedham,
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Maine, the Canadian woods, or Cape Cod. He preferred dig-
nified, old hotels to modern, luxurious ones. In 1914 he wrote
to Alfred from one of the latter sort in Detroit: "At this hotel,
I was introduced to the modernist stunt of having not only
an orchestra at dinner and singers, but also dancers. Pompeii
and Alexandria are being emulated. I guess a heavy batch of
adversity wouldn't hurt American morals."ll In 1926 the
Brandeises abandoned the Washington apartment where they
had lived for more than a decade. "The 'improvements,' "
the justice wrote Julian Mack, "have at last driven us from
Stoneleigh."12 His furniture was strong and simple ("buy
nothing your grandchildren cannot use," he once advisedI3).
This distaste for much of what was new in America was
at the heart of his character, and many who commented upon
him-particularly in his old age-remarked upon the sim-
plicity of his life-style, his austerity, his hatred of luxury, his
spare diet. That was the meaning, probably, of the many
observers who compared him to an Old Testament prophet
and who thought of him that way. His personal habits and
preferences seemed like a righteous rebuke to the stupidities,
the complexities, the frills of the twentieth century.
This temperament made itself felt in his progressivism as
well as in his way of life. He looked back over American
history (like many other Progressives who hailed from the
West, from rural regions, and from small business back-
grounds and found themselves in places like Chicago, New
York, or Boston) and detected a falling away from old virtues,
the introduction into American life of harmful and dangerous
tendencies. And he set out to apply his tremendous energies,
his luminous intelligence, and his legal and political skills in
an effort to oppose them.
Brandeis was particularly distressed by three things that, he
believed, had newly entered our national life and that were
in danger of spoiling it: first, the corruption of American so-
ciety-the threat to the country caused by an excessive de-
votion to materialism and personal greed and the resultant
evaporation of the old republican virtues of community ser-
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vice, honesty, and public honor; second, the growth of enmi-
ties and tensions between the industrial classes and the
consequent breakdown of the sense of mutual respect and
community feeling that, he thought, had characterized an ear-
lier America; and third, the rapid consolidation of American
business and American government that had taken place dur-
ing the last years of the nineteenth and the first years of the
twentieth centuries.
Probably the first thing that attracted his attention and that
set his feet down the road to progressivism was the discovery
of substantial corruption in business, in government, and in
the relations between them. 14 Professor Allon Gal recounts
the story of Brandeis, at age ten, accusing the treasurer of a
Louisville debating society of loose accounting-the scoun-
drel could not properly account for forty cents. 15 He sup-
ported Grover Cleveland in 1884 largely because he thought
James G. Blaine was dishonest. And his earliest work in Bos-
ton reform circles was with the Civil Service Reform Associa-
tion, the Boston Citizenship Committee, the Massachusetts
Society for Promoting Good Citizenship, and the Election
Laws League. He was one of the moving spirits behind the
Good Government Association. 16
The story of Brandeis and William Ellis, his client, is well
known. Ellis was a liquor dealer, and in 1890 Brandeis called
him into his office, handed him a list of Massachusetts state
legislators, and asked him which could be bribed. Ellis calmly
checked the names off. Brandeis said, "Ellis, do you realize
what you are doing?" and discoursed upon the evils of bribery
until the tears ran down his client's face. 17 It was his hatred
of corrupt lobbying and legislative practices that led him to
the battle against the Boston Elevated Railway Company and
to the formation of the Public Franchise League after 1897.
Brandeis's speech to the Boot and Shoe Club in March 1903
was his fullest statement on municipal corruption, bribery,
and the unwholesome relationship between businessmen and
politicians. His solution was a simple one (so simple, in fact,
as to open him to the charge that at this stage of his reforming
career he was still unsophisticated, naive, and simplistic): "It
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is needed that public opinion be aroused, and that good, hon-
est, honorable men be drafted into service as our office hold-
ers.,,18
Brandeis never outgrew his outrage at dishonesty in high
places. The Pinchot-Ballinger conservation controversy of
1910, for example, that great crusade against Taft's Depart-
ment of the Interior for selling reserved land to the Guggen-
heim interests, the public battle that first lifted Brandeis to
national attention, will be misunderstood if it is seen as being
principally about the conservation of natural resources. Prin-
cipally, it was about public officials who had not honestly
discharged their duties and who had thereby betrayed the
people of the United States. 19 And Brandeis's bitter comments
on the accounting methods of the Lipsky Zionists in the
twenties20 or on the culprits in the Teapot Dome scandals2l
show that the boy who wanted to know what had become of
the forty cents never lost his passion for honesty in the dis-
charge of the public business or his insistence that corrupt
men be replaced by honest ones.
Even more distressing to Brandeis than the discovery of new
levels of public corruption among modern businessmen and
politicians was a second intrusion into the new industrial so-
ciety, an intrusion even more disturbing and dangerous. He
thought that he was able to fix an exact date to this new
realization on his part. In 1891 he had been asked to teach a
course on business law at the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology. While he was dutifully preparing his lectures, news
came of the bloody suppression of the Homestead strike in
Pennsylvania. His own description of what happened is a fine
account of its impact on his own views and of the extentto
which he saw the trouble as a genuine intrusion of a modern
evil upon a healthier and more peaceful America.
I think it was the affair at Homestead which first set me
to thinking seriously about the labor problem. It took
the shock of that battle, where organized capital hired
a private army to shoot at organized labor for resisting
an arbitrary cut in wages, to turn my mind definitely
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toward a searching study of the relations of labor to
industry.
I had been asked to give a course on Business Law at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and had
gone to some pains to prepare my lectures, tracing the
evolution of the common law in its relation to industry
and commerce, when one morning the newspaper car-
ried the story of the pitched battle between the Pink-
ertons on the barge and the barricaded steel workers on
the bank. I saw at once that the common law, built up
under simpler conditions of living, gave an inadequate
basis for the adjustments of the complex relations of the
modern factory system. I threw away my notes and ap-
proached my theme from new angles. Those talks at
Tech marked an epoch in my own career. 22
The realization that industrial classes were approaching
dangerously near to a state of war led Brandeis to take an
important role in that sort of progressivism that concerned
itself with industrial conditions. His work in this field can be
considered under two heads: efforts to reach accommodation
and understanding between the capitalists and the workers
and efforts to improve the condition of the workers.
In a 1904 speech, delivered before a group of employers
who had just been engaged in a bitter strike, Brandeis laid
down the principles of "industrial democracy." "Some way
must be worked out by which employers and employees, each
recognizing the proper sphere of the other, will each be free
to work for their own and for the common good, and that the
powers of the individual employee may be developed to the
utmost. To attain that end, it is essential that neither should
feel that he stands in the power-at the mercy-of the other."
For their part, employers must recognize at once and without
hesitation the right of workers to organize; for their part,
workers must behave responsibly and legally in the conduct
of their affairs. 23
Brandeis's work on behalf of better understanding between
capital and labor absorbed him for thousands of hours in the
first decade of the twentieth century. That work ranged from
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efforts to persuade businessmen, like his clients E.A. Filene
and William H. McElwain, to institute various forms of "in-
dustrial democracy," to personal arbitration of management-
labor disputes under the auspices of the National Civic
Federation, to spirited advocacy of various schemes designed
to ensure regularity of employment for the benefit of both
workers and owners. 24 No doubt his best known attempt to
bring peace between warring industrial classes was in the
famous New York garment strike of 1910. By winning the
confidence of both sides in this gigantic strike and by prompt-
ing both sides to see the advantages each had in arbitration
and cooperation (as well as by endless patience, stunning
diplomatic skill, and high imagination), Brandeis was able to
achieve a "Protocol of Peace" that restored some order to that
chaotic industry-at least for a time. 25
It should be noted that in his role as bringer of peace to
the new industrial classes, he was not, by any means, always
on the side of the workers. He debated no less a labor-hero
than Samuel Gompers, president of the AFL, for example,
taking the position that labor unions should be incorporated
and thereby held accountable for their acts. 26 He fearlessly
evangelized for scientific management, a term he invented him-
self, despite the fears and resentments of his labor allies, who
saw the invasion of efficiency experts as a threat to fair labor
conditions. 27 And when he believed that railroad owners
were entitled to higher rates, he was willing to take their part
although it was not a popular position as far as consumers,
shippers, and workers were concerned. 28
But most often Brandeis was, in fact, to be found on the
side of the workers. In 1906 he began his lifelong effort to
provide affordable life insurance to Massachusetts workers
through the state's system of savings banks. It was that re-
form, he later said, that gave him the most satisfaction of any
he ever undertook; and the reason for it was nothing less than
to free Massachusetts workers froni their bondage to the com-
mercial life insurance companies and to provide them with
that financial security without which they could never hope
to be free men and women. 29 He also gave attention to bet-
tering pension plans for workers and to combating discre-
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tionary pensions that he regarded as a new kind of peonage. 30
Finally, Brandeis used his talents as a lawyer to defend before
various state courts and before the Supreme Court progressive
laws designed to regulate the hours and wages of American
workers. 31
Louis Brandeis is no doubt best remembered as a progressive,
however, for his battles against the third dangerous intrusion
into modern American life-what he called "the curse of big-
ness." The industrial giants, created by new techniques of
management, helped along by questionable and often illegal
practices, were, for Brandeis, the great enemies of traditional
American democracy. He had always been a foe of monopoly,
of course, and one of his earliest public fights, back in the
1880s, had been against the monopoly held by the Boston
Disinfecting Company.32 But by 1910 the battle against big
business domination had become the central tenet of his pro-
gressivism. His dogged, ten-year struggle against the at-
tempts of the New York, New Haven, and Hartford Railroad
to acquire a monopoly over New England transportation, his
testimony before numberless congressional committees, his
book, Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It, the
frontal attack on the "money trust"-all indicate the ferocity
of his opposition to bigness in the economic sphere.
Before he was finished, he tried to connect bigness to all
of the other evils he and other progressive spokesmen had
detected. Bigness was the real source of the corruption of our
political life; bigness was the real cause of waste and ineffi-
ciency (the claims of the advocates of large units of production
notwithstanding); bigness was at the heart of the disrespect
for law in modern America; bigness was responsible for the
rape of our natural resources; bigness poisoned democracy at
its very source-the belief in the rough equality of the Ameri-
can people. Bigness treated its employees the worst. And its
intrusion into American economic life threatened that spirit
of adventure, invention, and initiative that accounted for so
much that was good about the national character.33 By the
time Brandeis was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1916,
he was no doubt best known in the country at large as the
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chief opponent of monopoly and the man who was advising
President Wilson about how to destroy this evil, restore com-
petition, and return America to that condition of relative eco-
nomic equality and small-unit production that had existed
before this serpent entered into the American garden.
It is worth noting that recent criticisms of Brandeis as a
progressive reformer have focused on this very characteristic,
his single-minded attempt to turn back the clock by combating
the invasion of big business. Historians who have considered
his reform career have almost universally given Brandeis high
marks for his integrity of purpose, his tactical sense and or-
ganizational skill, his courage and inventiveness. Those who
have criticized him, however, have concentrated their fire on
two aspects of his battle against the curse of bigness. First,
they have argued that his stubborn insistence that his eco-
nomic proposals were uniquely moral and that, therefore, the
positions of his foes were based entirely on selfishness and
disregard of the public good was blind and unfair. In fact,
these historians insist, Brandeis's opponents were often sim-
ply men possessed by an alternate-and more modern-view
of the economic needs of American society. And second, some
historians have argued that Brandeis's economic thought was
so hopelessly wedded to small-unit production and the de-
struction of bigness that he badly misunderstood the forces
underlying American economic life and consistently advo-
cated shortsighted and counterproductive policies.34
Brandeis's hatred of bigness included a hatred of big gov-
ernment, as is well known. The thrust of his advice to Wilson
in the campaign of 1912 was that monopoly could be con-
trolled without (as Theodore Roosevelt seemed to be arguing)
erecting a huge government bureaucracy to manage the
process. 35 Thus, Brandeis was a firm believer and an active
champion of the rights of states and localities to conduct ven-
turesome social experiments and to develop distinctive local
culture. (His generous and meticulous interest in the Uni-
versity of Louisville must be seen in the context of this desire
that American economic, social, and cultural life be decen-
tralized. 36) He insisted that states had to resist encroaching
federal authority if they wished to preserve their integrity and
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the liberty of their citizenry. Brandeis opposed centralized
government for the same reasons that he opposed consoli-
dated business-it was bound to be inefficient, it was bound
to be too powerful to accommodate itself to the democratic
process, it was bound to be open to corruption and careless
and brutal in the use of its tremendous power.
This, in brief, was Brandeis's kind of progressivism. He was
deeply disturbed by recent trends in American life because
he thought they were endangering the nation he knew. The
explosion of heavy industry seemed 'to carry with it unlimited
possibilities for blind materialism, political corruption of the
worst sort, class warfare and hatred, quite unacceptable limi-
tations on human freedom, the death of initiative and healthy
competition, the gravest threat to traditional standards of de-
mocracy itself. For him, therefore, progressivism meant the
rolling back of dangerous economic and political intruders.
In part, no doubt, he was led to this analysis-serpents of
evil entering into the garden of American happiness-by
his Kentucky boyhood, by his temperament, by the small-
businessmen clients he attracted and served so well and for
so long. But in part, it must be acknowledged, he was led
into this posture of opposition by an extremely thorough
study of American business practices, by a set of very high
standards for human behavior, and by a relentless and fear-
less conscience.
Before closing this discussion, it seems appropriate to suggest,
very briefly, two additional points-in order to redeem the
assertion, at the beginning, that putting "Brandeis" and "pro-
gressivism" into relationship might help to illuminate both
the individual and the movement. Thus, one point has to do
with him and one with progressivism.
It must not be assumed that simply because Brandeis took
his bearings by some vision of the American past that he was
closed to innovative and experimental measures. His expe-
riments, it is true, were directed toward the restoration of an
older and better time, but he was a bold and inventive re-
former. He took a little known English device, the " sliding-
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scale," and applied it to the Boston gas situation-by his plan,
adopted in 1906, dividends to stockholders were tied directly
to reductions in the price of gas charged to consumers. 37 Sav-
ings Bank Life Insurance was his idea from start to finish. The
"preferential union shop" was his way of breaking the dead-
lock between management and labor in the garment strike. 38
This flexibility enabled him to join hands with other pro-
gressives in establishing the Federal Trade Commission, the
Federal Reserve System, the Clayton Antitrust Act, and other
measures during the Wilson administration. 39
And what is to be learned about the Progressive movement
from this analysis of Brandeis's place in it? Simply that it was
always a chaotic and unplanned mingling of men and ideas,
of shifting coalitions and differing perspectives-chaotic, but
able to agree enough and come together enough and com-
promise enough to accomplish a wide variety of significant
and important reforms. As Daniel Levine wrote in 1964, "Fed-
eral regulation of corporations may appear to one man as a
method of protecting a rural way of life, to another as en-
couraging small businessmen, to still another as promoting
social justice for factory workers, to a fourth as asserting fed-
eral responsibility for national economic health, to a fifth as
forestalling more radical measures.,,40 The central fact to re-
member about Brandeis as a progressive is not that his own
private vision led him into tension with other reformers who
were each moved by their own private visions. The central
point is about how many views they held in common, how
well they were able to cooperate on certain ends (even though
moved by differing outlooks), how many particular measures
they were able to endorse and work for, shoulder to shoulder.
Louis Dembitz Brandeis was a part of this jumbled effort
of rival purposes and temporary alliances, of divergent visions
and personal agendas that combined to form the Progressive
movement. Because of his reputation, his stature, his age (a
little older than the other leading reformers), and because of
his wide range of acquaintanceship within the movement, he
was a very important part of it all. 41 He had his private views,
of course, and he held them strongly. But in his integrity of
purpose, his relative freedom from doctrinaire solutions (if
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not from a doctrinaire insistence on his diagnosis of the curse
of bigness), and his readiness to work with others-even
those who approached the problems of America in different
ways-he represented what was best about the Progressive
movement, and it is entirely fitting that he should be remem-
bered as one of its most effective and important representa-
tives.
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Brandeis and the Living
Constitution
PHILIPPA STRUM
The conference at which this paper was delivered was entitled
"A Mind of One Piece,,,1 a phrase used by Felix Frankfurter
to describe Brandeis's complete and cohesive political and
judicial philosophy (and, later, the title of Melvin Urofsky's
impressive book about Brandeis). Brandeis's former law clerk
and friend Paul Freund has written that "it is hardly likely
that anyone came to the Supreme Court with a more closely
articulated set of convictions than those which Brandeis
held.,,2 Brandeis did indeed develop his beliefs before he
reached the Court. They did not change after he became a
justice, but, as Professor Mary K. Tachau stated, the convic-
tions he took to the Court changed the Constitution for all
time. One of the things he did was to emphasize its nature
as a living constitution, and it is to that topic that I should
like to address myself.
In order to do so, I propose to discuss Brandeis's view of
human nature, his view of law, his closely allied view of con-
stitutional interpretation, and, finally, his great importance to
the civil liberties and particularly the freedom of speech that
we enjoy today.
Brandeis declared to Harold Laski that human beings are
"wee things," and he wrote in one of his major decisions, "Man
is weak and his judgment is at best fallible."3 But for Brandeis,
the infinite fallibility of human beings was balanced by their
infinite educability. That ability to learn is one of the keys to
Brandeis's philosophy and his perception of human nature.
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Because human beings are fallible, their endeavors, whether
economic or political, must be kept small. And so he believed
in democracy, which he saw as the active participation in any
institutional entity-political, economic, social-of all the
people involved in it, so that no one person attempted or was
expected to playa role more extensive than that manageable
by any single human being.
Alvin Johnson once called Brandeis an "implacable demo-
crat." Dean Acheson labeled him an "incurable optimist.,,4
He was both, believing that sufficient doses of democracy
inevitably result in a good political system. He emphasized
the need of human beings for the leisure during which to
fulfill their possibilities for individual creativity. His ultimate
goal, therefore, was liberty. Everything else in his thinking
followed from that. The role of the state, the Supreme Court
included, was to create the circumstances that would enable
people to fulfill their potential. This meant maximizing their
liberty-whether by protecting their access to ideas or by pro-
tecting them from economic forces that would encroach upon
their liberty to create-by giving them adequate wages, ade-
quate leisure, and an adequate opportunity to participate in
the economic decision-making process.
Brandeis's starting point was the human being, with his
and her capabilities and limitations. Another element in his
thought, and one that illuminated his view of the law, is what
is now known as sociological jurisprudence. At the Harvard
Law School, where he studied the case method introduced
by Prof. Christopher Langdell, he learned that it is frequently
cases that establish principles of law. Langdell declared:
"Law ... consists of certain principles or doctrines....
Each of these doctrines has arrived at its present state by slow
degrees [through a series of cases].... To have such a mas-
tery of these as to be able to apply them with constant facility
and certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is
what constitutes a true lawyer."s Law, therefore, cannot be
understood as a fixed entity but rather as something that
moves, changes, and undergoes transformation. Statutes rep-
resent solutions to factual problems that have arisen at par-
ticular historical moments, so to understand statutes, it is
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necessary to understand their historical underpinnings. Law
is reflective of current social facts, of present felt necessities,
and of the legal response to them considered most appro-
priate. The role of the constitutional lawyer, in the legal
system perceived through the prism of sociological juris-
prudence, is to present the judge with the larger social facts
behind the particular felt necessity that resulted in a law and
the connection between the necessity and the law. The role
of the judge, it follows logically, is to learn from the lawyers.
(Or so Brandeis believed when he was a practicing attorney;
he carved out a more active role for judges when he himself
became one.)
The Brandeis brief, the first brief that had more pages by
far of statistics than of legal principles, was, of course, semi-
nal. It exemplified the method of explaining to a court the
facts that make a law reasonable and, therefore, bring it within
the purview of the Constitution. One of the facts of which
Brandeis was well aware was that the major work on the brief
had been done by his sister-in-law, Josephine Goldmark; and
consequently, he wanted to give her credit by taking the
highly unusual step of putting on the front page of the brief
the name not only of a woman but of a nonlawyer. He felt,
however, that the United States Supreme Court was not ready
for either but promised to put her name on the next brief they
produced together. He did, citing her as his "assistant" on
the title page of their next major brief. 6
The vision of the Constitution embodied in that brief and
in Brandeis's thinking was one that combined permanence
and change, as the basic law of the land must do. It creates
institutional and procedural imperatives, such as federalism,
separation of powers, and responsiveness to the people. The
last implies the existence both of change and of limitations
on the power of governmental institutions. The Supreme
Court was one of the institutions so affected, and Brandeis
viewed the Constitution as giving the Court a very limited
mandate. In a democracy social policy is made by legislatures,
not by judges, and the Constitution must be read as requiring
the Court to exercise judicial restraint. Brandeis laid down the
basic rules of constitutional adjudication. Judges must not
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render an opinion in the absence of a real conflict, as when
parties seeking to overturn a law agree to sue each other.
Judges must not hear a case when the matter involved is not
ripe for decision. Whenever possible, judges must decide on
statutory rather than on constitutional grounds. Supreme
Court justices must not decide the meaning of local and state
laws but accept the interpretation of the highest court of the
state. Judges must consider the consequences of their deci-
sions. If, for example, a particular decision would imply crea-
tion of a new right, judges must be aware of all possible
ramifications. When the Court was asked to validate a prop-
erty right in news dispatches, it was Brandeis who refused
to go along on the grounds that the ultimate consequence
would be the end of freedom of ideas. And most important
of all, Brandeis urged judges to interpret both the Constitution
and the cases before them on the narrowest possible grounds.
The net result was an enjoinder to judges to limit their input. 7
The logical consequences of Brandeisian judicial restraint
were the handing down of opinions upholding constitutional
laws Brandeis disliked or declaring unconstitutional laws he
considered to embody desirable social policy but to be beyond
the constitutional powers of those who enacted them. Above
all, he supported the right of state legislatures to experiment
and the duty of the Supreme Court to uphold the constitu-
tionality of their experiments. Very much the federalist, Bran-
deis was opposed to centralization of power. This was part
of his dislike and fear of bigness, which he felt would simply
get out of hand. While he nonetheless supported the doctrine
that the Constitution permits creation of the kind of federal
police power embodied in the Wagner Act, the Fair Labor
Standards Act, and the Social Security Act, he opposed both
turning amorphous areas of power over to federal officials
and the tendency of the federal government to become overly
big by assuming powers that more properly belonged to the
states. Along with Lord Acton, Brandeis believed that power
tends to corrupt and that absolute power corrupts absolutely.
Therefore, he voted against both the unilateral power of the
president to fire executive officials when a statute required
Senate agreement and the vast powers given to the president
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by the National Industrial Recovery Act. He explained his
attitude toward New Deal decisions in this way. "I have not
been against increase of federal power, but curtailment of
State's powers."B
The most important contribution of Brandeis to constitu-
tional interpretation and to keeping the Constitution a living
one was his emphasis on facts. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
and others such as Roscoe Pound were among the first to
recognize that laws changed and indeed ought to change in
response to the felt necessities of the people. But neither
Holmes nor Pound told judges how to ascertain what the felt
necessities of the people were, so that the judges would know
what alterations in constitutional interpretation were justified
by changing societal circumstances.
Sociologist David Riesman, who clerked for Brandeis and
left the law in part because he felt unable to live up to the
standard set by him, wrote that Holmes's opinions "merely
told how not to interpret the Constitution," whereas Brandeis
"has tried . . . to lay the ground work of a pattern of consti-
tutional interpretation." That was indeed Brandeis's self-
assigned task. He interpreted sociological jurisprudence as
meaning that judges had a duty to take judicial notice of facts,
and he urged them to do independent fact-gathering before
rendering judgment. In one of his more famous decisions, he
declared that the reasonableness of state regulations "can or-
dinarily be determined only by a consideration of the con-
temporary conditions, social, industrial and political, of the
community to be affected thereby. Resort to such facts is nec-
essary, among other things, in order to appreciate the evils
sought to be remedied and the possible effects of the remedy
proposed. ,,9
But appreciation of the evils that legislatures sought to
overcome did not imply the desirability of automatic accept-
ance by the Court of any and all state legislation. Brandeis
had spent most of his adult life in Massachusetts and had
fought for much of that time against the corruption that ran
rampant through the halls of the State House. He was scarcely
ready to accept a state legislature's judgment of ration-
ality-that, in fact, was why judges had to do their own fact-
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finding-but he was ready to bend over backward to allow
the states to experiment with remedies for problems he con-
sidered to be real.
Perhaps his best statement of this approach was in the case
of Jay Burns Baking Company v. Bryan, which involved a statute
regulating the size of loaves of bread sold in Nebraska. Bran-
deis's opinion included fifteen pages of information about the
baking industry, most of it in footnotes. It is with some amuse-
ment that one remembers that it was to a bench of Supreme
Court justices, not a meeting of either baking industry rep-
resentatives or social scientists, that Brandeis said he and his
brethren "had merely to acquaint ourselves with the art of
breadmaking and the usages of the trade; with the devices
by which buyers of bread are imposed upon and honest bak-
ers or dealers are subjected by their dishonest fellows to unfair
competition; with the problems which have confronted public
officials charged with the enforcement of the laws prohibiting
short weights, and with their experience in administering
those laws."IO
Occasionally, his emphasis on giving states as much leeway
as was defensible led Brandeis to differ with his fellow socio-
logical jurisprudent, Oliver Wendell Holmes. Pennsylvania
Coal v. Mahon involved a Pennsylvania act that forbade mining
of anthracite coal in a manner that would cause the subsidence
of a home. A coal company that retained mining rights under
land on which a home was subsequently built and was then
prohibited by the statute from exercising its rights sued,
charging that the act violated the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Holmes, writing for the Court,
agreed that the state had taken property without compen-
sation after having contracted to give the mining rights to the
company. Brandeis stated in dissent that state protection of
individual safety was a legitimate concern and that the law
was a reasonable way of achieving it. Brandeis summed up
what he considered to be the two justices' differences of ap-
proach when he told Frankfurter that "Holmes did not ad-
vocate [state experimentation]; he putupwithit."ll Even when
the two men came out on the same side, it was frequently for
different reasons. Truax v. Corrigan permitted state injunc-
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tions against picketing. Brandeis used fourteen pages to cite
other state laws, concluding that the injunction was not an
unreasonable way for the legislature to deal with the problem
of labor picketing. Holmes took a relatively laconic two pages
to find such injunctions not prohibited by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 12 The "originator" of sociological jurisprudence
made a purely legal argument; Brandeis looked at the facts.
The result of Brandeis's emphasis on facts was that his law
clerks found themselves spending far more time in the Library
of Congress than in the law library. They had to tell Brandeis
what was happening in the "real world." Brandeis's opinions
contain citations of studies, statistics, censuses; this was what
he meant by a democratic judiciary's being responsive to the
people and their needs. He wanted to know what nonjudges
thought. When Felix Frankfurter and James Landis began
work on their Business of the United States Supreme Court and
asked Brandeis what made the Court such a good one, Bran-
deis replied that one element was "the play of public opinion
upon the Court's performance." As a young man, he had
helped create the Harvard Law Review. While on the bench he
became the first justice to use extensive citations of law review
articles, with which he made himself familiar so as to know
what lawyers not in contact with the Court were thinking.
Magazines of opinion and newspapers were equally impor-
tant. 13
There was one area in which there was very little room for
change as far as Justice Brandeis was concerned, and that was
the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech and press.
In this, he went much further than did Holmes.
Brandeis hated the Fourteenth Amendment because the
Court had turned it into a vehicle for the striking down of
experimental economic legislation being enacted by various
states. He felt that if it had to remain in existence, the amend-
ment should be used only to ensure that state legislatures
observed procedural regularities and to protect those things
"fundamental" to a democratic system. These he listed as
"Right to Speech. Right to Education. Right to choice of
profession. "Right to locomotion."14 In Pierce v. United States,
Brandeis argued that free speech was needed to safeguard
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the "fundamental right of free men to strive for better con-
ditions through new legislation and new institutions."lS
Speech came first, but notice that education came second. It,
like speech, could be limited only in the rarest of circumstan-
ces, because without education there would be no free flow
of ideas; without education the members of democracy would
not have access to the ideas they needed in order to be able
to vote intelligently.
This was true at all times. Holmes's famous "clear and
present danger" doctrine holds that government can restrict
speech more stringently in time of war than in time of peace.
Brandeis gradually came to disagree, and his disagreement
has received too little attention. Brandeis dissented in Shaefer
v. United States, a 1920 case that was typical of the somewhat
hysterical prosecutions for sedition during World War I. After
asserting erroneously that "the constitutional right of free
speech has been declared to be the same in peace and in war,"
Brandeis went on to enunciate his own principle. "In peace
too men may differ widely as to what loyalty our country
demands and an intolerant majority swayed by passion or by
fear may be prone in the future as it has often been in the
past to stamp as disloyal opinions with which it disagrees."
He added that he found it acceptable for government to leg-
islate against espionage (although only during wartime) but
not against sedition. Sedition is no more than ideas of which
the government disapproves; the important point is that it is
ideas and so must be permitted. 16
Brandeis's comment about the right of speech being the
same in peacetime and in wartime was more than wishful
thinking (the Court in fact had never made such a declaration);
it represented his recognition that speech is never as neces-
sary as it is during war, when people are being asked to make
the supreme sacrifice for their country. Neither was he con-
vinced that the sanctity of property or the fear of violence was
sufficient to stifle speech. In the soaring paean to speech that
constitutes his concurrence in Whitney v. California, he de-
clared that even the likelihood that speech will result in "some
violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify
its suppression. There must be the probability of serious in-
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jury to the State." Note that he spoke of the "probability,"
not the possibility, of "serious injury" to the state. There must
be imminent danger of the overthrow of the state before
speech can be suppressed. Obviously, he was not advocating
waiting until people were actually marching into government
buildings carrying bombs, but neither was he convinced that
a few students demonstrating on a campus and perhaps doing
some property damage was sufficient reason to stop them.
On the contrary, he would no doubt have approved campus
activism as part of one's education in democracy, for he be-
lieved a politically inactive electorate to be the"greatest dan-
ger to freedom."17 And that is where Holmes and Brandeis
disagreed.
In 1920 the Court upheld the Minnesota law prohibiting
anything, including speech, that would interfere with military
~nlistment. Holmes concurred; Brandeis dissented, saying
that Congress had preempted the field for such laws under
the war power and that in any event the speech being pun-
ished (attacking conscription because it had not been voted
upon by the general electorate) was harmless. 18
Holmes has traditionally been considered more of a phi-
losopher, Brandeis a pragmatist. It is therefore instructive to
realize that it was Brandeis who looked deeply into the po-
litical philosophy that underlies the Constitution and found
a much greater need to protect speech and the free flow of
ideas than did Holmes. One reason for the difference between
them was that Brandeis saw speech not only as an end but
as a means. Brandeis believed in absolute truth; among his
absolute truths were beliefs in human limitations, human edu-
cability, the corrupting nature of power, the evils of bigness,
and the importance of individual dignity. Holmes, however,
saw democracy-as opposed to Social Darwinism-as em-
bodying no absolute truths and therefore could not see speech
as an end in and of itself. His famous reference to the "market-
place of ideas" was extremely utilitarian, as was his statement
that "I am so skeptical as to our knowledge about the good-
ness and badness of laws that I have no practical criterion
except what the crowd wants." Brandeis couldn't have said
that. He could recognize the difference between good and bad
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laws as well as between good and bad ideas. Their disagree-
ment lay in the implication of Holmes's position that the Con-
stitution doesn't give the Court the positive obligation to
protect the free speech of the people, as opposed to the nega-
tive duty to prevent government from interfering with speech
unnecessarily. 19
A discussion of Brandeis's constitutionalism necessarily in-
cludes the right that he had made famous long before he
joined the Court: the right to be left alone, or privacy. Brandeis
and his partner Samuel Warren's article, "The Right to Pri-
vacy," which appeared in the 1890 Harvard Law Review, was
the first American law review discussion of that key right.
And although the genesis of the article was the intrusive press
coverage that followed Warren's engagement to a member of
another prominent Boston family, the argument in it went far
beyond media reporting of private matters. 20
The article claimed that all human beings are entitled to a
certain amount of isolation and that public scrutiny, in a situa-
tion deserving of privacy, constitutes an assault on dignity.
It was, of course, intrusion by the press that was Brandeis's
and Warren's immediate concern.
But Brandeis considered intrusions upon privacy by the
government even more serious because they endangered de-
mocracy. Privacy-whether of the individual or of the
group-is necessary to the creation, development, and com-
munication of ideas. His concurrence in Whitney included the
statement: "Those who won our independence believed that
the final end of the State was to make men free to develop
their faculties.... They believed freedom to think as you will
and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth." Speech has value in
a democratic political system only if it follows or encourages
thought. Added to Brandeis's insistence that "public discus-
sion is a political duty," this means that the privacy vital to
thought is a constitutional necessity, implicit in the First
Amendment. 21
It is implicit in the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth amend-
ments as well, and Brandeis emphasized its importance to the
Fourth Amendment in his dissent in the case of Olmstead v.
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United States. Outraged by a criminal conviction based on
wiretapping, Brandeis proclaimed: "The makers of our Con-
stitution undertook ... to protect Americans in their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions, and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjus-
tifiable intrusion upon the privacy of the individual, whatever
the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the
Fourth Amendment."22
For someone who emphasized speech and education as
consistently as did Brandeis, it is telling that he called privacy,
rather than speech or education, "the right most valued by
civilized men." Clearly, he assumed that both free speech and
education were dependent upon privacy, which is one of the
reasons that privacy was labeled "the most comprehensive of
rights." It protects people in their isolation, in their homes,
in their workplaces, in their interchanges with other people.
The man who said that "if we would guide by the light of
reason, we must let our minds be bold" knew that bold minds
would not remain so if government deprived them of the
privacy to consider, play with, discard, adopt, and refine
ideas, either by themselves or in concert with others. He was
unhappy that "discovery and invention have made it possible
for the Government, by means far more effective than stretch-
ing upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is
whispered in the closet. . . . The progress of science in fur-
nishing the Government with means of espionage is not likely
to stop with wire tapping. Ways may some day be developed
by which the Government, without removing papers from
secret drawers, can reproduce them in c~urt, and by which
it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate oc-
currences of the home." Brandeis asked, in horror, "Can it
be that the Constitution affords no protection against such
invasions of individual security?" It is worth noting that Bran-
deis's working folder in the Olmstead case contains a 1928
newspaper clipping, reporting on the development of some-
thing called television. Clearly, technology held perils for pri-
vacy and for democracy as well. 23
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Brandeis believed in a dynamic, changing constitution. His
was a constitutional philosophy diametrically opposed to that
of original intent, if that term signifies treating the Constitution
as a fossil rather than as a living entity. What would he say
were he to hear the late twentieth-century version of an un-
changing constitution, especially in the manifestation reject-
ing privacy as a constitutional right? His comments about
some of his colleagues less eager than he to legitimize con-
stitutional experimentation and judicial protection of indi-
vidual rights are suggestive. Brandeis described his colleague
Mahlon Pitney as "much influenced by his experience and he
has had mighty little." He thought Pierce Butler "has given
no sign of anything except a thoroughly mediocre mind." And
he despaired of Justice Joseph McKenna, "The only way of
dealing with him is to appoint guardians for him.,,24
He also said, as was noted above, "If we would guide by
the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold." It is
neither reasonable nor bold to assume that the writers of the
Constitution, who were both, meant their document to be
permanently ossified in the society of 1787. Brandeis's con-
stitutionalism was reasonable and bold, and it ensures him a
prominent place in that small pantheon of thinkers who could
see both our faults and our potential and, falling prey to nei-
ther despair nor complacency, utilize them as the building
blocks for a mode of judicial interpretation appropriate to both
a democratic political system and a changing Constitution.25
1. Every Brandeis scholar owes his or her thanks to the won-
derful people in the University of Louisville Archives who have been
so generous with their help and who, I suspect, know more about
Brandeis than any of the rest of us. Thanks are also due to many of
the other Brandeis scholars, because I discovered while writing about
Brandeis that others similarly engaged were willing to share their
material. That is sufficiently unusual in the academic world to war-
rant notice. And so for his help, I would like to thank in particular
Mel Urofsky, who, in addition to providing encouragement and sug-
gestions, has, along with David Levy, been so important to our work
and that of others by making the Brandeis letters available beyond
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MELVIN I. UROFSKY
A little over twenty years ago, I drove down to Louisville,
Kentucky, to work in the Louis D. Brandeis Papers for the
first time. My dissertation topic had just been approved by
the history faculty at Columbia, and I was eager to begin
research on the relationship between Brandeis and Woodrow
Wilson to test Arthur S. Link's description of Brandeis as "the
intellectual architect of the New Freedom."l As it turned out,
there was not enough in the manuscripts to support a doctoral
thesis,2 but the wealth of material I found in the papers con-
vinced me to find some other area in which to use them.
Little did I guess at the time that the bulk of my research
activity for the next two decades would, either directly or
indirectly, be tied to the life and career of one man. That initial
trip led me to join with David W. Levy in editing the Brandeis
Letters, 3 to various essays and articles on Brandeis as well as
an interpretive biography,4 to extensive research on American
Zionism,5 and to further work on two of Brandeis's chief lieu-
tenants, Stephen S. Wise and Felix Frankfurter. 6 I became
involved for a time in American Zionist affairs and tried to
restate the Brandeisian philosophy, an endeavor that failed
to succeed in the seventies as it had in the conflict between
American and European Zionists six decades earlier. 7 Bran-
deis's influence relit a smoldering interest in the law, so that
at age forty I entered law school and, like him, found the
study of law a great delight as well as an enormously satis-
fying intellectual challenge.
But things have changed a great deal since 1965. I am older
and, I hope, a little wiser, although my enthusiasm for the
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subject remains intense. More important are the vast changes
in the field of Brandeisian scholarship. When David Levy and
I published the first volume of the Letters in 1971, we ex-
pressed the hope that it might lead other scholars to reex-
amine various aspects of his career. 8 While we would certainly
not claim that renewed interest in Brandeis stems solely from
our work, we do know that many writers have utilized the
Letters extensively, and they have been in touch with us over
questions raised in their research. Needless to say, we have
derived much satisfaction from this.
It is not my intention to review all of the scholarly literature
on Brandeis. Rather, I would like to suggest an explanation
for this torrent of writing and why some of it often appears
so argumentative. Then I want to offer some suggestions for
research to be done, the "Brandeis agenda," if you will, in
the next twenty years.
In 1965 nearly all of the material available on Louis Brandeis
reflected the awe and devotion he had inspired in two gen-
erations of reformers. 9 Early biographers such as Jacob de
Haas10 and Alfred Lief11 were embarrassing in their adulation.
Alpheus T. Mason's semiauthorized Brandeis: A Free Man's
Life appeared in 1946 and culminated over a decade of mono-
graphic studies on particular aspects of Brandeis's career. 12
Mason was the first to have access to Brandeis's nonjudicial
papers and also interviewed the justice several times after
Brandeis had retired from the bench. Yet although Mason
raised one or two questions about Brandeis's judgment in a
few situations, there is no doubt where his sympathies lay;
he, too, saw Brandeis as larger than life.
Indeed, why not, for Louis D. Brandeis is a figure to ad-
mire, and there is an air of high drama surrounding his life
and career. A successful commercial lawyer turned urban re-
former in an age of reform; the organizer of the first people's
lobby and a successful crusader at local, state, and national
levels; a legal innovator and perhaps the greatest litigation
attorney of his day; a late convert to Zionism who reformu-
lated its premises so as to make it respectable in the United
States; and finally, crowning his career, a justice on the United
States Supreme Court where, in his twenty-three years of
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service, he firmly established his reputation as one of the
truly great justices in our history. Even those who have criti-
cized other aspects of his work and thought acknowledge his
greatness as a judge;13 his opinions and dissents continue
to be cited by contemporary courts as authoritative, an hon-
or that few of his contemporaries-even the Olympian
Holmes-now enjoy. For it was Brandeis who pointed the
way in the most important jurisprudential development of
this century, the application of the Bill of Rights to the states
by incorporating its provisions through the Fourteenth
Amendment. 14
By the late sixties, however, the liberalism that had dom-
inated American political life since the New Deal had begun
to crumble, in part because of its own excesses and in part
because of the Vietnam War. The optimism that lay at the
core of liberalism, the belief that positive government could
remedy societal evils, that social engineering could improye
men and women, and that persistent maladies such as racism
and poverty could be eradicated-all came to be viewed not
only as passe but as wrongheaded. Instead of Franklin Roo-
sevelt, Harry Truman, or John Kennedy with their calls to
make a better America, we got Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter,
and Ronald Reagan, all of whom castigated the government
and called for the reduction or even the elimination of pro-
grams that reformers had spent a half-century putting into
place.
With this sea-change in the political world came a scholarly
reexamination of the theoretical ideas and constructs that had
dominated public discourse for five decades. With a newly
invigorated defense of the free enterprise system, attention
turned to Brandeis's castigation of monopoly and his attacks
on what he termed "the curse of bigness." His condemnation
of industrial giants as subversive of political freedom, his
charge that bigness in business inevitably led to inefficiency
and corruption, and his call for a return to a small-unit, highly
competitive market had been applauded by reformers since
the early years of this century, and for many liberals big busi-
ness constituted the greatest threat to American democracy.
But many scholars now asked whether these views made any
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economic sense, not only in the seventies, but even at the
time Brandeis had first put them forward. 15
The revision began with Richard Abrams's examination of
the New Haven-Boston & Maine merger fight. 16 The stan-
dard view explicated by Mason in both the biography and a
separate monograph portrayed Brandeis as opposing J.P.
Morgan's grab for power on behalf of a duped citizenry. I?
The citizenry had to have been duped, for otherwise, Mason
could not account for the large number of responsible and
supposedly hardheaded businessmen who opposed Brandeis
and supported the merger. Abrams made a convincing case
that New England businessmen needed a more rational and
unified transportation system in order to remain competitive
in a rapidly changing national market.
Similarly, James Penick18 has suggested that the Pinchot-
Ballinger controversy, in which, again according to the Mason
account,19 Brandeis exposed the anticonservation plots of the
Taft administration, may not have been quite so simple. In
fact, Secretary Ballinger's overall proposal for the use of public
resources made a great deal of economic sense and bore a
striking resemblance to the plans adopted a generation later
during the New Deal.
Abrams and Penick did not, it should be noted, ascribe
either evil intentions or stupidity to Brandeis; rather, they
suggested that his set of economic assumptions did not nec-
essarily correspond to the new demands of a swiftly evolving
macroeconomy. Albro Martin, on the other hand, condemned
Brandeis for his allegedly self-righteous criticism of corporate
managers whose good intentions and historical rightness
Martin took as self-evident. 2o In less vitriolic terms, Gabriel
Kolko believed Brandeis's emphasis on efficiency led him to
miss the real issue, the realignment of power. 21
A rather strange and even more ill-tempered version of the
Martin view appeared in an article in Harper's Magazine by
L.J. Davis, entitled "Other People's Money: How Justice Bran-
deis Almost Ruined the Country." It is a tendentious and
error-studded piece, which claims that after Morgan had "sin-
gle-handedly stopped the great panic of 1907, it became clear
to certain thoughtful men that the order he had produced was
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good, and that to return to the dubious blessings of capitalism
unchained was unthinkable." Unfortunately, Louis Brandeis
was not one of these "thoughtful" men, and he proceeded
to attack the great financier, according to Davis, as though
120 years of economic development had never occurred.22
The most sustained and well-reasoned attack on Brandei-
sian economics has come from Thomas McCraw, in an article
in The American Scholar and in his Pulitzer Prize-winning
Prophets of Regulation.23 McCraw correctly identifies the roots
of Brandeis's economic thought in a Jeffersonian view of so-
ciety and also, I believe correctly, notes that action rather than
philosophic consideration marked Brandeis's career before
1916. McCraw argues: "Brandeis's emphasis on the 'curse of
bigness' proved to be an illogical principle on which to base
realistic remedies for the ills of modern life.... Certainly it
is of little help in shaping economic policy. In the case of
business organizations, bigness is indeed a curse for some
industries (leather, apparel, food service); but for others (steel,
oil, automobiles), it represents not only a virtue but an inevi-
tability."24 Research in all disciplines, according to McCraw,
as well as historical experience in all democratic market coun-
tries, proves this; there is a cluster of industries across a scale,
and all efforts to move industries away from their natural
cluster, to make small business large or large business small,
have had little success.
I am prepared to concede a number of economic points to
McCraw and the others who argue about the inevitability of
bigness in certain sectors of the economy, as well as to agree
that size in and of itself is not the sole criterion we should
use in judging either the economic or the social utility of in-
dustry. This, I should add, is hardly a radical or a treacherous
statement; Walter Lippmann, Harold Laski, and Adolf
Berle, all of whom admired Brandeis greatly, condemned his
economic thought as wrongheaded or, in Laski's elegant
words, as "a nobly romantic anachronism."25
But Brandeis himself never claimed to be an economist and,
aside from his perhaps overexaggerated faith in the panacea
of efficiency, never proposed any economic guidelines for
business control or development. Rather, we should view
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Brandeis's strictures against bigness in moral terms; further,
we must view them not in the light of contemporary economic
thought but in the context in which Brandeis himself worked
and wrote, America in the age of industrialization.26
The debate over the rightness or wrongness of Brandeis's
economic views is largely irrelevant in assessing the man, as
is the related debate over the wisdom or futility of American
antitrust policy. Brandeis responded, as did so many of the
Progressives, to the moral, social, and political strains that
the new industrial giants placed on the system. Brandeis wor-
ried about opportunity, about preserving a type of society in
which ambitious and talented persons could, through hard
work and ability, be able to make their fame and fortune. He
despaired about the ability of democracy to survive in a sys-
tem where everybody worked for large, impersonal corpo-
rations with little hope of personal success or independence.
I, for one, do not believe these concerns to be irrelevant.
The terms of the debate have changed, and Brandeis certainly
did underestimate the ability of the economy to generate new
opportunities for individual enterprise. In the light of recent
headlines about corporate greed and the social irresponsibility
of large, multinational corporations, however, it would seem
that the questions Brandeis raised three-quarters of a century
ago should still be of concern. We need not accept his solu-
tions to recognize the validity of the questions; in fact, Bran-
deis made it quite clear on a number of occasions that people
had to devise their own solutions to social problems. That
was what democracy was-and is-all about.
A second area in which Brandeis has figured as a center
of controversy involves his extrajudicial activities and the al-
leged "scandals" uncovered by Bruce Allen Murphy in The
Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection. 27 My differences with Profes-
sor Murphy are well known and need not be reiterated here. 28
The book, however, as well as Nelson Dawson's more limited
study of their collaboration,29 does raise legitimate questions
about the nature of the judicial role, the controlling ethics of
those who sit on our nation's highest court, and the role that
judges should or should not play in the larger political arena.
It also raises questions about the ethical obligations of law
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professors, and to some people Felix Frankfurter's role as
Brandeis's surrogate involved more complex and more dis-
turbing issues. Judges, after all, have been extrajudicially in-
volved in the political process since the founding of the
nation.
Here again, I do not wish to defend Bandeis by claiming
that because of his personal integrity we can be sure that he
did not abuse either powers of his office or the trust reposed
in him. Nor is it enough to note that the standards of judicial
conduct have changed in the last fifty years and that if Bran-
deis were alive today he would no doubt adhere to the current
strictures on judicial activity. In an essay I wrote many years
ago, I pointed out that if, in the matter of his political in-
volvement while a judge, we hold him up to his own pro-
fessed standards he falls short.3D It is regrettable, but also
somewhat reassuring, to find human traits such as fallibility
in his character.
The debate over Brandeis's economic beliefs and the in-
tegrity of his extrajudicial conduct will, I am sure, continue
to be debated so long as we continue to recognize Louis Bran-
deis as one of the important figures in the legal and political
history of modern America. But I believe there are more fruit-
ful avenues of research for scholars to pursue. Let me suggest
four areas where I think we need new, fresh approaches.
Reform: The criticism of Brandeis's economic views should
lead us to reexamine reform activity before World War I in
general, as well as his role in particular. Unlike the "good
guys/bad guys" view that permeated so much of the early
writing on progressivism, we are now beginning to under-
stand the complexities and variety of reform. Rather than talk
about a single progressivism, we acknowledge the existence
of many progressive strands, together making up an enor-
mously rich tapestry. 31
How we view that tapestry, what threads and patterns we
wish to focus upon, depends on our predilections and inter-
ests. Some of us may approach it through an interest in wom-
en's history, and Brandeis appears to have been one of the
few male reformers with extensive ties into the circle of
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women reformers such as Florence Kelly. 32 Or we may choose
to explore labor history or the reformation of governmental
process or the structural nature of business.
It has long been my view that progressivism can best be
understood through the individuals who led discrete reforms
and through those who served as "linchpins" of reform, tying
together those with relatively narrow interests into more pow-
erful coalitions.33 If there is anything that the Letters show
clearly, it is Brandeis's extensive contacts with dozens of re-
form movements and literally hundreds of people. Part of his
strength as a reformer can be traced to this network of contacts
that he created.
What we need are monographic studies of some of Bran-
deis's particular reform efforts, but viewed in broad context.
Mason's study of savings bank life insurance,34 for example,
is too narrowly focused, concentrating almost entirely on
Brandeis and ignoring a number of factors, such as the labor
union agenda, the economic and political reasons so many
savings banks proved reluctant to join the system, and the
role of other activists. Brandeis's role is heroic enough, but
he could not have done it alone; he needed and sought allies,
and the institutional structure he created served him well as
a model in later reform.
The suggestions of McCraw and others that Brandeis's eco-
nomic ideas lacked validity need to be examined not only in
the light of what we know today about economic theory and
development but also in the context of the times. More im-
portant, we need to understand what Brandeis strove for in
terms of ultimate goals. It may be too facile to summarize his
views by saying he wanted to reestablish a small-unit, com-
petitive economy to undergird a small-unit, Jeffersonian so-
ciety.
Everything we have learned about Brandeis indicates his
hardheadedness, especially about facing up to facts. He was
not emotionless; to the contrary, he cared much and cared
deeply. But as he once told his daughter Susan, she would
do well to remember that "life is hard."35 These are not the
words of a Luddite, a man who would ignore the economic
and social facts of life to chase a chimera. He also chose his
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words carefully, so we cannot and ought not to assume that
he meant something other than what he actually said. The
task is to ascertain not only what he said, which, given the
large record he left for us, is fairly simple, but also what he
intended. I have a suspicion that as we do this there may be
more to the Brandeisian vision than we have realized so far.
The suggestions made by Philippa Strum, for example, on the
impact that Alfred Zimmern's The Greek Commonwealth had on
Brandeis36 might fruitfully be followed through with an em-
phasis on the meaning of balance in one's personal life as well
as in that of the state.
Zionism: A second area that requires additional research is
Brandeis's involvement in the Zionist movement. It is difficult
to recall that in 1965 not a single historical work had been
written about American Zionism. Although the movement
occupied much of Brandeis's time and thought for the last
thirty years of his life, Mason devoted only two thin chapters
to Brandeis's involvement, and it is clear that Mason under-
stood neither the movement nor the reasons for Brandeis's
interest.
There are two aspects of Brandeis's Zionism that have re-
ceived scholarly attention, what we might call the how and
the why. I have argued that in terms of how, we can view the
Brandeisian era in American Zionism as an extension of his
reform work. 37 "Men! Money! Discipline!" became the motto
of Zionism in this country, just as it had been for savings bank
insurance, monetary overhaul, and a dozen other activities.
More important, the Brandeisian synthesis, which rephrased
the goal of a modern Jewish homeland in Palestine in terms
of American ideas, made Zionism respectable in the United
States, not only to assimilated Jews, but to non-Jews as well.
Insofar as the how is concerned, I think the thesis has held
up pretty well. Some scholars have criticized certain points
and clarified others, but the essential argument of Brandeisian
Zionism as a variety of American progressive reform remains
valid.
The second part of the question, why Brandeis became a
Zionist, remains unanswered. In 1971 Yonathan Shapiro sug-
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gested an application of Everett Stonequist's theory of mar-
ginal man to the Brandeis group.38 By this thesis, members
of groups that are marginal to mainstream society and who
are rejected in their efforts to achieve respectability in the host
society will turn inward and take leadership roles among their
own people. Brandeis, according to Shapiro, failed to win the
status his talents should have brought him, first in Boston
and then in the country at large, because he was Jewish; as
a result of anti-Semitism, therefore, he returned to his people
and became their leader.
Shapiro, however, had very little evidence to support his
claim that Brandeis had suffered from anti-Semitism; in 1980
Allon Gal's Brandeis of Boston offered some proof that Brandeis
had, indeed, been discriminated against because of his nomi-
nal religion.39
I remain unconvinced. Even conceding Brandeis's reticence
over personal matters, there is very little in his papers, in-
cluding the recently opened cache of over two thousand per-
sonal items to his family, that could be interpreted to show
that Brandeis felt the type of suffering Shapiro claims is nec-
essary to cause the marginal person to turn inward. That
prejudice existed is undeniable, but that it was the causal factor
in leading Brandeis to Zionism is difficult for me to accept.
Even in the fight over Brandeis's confirmation to the Supreme
Court, anti-Semitism played a very minor role in the oppo-
sition, and by then Brandeis had become the established
leader of the movement in America. 40
Ben Halpern and a few others have suggested that Brandeis
had never really strayed far from a commitment to Judaism,
and they point to the Frankist background of his family.41
Even if the ritual of Judaism had been ignored in his Louisville
home (as it would be in his Boston home as well), Fredericka
and Adolph instilled in him the prophetic teachings of justice
and mercy.
Such a thesis is incapable of proof one way or the other.
The prophetic ideals of Judaism, as Brandeis often pointed
out, differed little from those of Thomas Jefferson's deistic
humanism. In her memoirs, Fredericka wrote that she had
never believed in any formal religion and had raised her chil-
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dren to appreciate the beauty of all religions without being
committed to any particular form. 42 Brandeis never denied
his Jewish birth, but at least before 1910 he seems to have
considered it akin to brown eyes or black hair, an accident of
birth, with no special significance.
The works of Shapiro, Gal, and Halpern must certainly be
taken into account if we are ever to discover why Brandeis
became a Zionist. Unless there still remains one more hidden
cache of letters, we will not find any new or startling reve-
lations, and we will have to fall back on his own explanation-
that in Zionism, Brandeis found the noblest ideals of the
American heritage-without dismissing this as apologetic
rhetoric.
There is, however, still much research that can be done,
on both the how and the why. Some of Brandeis's chief lieu-
tenants, such as Julian Mack, the Flexners, Abba Hillel Silver,
and Felix Frankfurter, either lack good biographies or have
had their Zionist work relegated to a secondary role. 43 We
need to know more about the interaction of the various Zionist
groups and how the imperative for Americanization affected
their Zionist ideas. Brandeis, whom his law partner once de-
scribed as more Brahmin than the Brahmins,44 must have
presented an awesome figure to the Yiddish-speaking So-
cialists of the East Side. And, of course, we do need to know
more about anti-Semitism and how-if at all-it affected
Brandeis and his associates.
The Law: Not surprisingly, much of the early scholarly litera-
ture on Brandeis dealt with his commitment to "a living law."
His 1905 speech to the Harvard Ethical Society, a talk that
greatly influenced the young Felix Frankfurter, is still consid-
ered a classic. 45 Allon Gal has drawn a good portrait of the
clientele Brandeis served in his law practice,46 and that in-
formation has given us considerable insight into other facets
of Brandeis's career and thought. There has been little analysis
of his work as a litigator, but it is clear from contemporary
accounts-especially from those whom he bested in legal
combat-that Brandeis may have been the greatest courtroom
lawyer of his time.
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From the time he took his seat on the high court in 1916,
law review writers paid close attention to his opinions and
especially to his dissents. During the reaction of the twenties,
liberals looked to him and to Holmes to sustain the liberal
viewpoint; in the thirties they relied, not always to their sat-
isfaction, on Brandeis, Benjamin Cardozo, and Harlan Fiske
Stone to justify the economic experimentation of the New
Deal. By the time he retired from the Court in 1939, even
those who had been among his bitterest critics at the time of
his nomination applauded him as one of the great jurists in
the history of the Court.
In the forties and fifties, Brandeis's reputation remained
high. The policy of judicial restraint that he and Holmes had
defended now won adherences from the Roosevelt and Tru-
man appointees, and the Court in practice abandoned review
of economic legislation.47 Brandeis's championing of the
administrative agencies48 and his call for courts to stop second-
guessing administrative findings also became widely ac-
cepted, and the courts got out of the business of reviewing
rate schedules and other commonplace bureaucratic business.
His innovative use of facts in the Muller49 brief became the
norm in litigating social issues, and the decision in Brown v.
Board of Education (1954) marks the ultimate triumph of the
Brandeis brief.5o Most important, the proposal that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment included the
protection of civil liberties developed into the doctrine of in-
corporation, and courts began playing an activist role in pro-
tecting civil rights and civil liberties, a role Brandeis had urged
upon them in the twenties.
Ironically, one area where Brandeis's jurisprudence re-
ceived less than enthusiastic applause involved a seeming
triumph, his overturn of federal common law in Erie Railroad
v. Tompkins (1938).51 Within a few years, however, courts be-
gan "interpreting" Brandeis's call for federal court deference
to state decisional rules in such a way as to effectively negate
Erie. 52
In the late sixties and early seventies, as liberalism col-
lapsed, the reputation of "liberal" judges such as Brandeis
inevitably came in for reappraisal. G. Edward White, in his
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thoughtful study of the American judicial tradition, noted that
"Brandeis was a liberal in his result orientation only to the
extent that liberalism endorsed Brandeisian social policies; he
was a liberal in methodology only to the extent that judicial
self-restraint fostered results he thought sensible. ,,53 In short,
Brandeis allowed his own prejudices to affect his judging.
When first Dawson and then Murphy "exposed" Brandeis's
extrajudicial involvements, it appeared to many that under
the black robes their hero had feet of clay.
By this time a number of writers had begun to reexamine
Brandeis's life and work and especially his contributions on
the bench. Thomas McCraw, who has been so critical of Bran-
deis as an economic reformer, nonetheless considers him "a
truly great judge," whose tenure was marked by "impar-
tiality, wisdom and judicial depth."54 David Levy argued con-
vincingly for an inescapable integrity that ran through
Brandeis's entire career.55 Alexander Bickel's brilliant analysis
of Brandeis's suppressed opinions showed how well the jus-
tice could play the political court game,56 while Bickel's
trenchant critiques of judicial activism refurbished, at least
partially, the Holmes/Brandeis/Frankfurter philosophy of ju-
dicial restraint. 57
In what is perhaps one of the most important doctrinal
developments of our time, the Supreme Court has placed its
imprimatur upon a constitutionally protected right of privacy,
an idea first proposed by Brandeis at the end of the nine-
teenth century. "The right to be let alone," he later proclaimed
in the thirties, is the greatest of all rights and "the one most
cherished by civilized man.,,58
It should not surprise us that liberal jurists such as William
O. Douglas would quote Brandeis in this area, but so have
conservatives such as Warren E. Burger.59 In the thirties Bran-
deis's warnings about the dangers of government surveil-
lance, especially through the use of modern technology, were
dismissed as farfetched by his contemporaries;6o in the eigh-
ties we know that he barely hinted at the possibilities of elec-
tronic intrusion into home and office.
For all that has been written on Brandeis the Judge, how-
ever, it may be that the best is yet to come. Brandeis gave his
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reform and Zionist papers to the University of Louisville Law
Library, but he entrusted his court records to Felix Frank-
furter, who guarded them jealously and refused to allow AI-
pheus Mason access. Frankfurter deposited the papers in the
Harvard Law School but kept them sealed. He later turned
control over to Paul Freund, one of his former pupils and a
Brandeis clerk, indicating that he expected Freund to write
the biography of their common mentor. Frankfurter also al-
lowed his own clerk, Bickel, in to study the unpublished opin-
ions.
These papers are finally available to all scholars, not only
at Harvard; but in a microfilm edition as well. 61 Bickel used
some of them in the last work he did, the volume on the
Edward Douglass White Court for the Holmes Device;62 no
doubt the authors who will write on the Taft and Hughes
courts will find much of value there as well. With this, the
last major known collection of Brandeis papers now open, we
should be able to learn a great deal about the Court and about
one of its greatest members.
Personal Life: A final area where much work remains is Bran-
deis the Man. Because he valued privacy so highly, none of
the early works included very much information on his per-
sonal affairs. The family doled out a relatively small amount
of private papers to Mason, and his daughters gave only a
marginal number of notes to the Letters project. These few,
and for the most part impersonal, items distorted our view
of Brandeis. Some people, noting that Brandeis's letters to his
wife read like law briefs, and Brandeis briefs at that, con-
cluded that the austere public personality reflected an equally
cold private nature, a conclusion that the available evidence
seemed to confirm.
Certainly, the Brandeis family lived simply and far below
the material style that his ample income could have provided.
Brandeis just had little use for the frivolous or the merely
decorative; in food, clothing, and shelter, he preferred the
simple and utilitarian. He did not like telephones or auto-
mobiles and did not even want to own property; he only
bought his summer home on Cape Cod because the owner,
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from whom he had previously rented, threatened to sell it to
someone else. Dinner at the Brandeises was simple to the
point of being spartan. Julian Mack, a lover of fine food, once
commented that when you went to the Brandeises' for dinner
you had to eat beforehand and then again afterward.
Following the death of Susan Brandeis Gilbert, her family
discovered a cache of about 2,500 letters written by Brandeis
to his wife and daughters over a fifty-year period. So far, only
one person, Lewis J. Paper, has exploited this collection,63
but it will be essential to future scholars. We now have the
material to examine a number of aspects of Brandeis's family
life and can try to extrapolate how certain events, such as the
frequent hospitalization of his wife for depression, affected
his life and career. We know very little about either Susan or
Elizabeth before they entered on their own public careers; the
Gilbert Papers give us an entirely new and quite surprising
portrait of them as girls and young women. Susan, it turns
out, had a wild romantic streak that caused her parents much
anxiety.
The Enduring Brandeis
Having much, of course, makes one want more, and this
appears true for Brandeis scholarship as well. Within the past
few years, we have seen several new biographies, each of
which makes a significant contribution to our understanding
of the man. In the next few years, we can expect to see two
more volumes of letters, one incorporating the Frankfurter
material and the other consisting of family papers, primarily
from the Gilbert collection. The ongoing debate over Bran-
deis's economic views has generated a number of pieces and
shows little sign of abating. The opening of his court papers
will facilitate the work of several people who are now engaged
in writing about his judicial career.
But all of these works are like pieces in a puzzle, and the
sum in this case is surely greater than the parts. At some
point we will have all of the pieces in place, and then Louis
Brandeis will finally get the biography that he-and we-
deserve.
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I have no doubt that the pieces and the biography will be
written, for the enduring interest in Brandeis rests on far more
than his success as a reformer or his brilliance as a judge, and
his reputation will easily withstand the carpings of economic
critics or those who think he sullied the judicial ermine.
Brandeis's appeal rests not only on what he accomplished
but on what he tried to do, namely bridging the values of a
passing era to the still vague assumptions of a new time. He
did not know all the dangers or rewards that the new era
would offer, and his critics miss the mark when they complain
that he misunderstood industrialized modern society. He
never claimed to have all the right questions. Some of these
may not be as burning as they were in his day, but the under-
lying themes are still there.
If we have won the battle to eliminate child labor and to
establish fair wages and hours, we have still not resolved the
appropriate relationship between giant corporations and their
individual workers.
If the worst abuses of monopoly have been abated by anti-
trust laws, the issue of large-scale concentration of economic
power is still with us, in the form of multinational corpora-
tions and conglomerates.
If the Supreme Court has recognized the existence of a
constitutionally protected right to privacy, the limits and na-
ture of that right are still far from clear.
Brandeis's emphasis on the link between morality and eco-
nomics, which has been derided as irrelevant and wrong-
headed, appears once again to be timely, as are his warnings
of the dire consequences that result when government offi-
cials break the law in the name of some "higher good."
With such great concern over the role of activist courts, we
may do well to look anew at his views on judicial restraint
and the limits of judicial power.
And with the relationship between American Jewry and
Israel so strained, the ideas of a collaborative kinship that he
articulated might well provide the basis for rethinking the
nature of Zionism as well as ties between Israel and the Dias-
pora.
Perhaps this is why I keep coming back to the man, to his
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life and work. On several occasions I thought I had finished,
and each time I would run across something new, a letter or
an opinion or a source I had not seen before, and suddenly
there would be a new idea, a new appreciation of what
he stood for. I am not done exploring Brandeis, but it is
a vast territory, and those of us working there welcome com-
pany.
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